History Studies: University of Limerick History Society Journal Vol (1) by University of Limerick History Society

•History Studies
University of Limerick
History Society
Journal,
Volume I 1999
The University of Limerick History Society would
acknowledge the generous support of our sponsors:
like to [ditonl Edward Horgan
Dr. Roger G.H. DO\\ner, President, University of Limerick
University of Limerick Foundation
Professor Colin TO\\nseod, Dean, College of Humanities,
University of Limerick
Professor Nicholas Rees, Head, Depanmcnt of Govemment and Society,
University of Limerick
University of Limerick Students' Union
O'Mahooy's Bookshop
&...-nadettc Whclan
Advisor)' Board
John Logan . P3<b'aig Lc:nihan
Department ofGo"cmll~t~ SocIety
Univ....-sity of Limenck
BistorJ Society Committee 1997-98
))avid A. Flcming
Auditor
Kenncth McDonagh
Committee Membtt
lbomas 0' Donovan
PilbJic Rf!lafionJ Officer
Fintan Tuohy
Conunittee Mcmbl....
Caroline Slync:
l"icr<Quditor
Ciaro Kane
&crt'tary
Ncil CalTed..--y
Couunittec Membtt
should be addressed to: The F.diIOl"S, HiJtory Studif!.J, U~i\'~ity of~~Society, Um,"cmty of Liml..'lick Students' Union. UmvCfSlty of
Limerick. Limerick, Ireland.
Hutory StJ«/ia is a refereed publication of the Uniwrsity ofLimerick History Society
and is published annually. It IS registered with the Irish International Standard Serial
Numbet- (lSSN) Ct.'!ltre at the National Libnuy of Ireland.
CO"er design by Je-nnifer McCafl'rq and Norn McGillicuddy, Limerick School of Art
and Design, Limerick Institute ofTechoology.
The co\'er incorporates the concept of past, present and future which is depicted fltStly
b)' lhe use ofthc Buddhist S)rnbol all"'. The idea is secondly rcp.-esented by three
iIlustrnti,·c heads looking in difrerent directions. They S)mbolise the searth for history
by past, pn."S\.."flt and flltl.ll"e historians.
Copyright Cl by the contributors listed herein and History Studif!3, 1999, including all
bibliographical references,
No ptII1 of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval S)"sl.cm, or
tnlnsnutted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocop)ing,
recording, or 0lh(..'TWisc, without the prior pennission of the Uni\"ersity ofLimcrick
History Society.
Printed by Litho Press Ltd., MidletOIl, Co. Cork.
ISSN 1393-7782 •
"
•
Russian history
Contents
Editorial
The silcnce ofthc birds: Zolhan's Holocaust
Edward Horgan
The ~thof the ot.hers: reflections on the Nazi use ofgenocide and
eugcrucs to create a Master Race
Wi/liam 0 'Brien
The Holocaust
Andreas Roth
'With burning anguish': the Vatican. the Jews and the Third D_' h.
193345 ~IC
DUI/id A. Fleming
Mothcrs of the Fatherland: women and Natiooal Social' 'GeIsm IQ nnan)'
Janet Power
Corinthian or Philistine?: a history of modem sport
Jack Anderson
A troubled relationship: the influence of the West on
IVi/lianl Sexton
Who fears to speak" cha ' ,
.. ngmg patterns of remembenng 'Ninety-Eight
Maura Cronin
Yugoslavia: the first two thousand )'ears
Gerard Downes
The road to Kosovo: thc Balkan wars 1991-8
Edwnrd f10rgnn
Advcrtisements
Contributors
ii
8
21
31
41
48
57
69
83
96
\08
113
Preface
In 1997 the History Society in !.hc Univcrsity of Limerick \\~..ls established by
faculty and students. This development revealed the healthy stalc of interest in
histol) which was soon confirmed by the high allendancc at lectures.
seminars. film showings and field trips. It is not often that onc gets the
opportunity to praise the e;\{tra<urricular activitics of undergraduate and
postgraduate studcnts but on this occasion. howC\·cr. tribute must be paid to
the Society's committee for their cndeavours to promotc history within thc
Unh-crsity of Limerick and in the local community. Thc publication of llistory
Studies marks another important landmark in the development of hiSlOl)' at
the University of Limerick.
TIlls journal contains the fruits of the latxlur of the Society's
committee and members in the academic year 1997-8. Not only did the Histol)'
Society committee organise the respective lectures and seminars at which the
cnclosed papers were delivered. but it supervised the production of this
journal. Thc collection includes papers from both students and fawl!)' alike
and covers a "ide range of topics. UlClllCS and periods. It is hoped that readers
\\ill enjoy the wealth of the knowledge and infonnation contained \\i!hin this
collection.
Dr. BcrnadeUe Whelan
Patron
History Society
Univer.>ity of Limerick
•
•
Editorial
The study of historJ is a wcll established disci line F ' .
leachers and students of history have been scrvcl '. or ~,er SIXf)' years
which has set the stand' d fi . ~Y. Irish HlSlorical Studies
1. .. aT or most professional wnllng of history in Ireland
nb7n.1 years lustonans have opted to answer new needs by publishing nC\\~
PH" Ic<U10ns such as the Irish Economic and Social l!islorv Jour I d
IstOry Ireland. . no an
Irish universities too. have a well camed '. .
historical analysis and h I I . '. reputall.oll In foslcrmg
Socie 'establish . se 0 ars up..TIle Uruversny of Limerick History
withi;;hc ~ttive:::t;n~~l~~~dcvo~~d Itself to promoting the study of history
the histor.r faculty the'S ".-., ~ a~ Ive support of Or. Bemadettc Whclan and
• OCh••., gm\ to become onc of the most active r
campus. At its foundation, members of the Historv Soc'e' •d cd gb o.ups on
P
rod'" 'J I" a opt t e Idea of
ucmg .a Journal d~ca.tcd to publishing both und~rgraduale and _
graduate nork. In cotlJunctlOn nith this members of th. post
appropriate .to publish the papers presented at their mcctin;s,Soclety thought it
Hi _ TIll,s firs~ volUl~e of ffjstory Studies contains papers presented t th~tOt)' Society. mcludlllg those delivered as part of th H I 0 e
whIch took place in November~Deccmber 1997 e 0 ocaust Forum
With the support of the history facul~' and the financial s
gene.rous ~~efactors within the University, the History Society is uppo~ of
publIsh thIS Journal and hope that it brings , b' prou toenjoyment to t e reader.
David A. Flcming
Edward Horgan
August 1999
Tbe silence of tbe birds:
Zoltan's Holocaust'
Edward Horgan
The human mind oftcn likcs to forgct the lUlpleasant and rccall the bettcr
things of life. The Holocaust is the greatest blot on tbe history of mankind.
Yet, already many are in denial or in ignorance of it and many would prefer
history and humanity to begin to forget or continue the process of forgetting.
Dcborah Lipstadt. in her book Denying the Holocaust, addresses
what she regarded as the "growing assault on truth and memory'? Many of
U10SC leading the attempts to deny the naturc, scope and C\'en the historical
facts of the Holocaust comc. predictably from right wing nco-fascist sources.
But Lipstadt also lists politicians, sueh as Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and
David Duke in the United States of America. influential writers such as David
Irving in the United Kingdom, Roben Faurisson in France and Patrick
Buwnan. the US syndicated columnist. as examples of others who supPort the
denial of the Holocaust to varying degrees.
Many years ago the prominent German historian, lbcodor Mommscn.
warned that it would be a mistake to belie,'c that reason alone was
enough to keep people from believing such falsehoods. If this were the
case, he said, then racism, anti-Semitism, and other forms of prejudice
would find no home.,3
There is also a popular misconception that the Holocaust was a once-
ofT aberration of mass insanity that is never likely to be repeated. The killing
fields of Cambodia. the 'ethnic cleansing' of Bosnia and Kosovo and the
almost incxplicable and ongoing horrors of Rwanda and Burundi. should all
serve to remind us that human suffering on a vast scale can be inflicted by
l In November 1997 the University of Limerick History Society hosted a fonnn on the
Holocanst The spcaKer on the final night of the forum was Zoltan Zinn-Collis a
survivor of Bcrgcn Belsen concentration camp who now resides in Athy, Co. Kildare.
This acwUllt is~ paltly on Zinn-Collis' ~Ultion to the fonnn and on an
interview conducted v..ith him in September 1998.'The author also met with one of
Zoltan's rescuers, Dr. Han Collis, who was part of the medical team which entered
Bergen Belscn camp shortly after its liberation in 1945.
1 Dcborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust (Jerusalem, 1993).
3 ibid., p. 25.
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humans on humans at any time. These olher instances of genocide show that
such crimes against humanity are not just a Gennan phenomenon. While Ihe
Third Reich carried oul tIle Holocaust. Ihe scale and tbe manner in which the
slaughter occurred could not have hapJX:ncd without the involvement or
complicily. deliberate or otherwise. of other European govenunenfs and
individuals. Ireland. isolated by its neutrality and its geography, bears some
guilt due 10 neglect. Ireland's wartime representative in Berlin. Ambassador
Victor Bewley, was anti-Jewish. and the Departments of External Affairs and
Justice effectively prevenled certain Irish efforts to assist with the rescue of
Jews from Germany and central Europe before, during and even uner the war.
Robcrt Briseoe. a vcteran of the Irish War of Independence and a Jewish
minister in Eamon de Valera's Fianna Fail government during fhe war ~'ears
failed 10 get a visa for emry into Ireland for his aunt who was in immediate
danger in Gennany just lx:fore the war. His son. Jac Briscoc, recalled:
I wenl through the records and discovl:red that my father had applied to
Gerry Boland, the Minisler for Justice al that time, for pcnnits. Gcrry
Doland had tuolCd him dO\\1l, saying thal he didn't want problems with
allli-Semitism and the unemploylw.:nt level was already too high as it
.,
was.
Rolx:rt Briscoc's aunt was later gassed at Ausehwitz concentration camp. Up
to onc hundred and fifty-five of his other relatives were also killed in the
Holocaust.
Denmark was one of the few countries that behaved in an honourable
manner towards Jewish people. and demonstrated what might have been and
what should have been the case in the rest of EuroJX:.
WhL"Il in the spring of 1940 Ix:rullark \\'as occupied, the J)L"'Ople resolutely
refused to enforce any discriminatory regulations ... three years later when
the Germans took OVL'T the administration of the COWltry, ... almost !lIe
whole of the inconsiderable connnunity tof Jews] \\'(.'fe ferried in all
mallnCf of flimsy craft over to Sweden.s
Robcrt Collis. an lrislunan Ulen serving in the British Annv as a
doctor. raised the broader issue of genocide brieOy when he rcco~ed a
convcrsation he had in Bergen Belsen in 1945 with a British officer. Referring
to the delicate issue of mass killings by the Russians. Collis asked: 'But what
about their concentration camps, ulCir shootings, their Belsens? Are we going
4 Mary Rose Dourly, Hidden memories: the personal recollections ofslIIvivors OI/(/
-:it1lesses [0 the Holocaust living in Ireland (Dublin, 1994), p. 13.
Cecil Roth, A history ofthe Je'K~' (Ne\\ York, 1970).
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to shut our evcs 10 all that as we did to Hitlcr's and comfort ourselvcs with
another "pea~e in our Lime" bit ofwishfulthinkingT6 .
The question can be miscd whether, It IS wrong 10 blame all
Gcnnans. p311icularly subsequent generations. for the Holocaust? Arguably,
that would be just anoUlcr manifestation of racism. In order. for calas.trophes
such as the Holocaust to happen. forces of cvil driven by e~'II. pcrsonifi.ed by
an acti"e minority. arc necessary. However, it also requires Ignorance. SIlence
and apathy by Ihe majorily. Historians havc a duty to explore an~ reveal thc
truth so that present and future generations may l~m from p3S1 mJstakeS.
Zoltan Zinn. at the age of four, was a pnsoncr at. Bergen. Belsen. He
should not havc survived. Thc Nazis took special intcrest III e~sunng that t~e
next generation of Jews would be wiped .out. It was. conSJ~er~d essentJal
ulcrcfore 10 ensure thalthe elimination of c1uldrcn was given pnonl)'..
Upon reaching the eXlernlination camps, most children w~e sent to the.lr
u<:ath ... For instance, in one Freneh rowldup, of ]cws III July 1942 Ut
which 9,000 J)L"Ople were St.""Ilt 10 Auschwitz, 4.0Cl0 of whom. were
childn..'l.I, ouly 30 IX-'Ople rdumed home after the war, none 01 lhem
children.' .)) r h
Zoltan Zinn-Collis was born in August 1940 in the footlu sot e
Tatra mountains in former Czechoslovakia. His father, Adolf Zinn, was.a
Slovakian Jew. his mother a H1Ulgarian whose family descended from thc ZIp
Gcnnans of Slovakia.8 The Zinn children were baptised into .the ~rolestant
Refonned Church of their mother. ZoHan's very earlier years, hke .lllS ~rescnt
1" . K·''''~ was uneventful and ordinary. His early memones lIIc1udeue III I uare. . h
going 10 sce Ihe film Snow Whilc and Ihe Sevcn Dwarfs at a nearby to.WII Wit
his sister Edith. Their German heritage could have saved them. Thel~ fath~r
was evemually forced into hiding because hc was a Jew, b.ut remamed. III
regular contact with his family. living TOUgh in Ule ncighbounng :ountf)'Sld~.
The local Nazi Einstazgruppen9 evcntually became aware of hIS mother s
marriage 10 a Jew. She was approached by a. Ge~an officer who came to her
house and olTered her and her family protection If she renounced her husband.
Her Aryan background could have saved the family, but only at the expense of
b Robert Collis ang Hun Iloger/.eil. Straight Oil (I'IQ,Tldon, (947), p. 89.
7 Doorly, Hidden memorie.,. pp. 35-6. \
8 Ibid., p. 23. .
9 The word Ei/lslazntppm or 'sIX-"Cial action groups' refers toN~ murder squads ~t
up by lleinrieh Himmler's SS to exterminate Jews and conunwlIsts, among others, ill
East..:rn EurolX." and Russia.
,
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~ts ~ewish f;.llher. Like many others of mixed 1l41rriage. she refused 10 do:o It
IS likely that al this point shc was not aware of thc full implications of hcr
dcf~ncc.: of h.er hu~nd. Many Jcws and others in Gcnnany and thc occupied
temtones SlI1~ be~ICVOO that Ihcy were being deported to work camps only. and
not 10 cxlenmnalJon camps. This adds more gravity to the failure of those who
were. ~warc ~f the true nature of the camps. but who failed to protest and
publlclsc thcu c.~iSlcncc. Man}' more Jews could havc been saved if they and
~ general ~ubhc ~ been more fully aware of what was going on. Some
Ume later. Zmn-Colhs falher was arrested aftcr having been betrayed 10 the
~nnans. The w~ole Zinn fam-il}' v,as then arrested and their deportation
mghtmare began m January 1945. Having survived most of the war thC}' were
betrayed in its final months.
. Zinn-Collis' recollection of the period is that the first part of the
~' was by cattle truck. and that conditions were appalling. He thinks part
of~JOU~'was by bus and he recalls that the bus went off UIC road al some
pOl~1. posslbl}' bec3usc of snow and mud. BureaucrnticaJly and coldly the
famiJ)' was arrested. separaled from its father. entrained like catUe and sent to
an un~wn ~ination. This was to be thc procedure for the annihilation of
the cn~rc J~1sh popuJation in Europe. Of course, it would have been more
conven.lcnt if the a~thorities could murder their caplh'es as they were rounded
up. ThIs was done In some cases. especially during the initial captUfC of towns
in t~c Baltic Slates. the Ukraine and Russia. Daniel Goldhagen outlines in
detail how large numbers of Jews were murdered by shooting.
A samplc of the German slaughters included 23,600 Je\\'S in Kamcnct.s-
Podolske on August 27-28, 1941; 19,000 in Minsk., di\'idcd between two
different massacres In NO\'ember 1941; 21,000 in RO\no on November 7-
8, 1941; a total of O\'et 25,000 Jews near Riga on No\'CJIlbcr 30 and
~'fnber 8-9, 1941; 10,000 to 20,000 in Kharkov in January 1942; and,
m~e larg01 single shooting massacre., more than 33,000 over two days al
Babl Yar on the outskirts of Kie\' at !he end ofSeptember 1941.10
Zinn~ollis' story was just onc person's experience. He was one of the
~cept~ollally lucky ones. though il seems incongruous to apply the tcnn
luck.y to a~y aspect of his experiences at the hands of the Nazis. When
RUSSia was mvaded in Junc 1941 huge numbers of Jcws fell into Gcnnan
hands. Thc tasks of elimination and disposal became too grctlt to achieve
through 'on-the-spot' shootings. carried out by the Eim.-tazgruppen. Dealh
camps were erected to specialise in the elimination of 'undcsirables' by
10 Daniel 10tlah Goldhugcn, /lil/er's willillg e:t:eculiOllers (London, 1997), p. 154.
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gassing. Onc of the first dcath camps was Auschwitz-Birkenau which opened
its gates in March 1942. 11 According to Robcrt Collis. Spring 1942 saw the
beginning of the deportation of Jews from Slovakia by the Gennans with the
aid of the Slovak government. By November 1942 eighty thousand out of a
total of onc-hundred thousand had been deported. TIlen followed a pause of
twO years. In November 19-W thc Gcnnans occupied tllC country and
commenced to round up thc remainder ofthc Slo\'ak Jews.12 It was this second
roundup which finally scaled the fate of the Zinn family. Zinn-Collis does not
know how or when his father died. They wcre scparatoo from him during their
joume} to Belsen and he lIC\'cr sa" him again. Robcrt Collis in his book
noted:
We heard lhat Zoltan's Illmgarian T'llOt1k.,. had died in Bclscn from
typhus, that his fa~ had bi,.,:(1 takt..n from Ra\'cnsbrud: Lager to
Sachso=nhausen from \\here be \\as T1C\"er heard of again. ~ linJe
0C0tlk.-,. had died in Belscn and a sister lJ1 Ra\'ensbnJck. I}
Zinn-Collis does not kno'.\ what his mother's name was. At the age of four. a
mother is only kn0\\11 as Mamma. The loss of family S1i11 effects him..
particularl}' on family occasions. When intcfyiewed at his home in Athy. he
spokc of his daughter" s recent wedding. He was upset by the fact. that it was
an unbalanced wedding. He waS the only representative of the Zinn family at
the wedding.
His memories of Belsen are irregular. Like most four-ycar-old boys,
his priorities were on the dail~ events in his life. 'The lack of routine at this
period in Belsen. combined with the dreadful conditions and the ever-present
reality of death all around him. Icft an indelible impression on him. To this
day be creates a personal 'security ..onc' arouod himself and he defends il,14
Zinn-Collis 1lC\'er hugs strangers and has difficulty making close fricndships.
He says that he tends to be over-protective of his own children. But in other
1\'3\'S he acted as a nonnal four-...ear-old cvcn in a concentration camp where it
maY have helped him surv1\'e. At Bclsen he gOI on with the business of ocing
a precocious four-ycar-old, which required regular doses of mischief. He
recalls getting into trouble for being regularly caught in out-of-bounds areas
!llbid., p. 157. ..
II Collis and Hogcheil, Srraighr OIl, p 77.
Il Ibid., p. 65_
14 For his visit to the Ullin.-rsity of Lml...'lick on 9 ])o:..-ecmlx.,. 1997, Zoltan had arranged
to arrive at 6 p.m. yel, he arrived in l,im(,'1ick at 3 p.m. in ordcr to (''11SUre that hc was
familiW" with his surroundings and thllt he was on lime for his mccting.
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s~Ch. as the k.itch~n, and even pluy1ng with the Als.1tian guard dogs A "-h
slgmficant factor In the survival of many 0' the hild . r:... erh • . young c ren al Belscn was
t e presence of Iwo Jewish women. Hennina and Luba who had been
transfcrrc~ from Auschwitz and who assumed tile role ofnu~ and gua d"
for the children. Zinn·Collis recalls how he and olher small cltildrc r l~ns
washed by Hcrmina and L ha Ih' n \\cred h be" u on e rare occasIOns when water was available
an hlcd,n, mg ~nt 10 run around 'to dry oir while the "conin were being
was· rom thclr clothes.
L.ibcralioD in April 1945 came too late for many at Bel TIca~p. dcslgn<:d as ~ transit camp, was, in mid 1945, overflowing w:'dea~C
d)1ng or starving pnsoncrs. '
~en th..: Russi~s n~red the eastern conC(:ntTation camps, the inmates
\\t.'TC march<..'d 011 to more wcstem camps. Bclscn, which was designed I
hold not more than ten tho d t. 0
_ usan 11 utmost capacIty, was filled and filled
aga~~ .. , ~he numbers grew a~d grew till o\,(:r sixty thousand po..'Ople were
pn-,ssed 1I1to the camp DIsease broke 0"1 l' h clb ' . ... . yp us, ysentery and
lu 'rculos~s ....:ere .the chieC all aggravated by starvation. Now the people
began to dIe, fIrst ill tens, then in hundreds, day by day. IS
TIle camp had rc.1chcd a stale of almost total anarchy Food andhad effectivel t ...__ . even water
, . ~. ru~ ou or........,n deli.ocmtely cut oIT. Doorly nOled that on thc
da} of LiberatIOn ~ne of the last thmgs which Zoltan's mother heard was the
sound of cheers gOlllg up all around hcr. ,16 She died soon after.
A fe~\' weeks aftcr Liberation, Robert Collis arrived in Belscn with a
team of mcdlcal workers and volunteers One of Ih 1H ·1 0 . esc vo untccrs was Han
Roger.r.el . a. utch law student. who later became a doctor herself and married
obert Colhs. Because Robert Collis was a paediatrician he and his t .conl~ntrat~d tllcir activities on the children, most of whom were ill \~X
~u tJplc disc.ase:>. Robert CoJlis described how he was 'captivated' b)' Zoltan
Tom the beglllnmg: "... Zsollan Zyn, who lay moaning to himself in~e was but five years old. His side made him cl)' nearly all the timea ~~;lle~~
big. brown. lovely eyes were full of pain. ,]7 Han Collis recall 201" u
words to 11 . G· s tan s firsl
. letn In ennan. whIch she translated for Robcrt Collis· 'M f: tl
IS dead. now the doctor is my father.' . y a ler
I . _ Robcrt Collis brought five of the children. for whom no living
re atlves could be traced. 10 Ireland and arranged adoption or fostering for
1$ Ib·d1.,p.49.
:~ Doo~IY,Niddell memories, p. 30.
CollJs and Hog":rL.cil, Straight Oil. p. 6 [.
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them. They ineluded Zoltan and his sister Edith. He experienced many
bureaucratic difficulties. Irish adoption laws specified that adopting parents
must be of the S.11ne religion as the children therefore Zoltan and Edith could
not be formally adopted. However. they were effectively fostered by Robcrt
eoHis. which accounts for the Collis part of Zo\tan's name. Zoltan and Edith
were sent to the Quaker school at Ne\\10wn, Waterford. He speaks very wel( of
this part of his upbringing. "To them' he says, 'I was just another snotty nosed
kid, always getting up to mischief. They were non-judgmental and they made
no fuss about me and treated me as a normal child and that was just what I
needed during that period.'
When asked if he thought happenings like the Holocaust eould be
repeated in ecntral Europe or elsewhere, Zinn-Collis replied that the world has
already witnessed othcr holocausts in Cambodia. Bosnia and Rwanda. It was
these new acts of genocide that encouraged him to speak out and inform
people of what he had witnessed. He commented on the failure by the Roman
Catholic authorities in the Vatican to condemn the Holocaust during tlle
Second World War and the continuing failure by the Vatican 10 speak out
about events in Bosnia and Kosovo. He hopes that by publicising the
Holocaust he may achieve some good.
Lessons can be learned from the Holocaust. F"irstly. lhe official,
systematic policy of the Genuan Third Rcich succeeded. The immediate result
of the Holocaust was the murder of up to six million people by the Nazis. But
an even greater loss. to the Jewish people and to humanity as a whole, was the
loss of countless generations of unborn Jews and others murdered at
Auschwil;r~ Belsen and the other death camps. This is the hidden loss of the
Holocaust. Zinn-Collis and others like him. by thcir survival. and through
their families. at least robbed the Nazis of some of their hoped for
achievement.
The JC\\ish people lost not just those millions directly murdered but
also all the subsequent gcnerJ.tions that would have descended from them.
"
"
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The death of the others
Reflections on th? Nazi use of genocide and eugenics
to create a Master Race
William 0'Drien
~c twentieth cenl~l)' has wilncSscd n~ just a high loll of individual human:if~. ~Uf also. of enUre peoples. the e.'1CnUlnalion of which is tenncd genocide
I IS a rclatlvcly DC\',' lenn coined bJ' the Jeu,;~11 Am· I .Lemk" Ii " .., cncan awver, Rafael
In. TOm the Gl'"CCJ; \\ord genos meaning people or tribe and the La .
\'Cm coedre. 10 kill. Lcmkin defined it thus: IIQ
(X,'f1eml~}' speaking. genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate~~C~lOl1of a natIOn, cxcep~ where this is accomplished by mass killing
o ~ Its members ~s a Ilatlon. It is intended rather 10 signify a (»-ordllla~ed plan of different actions anning at the destruction of the
essctlhaI foundations of life of I18hona] arno,....., wilh .L_· r
annihilatmg the I th C"'YYI"". UN; lurn 0
• • '. ~p cs em~~ves_ The objecti\'es of such a plan .....ouJd~ tho.; disintegratIon of the polJtlC81 and social iru.1ilutio,'o G'-·d.directed . th ' . '" ... ......QCI C IS
• direcagainst. c I~tl~~t group as an entity and the actions invoh"ed
are ted lIgmnst mdlVlduals, not in their individuaJ capacity but as
llK:mbern of a nalional group. I
Lcmkin'S definition of gcnocide was inIluen--' by Lh .H I h ....-u e expcnence of thc1;4~u~. t e persecution of Jews and that of other minorities from 1933 10
new l::e ermany a~d. elsewhc.re. HowC\'er, the mass killing of peoples is not a
T p nomenon. It IS a lrag.Jc COmmon fact of history. In ancient times the
ml ltary dcfeal of a people frequently meant the slaUghter of
enslavemcnt of won~n and children. More reccntl)', Western ci~~I~:~ :~
proved no morc cllJJghtcncd. The Indians of both Nonh and South A .
lhoscJ~\·e been .the clear victims of genocide from the first arrival of EII~ne.,n:conOnents. In Tasmania the ". Abo'. . --"........., nh . na ve ngmal populatIOn was IjteraJl
unled ~I of.e~S1ence by the while settler population. Indeed, ninelecnl~
~ntU1)' Impenahsm olighl have brought glory and riches 10 some major
, uropcan ~wcrs bUI tlle COS! to indigenous popuJations was appaHingly high
IQ lerms of lin~s lost. humiliation. theft of propen}' and cultural Il;..........~__.
~Ion.
I Cited in 'Beyond the 1948 C . . .. .
custom int· , Omentlon - emergmg pnnclples in genocide in
2(Aut~ I ~,lJ;~~ ~;~n:'faryla"d Joumal ofInternational Law and Trode, 17,
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However thc Holocaust slands out as uniquc. Much has been \\'finen
:md much remains to be unde~ood as thc debatc currently surrounding
Daniel Goldhagcn's HiJler's Willing erecutioners TC\·eals.~ Interpretations of
this tragedy have varied. It must be borne in mind that the Naz.is targeted
more than the Jews. They also murdcred, on a large scale, the disabled,
gypsies. insane. and those it chose to categorise as 'asocial'. black or
homosexual. None ofthesc groups can be considered in isolation as the fate of
all was ultimatcly interlinked. For far too long the fate of these other groups
has beell largely forgonen. Yel. to deny the memory of their loss is to lose
sight of the Nazj obsession with eugenics. TIle Nazis, in panicular Adolf
Hitler and Heinrich Himmler. me head of the SchulZslaffen (SS). aspired to
create a socio-biologica1 Utopia in which all weaknesses were remo"xI from
the Genoan race. Such a dream necessitated tllC exclusion of those non·
Germans and Gennans who were deemed a threat to the purity of the race or
I'olt. In this it has to be admilled they were greatly aided by those of the
German scicntific and medical establishment who produced ideas of race
similar to thc Nazis.J
To gain some understanding of Nazi theorics 011 eugenics it is
important 10 examine the ninctccnth centul')' b.1ekground to Ihis pseudo
science. During lhat period racial prejudice which had existed for ccnturies
was validated by a scientific guise. a dc\'elopmcnt not confined to Gcnnany4.
In large part. lhe cvolutionary theories of Charles Darwin conuibutcd to the
process. but ill a way of which he wouJd have disapproved. Later writers.
influenced b)' Darwin's work. characterised the processes of evolution in the
phrase.. ·the sun'ival of the fiucst' and applied those ideas to human
relationships. In pankuJar they were interested in struggles between ethnic
and national groups. In this way of thinking only certain races were seen as
wOrlhy of survival. Given the great rivalries between thc major Europc.1n
powers in thc nincteenth centu!)' such ,icws were highly pcrsuasi,'e. Many
lhinkcrs and politicians became increasingly concerned about the Q11:llity of
their particular nation. They viewed with alann certain groups \\00 were
regarded as a thrcalto the long·tenn survival of the nation. Ethnic minorities
within thc stale clearly caused them much an.xicly bUI within their own groups
'.
> \~ Dame! Jonah Goldhag...-n. IliIler'3 ...·illillg uenttioner.f: ordinary Germans al/tl the
!lollXYJUJ( (London, 1996).
J lleury Frictlltmder, rile origins ofNazi gellocide: from euthanosia to 11Ie Firml
SolutiOfI (Carolina, 1995), pp. 123-6.
~ lames Joll, Europt' shIn /870 (I..oooon. 1990), pp. 101 ·12.
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were 10 be found othcrs whose feebleness, il was feared. would ultimately
~,ro~' Ihe race.. Thc II~t lay in their blood that is in their gencs. Many
SC~CnlJSlS. reflecting the mneteenth century's obsession with catcgorising all
things. labelled these individuals in groups whose behaviour or infirmitics
mighl be explained ill this wa}'.
, Crime. for example. was not a result of povert}', but bad gencs. The
dis.'lbled were an especial cause for alarm. As competition between nations
~nc~sed it was argued b}' man}' in Gennan}' that racial degenermjon would
IIIcvltably rcsull if such indi\~dua1s were allowed 10 havc children, HiSlOf)'
was J.>UI. 10 use to suggest that certain groups had not only an inherenl
supenonty but a great nalional dcstin~,. Such groups. it was argued. triumphed
because Ih? ha~ ~ght to preserve the integrity of thcir race. Those of Ar)'an
or Gcnnamc. ong1O were scen as especially favoured. Ironicall}" in lighl of
later evcnts. I1 was a Frenelunan. Jean Arthur Gobbineau. who with his Essay
on the :4'}'an race .first ~pularised the obsession with Aryan racial origins,
Such .'1CWS wcre lugbl}' mflucntiaJ in German)' but. it must be emphasise<l
not Just there nonetheless. The attraction was to a certain e:<lent
lUldefSlandable. Three successive wars. two of which were against Austria and
France. had led to German unification in 1871. Rapid economic success soon
followed. making Genoan)' the dominant European economv on the evc of
World War O~, It i~ perhaps not too surprising then that man)' in Germany
began 10 see their nation as chosen by providence to lead mankind
Yet. imperial Genoany was a societ), riven with divisions. A modern
economy was straining within an institutional strait-jacket based on a social
SlrUCturc dominated b}' the aristocraC)' and crown. A large working class led
~ t~c Ge~\:J.n Socialjst Party (SPD) challenged both the old landed elite and
Its mdustnal allics. For somc. modernisation represented a threat to old
"alues. a fear shared by conscr"ati\'cs in Gennany and generally across
E~~pe. Many retrc1ted into a bellicose nationalism. From thc accession of
":'llham 11 to the thronc in 1888. these problems greatly increased. In order 10
distra~t public attention away from growing domestic problems the political
esta~hshrne~t began to pursuc a more aggressively nationalist poliC)' in
foreIgn affmrs,
It was ~uring ~is period of tunnoil, of dramatic social and political
change thal Hitler. I-linunler and other leading members of the N37j
mov~ment received their intellectual fonnation. Gcmmn nationalism was a
multJ-fllCClcd. pheno~l1cn~n. rabid anti·Semitism, it must be s.1id, only
appeared on lIs lunatIC fnnge but il influenced man)' nonctheless. pal1icularly
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those such as the petite bourgeob;ie who were unable to find ~ sec~re place for
themselves in the new industrial and social order. Such beliefs Ulcorporat~
much pseudo scientific ideas on race and urged Gcmla8S to e.nsure the punty
of the Volk. Widely disseminated in the popular press at the time, they se~'ed
to confinn the prejudices of individuals who found thcmseh'cs in compclJlJon
with those whom they regarded as infcrior and yet often more successful than
they were. They offered a rationale of son~ of ~hci.r plight .and in calling for
the exclusion of those who did not meet then cntena of punty offered an easy
solution. . I
Exclusion was not extennination, or at least. not yet Dame
Goldhagen has been much criticised for atLributing to Gcnnans what i1e. caI~
an eliminationiSl anti·Semitism at Ihis time.s Yct, the dC\'c1opmcnt of Hitler s
thought on this issue is problematical. Thcre is no denying his hatred of JC'"'~
as Mein KampJrrmkes abundantly clear. His anti-Semitic beliefs date ~rom his
)'CafS in Vienna between 1907 and 1913. Ha\'i~g failed .to gct ~nto the
Viennese Academy of Fine Ans. he eked OUI an eXistence doing odd jobs and
living in doss houses. Ironically. as AJan Bullock indicates, he w~ ind~ed. to
the kindness of many Jews. in particular a stall·holder who proVided him.With
much needed clothes.6 In .~"ejn Kampf he professed to have been astomshed
by anti-Semitism. seeing in the Jew a man .no ~i~erent ~rom any ~r.
HowC\·cr. in the onhOOox Jews he saw something SllIIsler, Like ~ny racIsts
before him he saw in the object of his hatred not a hwnan beLDg.. but a
stereotype. a collection of negative characterislics which he saw as a threat ~o
himself. Jews were not the only objects of his ire ho\\"C\'er. as he n\:J.de clear I.D
Afein Kampf .
My inner revulsion toward the I-Iapsburg ~tc stcmhl): grew ... I was
repelled by the conglomeration of races which the ca~1131 showed. me,
repelled by this whole miXilm': of Czechs, Poles, Hunganans, Ruthemans,
Serbs and Croats and everywhere thc etl.'1lUIl mushroom of humanity.
k ....'S and more JC\\'S. To me the giant city Sl:,.'I,.'IIlt.oJ the embodiment of
racial desecration .. _The longl.-r I lived in this city the mon: my halred
g.rew for the foreign miXiure of mc(.'S which had bcgUI~ 10 comxlc this o~d
site of Gennan culture ... For all these reasons a longmg rose stronger In
me to go at last whither my childhood secret desirl.'S and Sl.'Cret 10\'':: had
drawn me.' .. ... ...\
SGoldhageu, Hitler '.! willing executiom:r.,: pp. 23-4, 80-1, 88·9.
6Alan DuJlock, flit/er: a .~tudy in ~vrwl/IY (Londoil, 19(2), pp. 34·5.
7 AdolfHitler, Alein kampf, translated by Jamcs Murphy (London, 1%9), pp. 114-5.
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The Jews topJXXf the liS! of Hitler's demonology of inferior races. These races
as a whole wcre a threat to the racial and cultural integrity of the Gennan
Volt and were 10 be excluded as far as possible.
. . A qU~Lion frequently examined by historians, is thal of when exactly
dId Hitler. dcclde 10 eliminate the Jews. In!.he early 1920s he outlined plans to
an a~~mtan~ of his intcntion on coming 10 power to erect gallows in
MURlch s Manenplatz and to ha"e all the city's Jcws hung. a procedure whicb
~ w~Ld lhen repeat elsewhere.' Yet. sucb explicit declaralions of his final
Intcntlons wc~ rare before the outbreak of war in September 1939. To gain a
more acc.urn~c Idea of Hitlcr's think.ing before the Second World War we must
look al his VIews on eugcnics.
, During I.hc 1920s Hjtlcr sel out his vicws on race nOI only in Mein
~an~pf bUI ~Iso In anothcr shortcr book that remained unpublished in his
lIfcllm~. ThIs ·.Second.Book'. as it has been called. sets oul more clearly lhan
Mem K.amplhlS theones on race. Domestic policies he defined as 'the art of
prescmng for !he people the basis of irs power in the fonn of irs racial valllC
and ~~rs.. F~reign poliLics he described as ·the an ofsecuring for a pcoj:)le
t~ hVlng~ 11 needs at a gi,'Cn time in tenns of size and resources.' For
thiS he ~""Isa~ed ~n a~ of ~me fh'C-hundred Ihousand SQuare kilometres _
a necessity whIch. ImplIed war. In the early 1930s he Slated:
We ar~ obhgf.:d as purt of our mission of preserving the German
populatIOn. Wc shall have 10 develop a technique of depopulation. If you
~ me ....'hat I mean by depopulalion. I mean the removal of c:.'IItire racial
WULs_~ that is ....'hat I intend to cany out - that is roughly my !ask.
NatuTe IS~I ~ \le too must be l.TUCI. If I can send out the flOwer of the
~ MOon. mto the hell of war \\ithout the smallest pit)' for the
~Il.mg of precl~ ~it..rman blood, thl..'1l sw-ely 1have the right to remove
mill.lOns of an .lllfcnor race that breeds like vennin! And by rcmO\'C I
don t nccessanly mean destroy: I shall lake systematic measures to
remove or dam thcir naturul fertility. For example, I shall kct..1J their men
and women SI.:parated for years. Do you remember the fulling birth rate of
the last WID'? Why should we not do quite consciously as through 8
nwnber of years what was at that time merely the ine\itable consequence
:~.?L. Wait~ n:e p.fJ~ho~/h~c God, (New York. 1993), p. 363.
\011 ScheWlck, Katohsche Klfl:he and Nlllionalsozialischte rassenpolitik 'i K~lto.and K. Rcgpen (eds.), Kotoli.fche Kirche und Natiollalsoziali,fms (Mainz" 1980)
CIted m Martyn Ilousdcn, Resistance, resistance and COII/ormfly ill the Thirrl Reich(London, 1997), p. 12.
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of the long ....llJ1 There are many ways., systematically and comparnhvdy
painless, or at any !'8te bloodless of causing undcsirnble races 10 die out. 10
It must be always bomc in mind then that Hitler targeted the Jews and others
for genocide not simply out of racism but also as part of a grand dcsign to
improve the Aryan racial stock. Bear in mind too that Lcmkins's definition of
genocide does not mean the immediate murder of the ethnic or racial group. 11
begins first nith their e.xclusion from society and can be dc\'cloped over time
from there.
Once the Nazi party came to power in 1933 it began to cxclude those
groups and individuals deemed unworthy of inclusion in the Volk. Jews as
Scmites were seen as a separate racial group. Througb the centuries they had
stubbornly preserved their culture and as such might aspire to becomc a state
within a statc. Tmditionally too they had been seen b)' many Gemlans as a
group given to deceit and to the e.xploitaLion of thc less privilcged in society.
Prejudice and m}1h greatly coloured how they wcre viewed as a raee whether
by scientists. Nazis or ordinal)' Germans. Through intermarriage with
Germans it was maintained thcy deliberately set out to dilute those
characteristics of blond hair and blue eyes lhat set Germans apart from others.
The disabled threatened the physical integrity of the Aryan race by passing on
their infirnliLics to later generations..Asocials' wcre madc up of criminals,
prostitutcs. beggars. alcoholics and others whose behaviour was seen as a
threat. Gypsies in thcir refusal 10 accept a settled way of life and traditional
authority wcre a particular threat to authoritarian social SlJUctures that would
guarantee thc economic. political and cultural success of the race. Gennans of
mixed race. often as a result of liaisons between black French soldiers and
German women. though '"Cl)' small in number. were all too OO\·jous a
reminder of miscegenaLion. Homosexuals were despised bec.1USC they
appeared to repudiate the obligation to breed and threatened the Nazi ideal of
a Mannersfadf. a patriarchal Slate in which womcn wcre to play only a
subordill.1le role.
The N37jS mo\'ed quickly against some of these groups \\ith laws for
cornpulsor) sterilisaLion. In 1933 a law for the pfe\'enLion of 'hereditary'
sterilised diseased offspring' was intnxiuced to 'Pfe\'Cnt Iivcs unworthy of
existence'. From 1933 to 1939 throc--hundrcd and twem" thousand women. a
half per cent ot the population. were sterili§oo.ll M~t were disabled or
schizophrenic and othcrs of mixed race. In November of that yeM. a law
10 H. Ramus, Hit/er .fpeab (London, 1939), p. 140.
11 Martyt1, Resistance and confor17lily. p. 15g.
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against dangcrous 'habitual' criminals was passed. It provided for the
sterilisation of males by castration. B)' 19-W. two thousand had been castrated.
. The option of fleeing Gcrman~' was nol available to Germany's
disabled who were largely confined to institutions. 11 had long been argued by
somc medical authorities that the cost of keeping unproduet.i,'c individuals
~1lS . unjustified. Funding of state-run institutions was drasticaJl)' cut and
ulC\'ltabl~' many inmates died as standards of care dcleriorated. Worse was to
folio" OOwC\·cr. In 1938 Hitler infonned the chief ph)'sician of the Reich of
his intcntion to dispose of the disabled on the outbreak of hostilities. He W35
as good as his word. From September 1939 thousands were killed, Man)' were
taken to special hospitals and killed by special injection or somc otber means.
Nor did this remain secret. In thc localities of many of these institutions there
was pU~Ii~ knowledge of these crimes. In one southern Gennan town man)' of
these vtClJrns were greeted by groups of children who cruelly taunted them
with actions that hinted of thcir cvcntual fale. During thc war UlOse who
rcn~incd in institutions wcre denied lhe extra ralions (hal hospitals usually
receiVed. Some psychiatrists had recourse to conccntration camps to rid
thcmselves of difficult palicnls. 12
. . From the very beginning the Nazis persecuted gypsies by applying
the ~X1stJng laws with cyer increasing vigour and eventually forcing them into
specially created camps. Their desire for a wandering life was characterised as
abno~I, the result of genctic inheritance. Many were sterilised very early on
along With the other groups and were later included b)' thc Nazis in the 'final
SOlution.'. Largel)' despi.sed by sctUed peoplc throughout most of Europe: few
at that tune came to thelT defcnce.
.•Asocials' were quite simpl)' those who might fall through the net in
any SOClet)'. For all their concern with social cngineering the Nazis showed
little real insight into the problems of social dcpri\'3tion and crime _ HiUer's
ow~ c.xperiences in the doss houses of Vienna notwilllstanding. Crime W35
attnbut~by the N37is 10 a genetic predisposition in this group and could only
be eradicated b)' the c.xclusion of this group from the wider population. This
was donc by sterilisation and latcr through murder in thc camps. Thc death
toll for HiUer's lack of social imagination was high.
1'2 The most detailcd account of the Nazi campaign ofcuthanasill is Henry Friedlander's, Tht
origins ofNazi genocide: from euthanasia to the Final Solution (Carolina, 1995).
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The plight of homosc:ruals during the Third Reich was largely
ignored until the 1980s.u Criminalised b)' PaIagraph 175 of the Genoan
penal code this group was soon targeted by raids on bars. clubs and the
headquaners of homosexual rights organisations. 11lc law was a~nded after
1935 10 criminalise all sexual activity between men and the N3ZlS used the
homosexual smear to 1'CIOO\'e opponents within the army. civil scl1.'iee and the
churches. Follo\\ing a time in prison under the law - some eight months or.so
_ homose.w.als were increasingly sent to the camps whilc those charged \\1th
gross indecency were sent directly to the camps. (h'erall, during the ~ird
Rcich. somc foTty to siX!)' thousand men were sent to the camps. Lcsbl3ns
were largcly ignored because as a group they wcre less visible - onc of the .few
benign consequences of a deeply patriarchal society, The work of Rudiger
LauUDann, Professor of Sociology at the Univcrsity of Srcmcn gave the first
clear picture of their fate.'" or those sent to the camps. ~ndcr ,the a~e of
twcnly, sevcnty per cent died. Homosexuals were given t~c 'plllk mangle as a
mark of thcir supposed weakness. As a group they OCCUPied the lowest rung of
the prison ladder and were victims of abuse not only from guards but othcr
prisoncrs as well. They wcre frequcntly given thc most d.1.n~crous work.. Ln
Saschausen. a camp outside Berlin. they were put to work ID the clay Pits,
filling trolleys whieh they then drew to the surface. The camp commandant.
Rudolf Hocss thought Umt hard work would makc mcn of homosexuals. In
fact it killed mOSl of tllem, Aceidents were all too frequent as half-staryed and
exhausted prisoners collapsed. 11le death toll among homosexuals re~ins
contentious. Some commentators ha\'e claimed it was as high as onc million.
Olhers !la,·c put it as low as fifty thousand. More realistically Lau~nn
estimates it at somewhere between fi\'e thousand and fifteen thousand With ten
thousand as the moSllikcly figure,ls
It was howcver. the Jews \\ho wcre the principal targets of Hitler's
hatc and the main victims of his desire 10 create a master race. There are two
schools of thought on Hitler's attitude to thc Jews. Onc school most recently
repTCSCnted by Daniel Goldhagen is of the view that HiUer wanted to
cxtenninate the Jews as soon as possible. HowC\'er. as has been noted above.
l3 Apart from a fe~.'niographical works. for exampl~, H~illz Hl,.'gl:r·s Mo. o/tlte pink
triongle and occasional refen.'nces in other works, Iiltle IS knO\\'ll of how homosexuals
fared.
14 Rudig.:r Lautmann, (cd.) Seminar: Gescllscha/t umJ homosemualital (Frankfurt on
Main, 1977).
"tbid., p. 133.
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e:xplicit declarations ofe1iminationiSl inlenl wen:: rare before the laic 19305. II
is argued here. as others have argued. that while he wanted to get rid of Jews
completely. he bided his time and worked iniliall}' to c.xcludc them by
removing them from as many areas of Gennan life as possible.
Bolh domestic and foreign considerations stayed Hitler's hand. For
much of the 1930s Germany was in quite a weak economic position. The
Jewish community was full)' integraled into Genoan life and though il
undoubledly faced much prejudice it was much more favoured than wcre
Jewish communities elsewhere. Indeed. both the financial and organisational
help PTO\;ded by Gcnnany's Jews was vital to the success of the Zionist and
other JC\\;sh IllO\~mcnts. As a group. their contribution to German cultural.
scienlific and business life was second to none" in fact. a group vital for the
gn)l\1h of Genoan)'. The public support the Nazis enjoyed before 1933 also
tends to be overcstiloated. As late as the general election of 1928 they received
onl)' two per cent of Ihe popular vote. Their rise to power was auributable to
factors other than anti-Selnitism. Thc other minorities discussed above couJd
be. ~sil~ rcmoved for the most pan as most were lllrcady marginalised or
cnmlllahsed. Howevcr. because Jews wcre inlegrated inlo Gernlan society the
community presented HWer and the Nazis with a major prrolem.
Hitler resorted 10 terror 10 gradually exclude Jen'S and quash any
sources of opposition 10 his long·tenn racial policies. After all. the Nazis
~'q).lo.ited the best weapon avaiJable to any totalitarian regime _ the
mdivtduals need to ensure their own survival.. Few are likely to be heroic a
fad which makes tbe deeds of those prepared 10 defend justice all the ~re
remarkable. Ch'er time the Nazis terrified the Genoan population either into
indifference. or more rarely, inlo active participation in tlleir genocidal
projects. Al firs! Hhlcr moved slowly but with ghastly results - the destruction
of the civil liberties of the Jewish population. Thc faet lhat Hitler was prepared
to lake his time and manipuJatc public opinion at home and abroad was
sinistcr and speaks of a failure of will. nOl just within Genoany but also
elsewhere. If peoplc are now obsessed with the question of how much the
German clvilian population knew of genocide during the war, Lhere still
remains the question of the extent of awareness outside Genoany of Hitler's
policy of e.xclusion and lerror. The camps had )'ct 10 be filled by Lemkin's
criteria, but violence was already being waged on Jewish institutions culture
religion and indeed quality of lifc. It may be suggested that Europd's majo;
powers allowed Hitlcr 10 fully implemenl his policies even before 1939.
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The policy of cxclusion was gradual. The Nurmberg ~ws of ~935
deprived Jews of citizcnship. reducing them to the status of ~ubjOClS. In Itself
this was a major suspension of civil rights and a \'cry public gcsl~re. 1~'S
were also forbidden to marry Al)'ans or ha\'c extra·marital relallons \\1tll
them. Somc thirteen otllcr supplementary decrees gTC3tly extended Ihc scope
of the Nuremberg Laws. All were introduced before 193~. In 193~ Jews wcre
c.xc1uded from the civil service, joumaiism, radio. fanmng, teaching, theatre
and film. In 193-' thcy wcre banned from working in the st~~ exchangc.
lbough it was only in 1938 thal they were banned from practlsl~g.law and
medicine. in practise they had long been inhibited from prncllsmg such
professions. Indeed. by 1936 over half of Gennany's Jews had no regular
inoome. Daily life became intolerable as shops refused to sell food or offer
services 10 Jews. This was widel)' known throughout Europe. .
A turning point was Kristafnacht. 9·)0 November 1938 when Hitlcr.
as William Shirer noted. finally lost control of his blood lus1. '6 On that night
thousands of Jewish businesses. homes. synagogues and other property was
attacked. Many were killed or seriously injured and somc thirty thousand were
interned. Thc attacks seemed spontaneous bul were in fad orchestrated by
Rcinhard Heydrich. Hinun!er's second-in-<:ommand in the Gcst~po. He
worked through local officials to co-ordinale tl)C mayhem. Indeed. It almost
P1O\'ed counter-productive for there was much sympathy towa~ the JC\\'S and
some Nazis feared a backlash. It Dell'er happened howC\·cr. Krlstafnacht was
perhaps the last time lhat Gennans might have darc:<110 publicly ~me to the
defence of their Jewish neighbour. There was no major protest, honC\'cr. from
the public al large. The Nazis had begun to lerrify the population i~to s~lcnce.
dangling the privileged status of being AI)'aD althem. a status which. lftll(~)'
were seen to sympathise with the oppressed, might be taken from them..The
Nazis were able 10 ITC3t the Jews evcn more unjustly after t~lat mght.
Insurance compensation for damagc was confiscated and a collecllvc. fine of
one billion marks was levied 00 the Jews for supposedly causmg the
disturbances.
The policy of appeasement pursued by the major European powc~
made Hitler bolder. As they shrunk back from challenging him, his rhetonc
became more ex-uemc and his vision ofthc futqre for non-Ar)'ans ever darker.
The '[mal solution' began to be fonnulated in 1939 following the invasion of
16 Willaim Shircr. Tile riJeolldfall afthe Third Reich (London wld Nl."W York, 1964),
p.531.
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Poland. In a secret meeting, "ith top-ranking Nazi officials. Heydrich outlined
his plans to confine European Jews to ghettos in large cities prior to
'rcscnlement' in the casl - 3 term which had become a euphemism for
eXlenninalion. No document outlining the basie precepts of the 'final solution'
seems 10 have existed. It is likely that Ihe plan was passed on verbally. donll
the ehain of command. b)' HimmJer. Heydrich and Goering during the
sununer of 19~1.1'Minutes do e.xist howC\'er of a meeting in Berlin in Jamtal)'
1942 in nhich the Slrategies to be employed in dC3ling with the Jewish
question were discussed. Heydrieh prm;ded figures of the size of the Jewish
populations in all Europ;:an countries. Ireland included. He estimated a tClal
of c1C\'en million Jews on the continent: all were to be e.'Xtenninated. Hitler
and Himmler were keen to rid themselvcs of the Gennan Jews and were no
longer constrained by domestic or foreign considerations. Germany was now
under the iron control of the Nazis and aoywa,· it was 3t war. Tbosc who
~Id be used would be empl~-cd in the Ge~'war efTon and would just be
Simply worked 10 death. Extermination camps would be used to e.,'enninale
the rest. In areas io the 'east" ovemm b)' Gcnnan forces. the local JC\\ish
populalion would be simply eliminated on the spoc:.
The question of public koowltxlge in Gennaoy is a \·e.xcd onc.
Goldhagcn's 'iew that most Gennans harboured an eliminationist anti-
Scmitism is m~h loo simplistic. It has prm'oked much criticism for distorting
m~h of the C\'ldcnce. both sccoodaIy and primary. Nonetheless a great man}'
ordi~l)' Gcmtans did aeth"CIy aid the Nazis in their genocide. Many ei\ilians.
particularly transpon officials. were invoked in bringing JC\\'s and others to
the camps. Pes!al workers brought news to families that were to be ·resettled'.
Nurses and doctors e.xamined those who were transponed. An estimated four
lbousand policemen accompanied the Wehrmacht to Russia in 1942 and with
others were responsible for the death of two of the six million Jews killed
during the war. It is cenain that rumours of much that went on was circulated
widely. panicularly the Nazi campaign of euthanasia. In the Ruhr almost a
qu.."lrter of the population of the industrial centres was Slavic in origin. 18 The
humiliation and plight of this group was public knowledge. lf ordinary
Germans were guil£y of anything, it was indifference. In their desire to
survive, they chose to ignore others more vulnerable than tllemsclves. It is the
destruction of human decency that allows tOlalitarian regimes 10 thrive.
n Ibid., pp. 1146-51,
I1 Man}'n, ResistallclI and cOllfomrity, p. 157.
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What arc the lessons of the Na7i genocide? The aforementioned
Rafael Lemkin acted as advisor 10 the American prosecutors during the
Nunnberg trials. It was under the auspices of the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations that the Convemion on the prevention and
punishmenr ofthe crime ofgenocide was drawn up. Anicles two and three are
for our immediate purpose the mes! important to consider. Article two defines
the following as acts of genocide: the killing of members of a group. causing
serious bodily or mental hann to members of a group. deliberately inflicting
on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical.dcst.~~n
in whole or in pan of a group, and imposing measures to prevent births ....'1thm
a group. Article three identified punishable crimes: genocide. conspiracy to
commit genocide. attempt to commit genocide. and complicity in genocide. By
the earl)' 19705 some SC\'ent)' countries had signed the Convention. HowC\'er.
it has failed to protect the rights of many minorities in many countries.
The war crimes commined during the conflict in Bosnia in 1994.
were truly appaUing in their brutalilJ' and here the echoes of the Nazi era are
truly chilling. All the factions involved in the conflict. according to the United
Nation's commission of inquiry into Balkan genocide in 1995, established
camps. seven-hundred and ftfteen in total. While all were TeSJXlnsible for war
crimes. it was among the Bosnian Scrbs that a clear and carefully co-ordinated
poliC)' of genocide .....as to be observed. The aim \\'85 to eliminate other
religious and ethnic groups from an area. a process lhat became known as
'ethnic c1C3nsing'. a euphemism as chilling as 'final solution'. The e).-pcrience
of the camp inmates of Bosnia closely paralleled that of lhe Jews and others
during the Nazi era. Packtxl into buses and forced to surrender lheir valuables,
they were transponed to camps as soon as their towns and vlllages were
overrun. Men of milital)' age were separated and sent to onc group of camps.
The death toll in these camps \\'85 high. Many were shot out of hand.
Standards of medical care were poor and tJle diet meagre. The newspaper
photographs and television pictures of emaciated men ponrayed a horror not
seen since World War Two. Rape and sexual abuse of women was systematic.
The Commission of Expens on Bosnia noted that once international media
repons of the rapes increased, sexual abuse in the camps declined, implying
that those in au~ority had il in their power.,all along to curb such attacks.
They concluded: '
The practises of ethnic cleansing, sexual ar;.<;aull and rape have bccn
carried out by some of the pwties SO systematically that thr..-y appear to be
the product of policy. llte consistent failure to prevent the commission of
such crimes and the consistent failure to prosecute and punish the
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~':J'8tors of these crimes clearly evidences the existence of a policy of
orruSSlon, The consequence of this conclusion IS that command
responsibility can be estabhshed
Will those responsible for this tragcdy - KardiC7_ Mladicz and others _ be
en~r brought to justice? TI)C immediatc post-war experience does not inspire
confidc~. Of thc estimated onc-hundred and fifty thousand war criminals
responslblc for genocide during the Nazi cra onJy thirty thousand havc been
brought to justice. Most of these wcre in the Eastcrn European COUntrics.
Ma.ny of those charged in thc Wcst got ofT with relatively light sentcnces.
ThiS was larg~ly duc 10 the influcnce of the United States, Britain and France
who w~re ~nxlous to use thc new West German}' as an obstaele to communist
expans.lon ,Into Western ~urope. This necessitated 3 strong German economy
a~ thIS \\as largely achieved by releasing from prison those industrialists.
C1v~ sen'ants and others who had worked or collaborated with the Nazi
regIme.
. , . One might well ask. \\ hat final line of defcnce is there for the weak if
JustIce Itself falls \ictim? The answer lies u;thin ourselves. Wc must 1lC',Cr
forgct !.he past and abO\"C all. we must tl)' to rise abovc individual selfishness
and speak out. The gestur:s wc might make may be small. but whcther it is by
letter o~ protest on the pbg~t of a. political prisoncr or b}' our refusal to buy
g~S ~\e suspect, arc made III a poson camp, wc still can make a start. At)(l't'c
all, It IS by movmg from stcrool}'])CS to real human beings that wc learn to
valuc and treasure the sanctity ofeach human life.
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The Holocaust
Andreas Roth l
Saul FricdJaender once defined the inherent difficulty facing C\'cl)' historian
of thc Holocaust as a 'paralysis' which 'derivcs from the simultancity and
interaction of entirely hetcrogeneous phcnomen'l: messianic fanaticism and
bureaucratic structures, pathological impulses and administr.:Uive dccrees,
arehaic altitudes and an advanced industrial socicty.·2 The fact that the
Holocaust was orchcstrated by the political elitc of u country nUlking among
the most developed as far as economic success. political awareness and
cultural heritage is concerned. contributcs to its singularity. J
Concentration camps were not ill\'ented b}' tne N37jS bUI by the
British in the course of tJlC Beer War, whilc gO\'cmment-instigatcd mass
murder had already been practised by the Young Turks who almost
annihilated the Anncnian people. The Na7is, however. perfected the
qualitativc and quanlit21ti\'c dimensions of genocide. NC\'cr before had mass
murdcr been justified by an openly propag:ucd. and allcgedly scientifically
based political ideology and never before had callously perfected tcchniqucs
enabled the perpetrators to murdcr more than fivc million people,
Up until recently no single piece of documented cvidence was
known to c..... ist pointing to a particular meeting of Nazi officials at which thc
decision to murder thc European Jews was taken. On 6 December 1997.
1 The author would like to acknowledge the help of Georg Spielmann in composing
this article.
l Saul Friedlaender, .Vazi Germally CUld th~ Jf!'oI'J: the YUlr.s if pel':U!Cliliofl 1933-
1939(NC\\ York. 1997).
J For general acrounts of the Holocaust and its hisloriography see, Chrislophcr
Bro\\mng: 'Di~ debatt~ ilbe,. di~ Idle,. de3 Ho/ocolUl' in: Ulrich lIerbcrt (e:d.),
Nationalsonalistische n:TIlIchtwlgspolilik 1939·1945. Neue forschlUlgcn wxl
konlro\"C~rsell (Frankfurt, 1998), Johannes llcil and Raincr Erb (cds.),
GddrichlS-..i,uefUChaft u,Id (JjJe"tlit-hkeil de,. ~/rcit urn Daniel J. Goldhagell
(FmnkliJrt, t998},.R:tlul Uilbcrg, 71,e deslrocliot'~the European Jews (New York.,
1985), i\llfcd Low, 71,e Third Rdch ami the Holocaust ill Gemlall his/on"ogroplry
(New York, I994), Alexnndcr Mitschl,;:r1ich, Die ullftllrigkeil zu /rouem: G''fmdlage"
koilektil'ell veri'altens (MilIIch(.'11,1977), Kurt Ptttzold, Tagesordll1l11g: Jrll[mmanl.
Die lVomrsee KQlljenmz am 20.
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however, Mic~ael Jcismann, writing. for~ Frankfurter A//gemeine Zeitung
~rted that In 1996 a <.Jennan histonan working in a Moscow archive
hitherto closed to the pubhc. uncm'Cred onc of Heinrich HimmJcr's, diaries.
On 18 December 19~1. the Reichsfiihrcr SS made the following,
fragmentary en.tT)·: '~C\VlS~ question. To be cxtcmtinatcd as partisans'. It
refers to a~~ WIth ~tlcr which had taken place on the same day. With
the .~lp of addiuonal Circumstantial evidence, another Gennan scholar
Christtan Gerlach, eXlra~latcd that the sinister decision was taken on Ii
December I?41 at a meetmg of top Nazi party officials.
l1Lis .gathe~g preceded by about a month the conference at
Wannsee outside Berlin, at which the main Reich authorities discussed the
ru~ ofE~n Jewry. Under the chainnanship of the head of the Reicb
~a~n Secu.nt}: Office, Reinhard Hcydrich, the conference agreed on the
total sol.UlJ~n ~f the Jewish question. The SchulZstaffin (SS) was accepted
as. the aommatmg and driving force of the murder machine. Heydrich
~puJated: 'All jC\\~ will be deponed to the Easl: for labour. Most "ill
disa~ ~gh natural diminution. The survivors will be U'Cated
accordingly. The places eannarked for such treatmcnt were the death
camps.
. Conccotrati~n camps were established in Gennany immediately
after Hitler's asswnptIon of pmo.'Cr in Janllat)' 1933. They were run by either
the S~ or the Sturmabteilungen (SA) and primarily accommodated litical
enemlCS of the Nll7js and so-<:aIled 'anti-social' persons rather than ':'vs In
1939 there ~'ere aoout twenty-five thousand prisoners in the various~
a mere fractJOD of the number ofintemees in StaJin'sgulag at the time ~~ua~ death or extennination camps were only set up in the course ~f the
mvaSlOn of the Soviet Union by the Gennan army (Wehnnacht) in 1941
The preferred locations of such camps, Ihe sole purpose of which was~
murder, "ere secluded areas of occupied Poland whe the ._=infrast . re re was a U<lulC
ructurc m pl3Ce whieh enabled. the co-ordinators of the Holocaust to
lllO\:C Ja:8e numbers of Jews by train from all over Europe to their final
destmaoon. Apart from this, eastcrn Europe was an ideal place due to the
presence there.of a cons!derably higher number of native Jews than in the
Gennan OCCU~led countncs of westcrn and southern Europe. More than half
of all Jews killed. by the N37jS died. in the ..J,. '1\ deathTrebl" . p Y""""--vw camps at
mka, Bclzec,. ~Ioor, Kulrnhof, Lublin and Auschwitz. In the latter
camp alone onc mIllion suffered death.
The killings, howcver, had started immediately after the in\'asion of
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Poland in Seplcmber 1939. whcn special 'task forces' - Emsalzgruppen -
were formed by the SS 1e..1dership. The Ejnsatzgruppen operated behind the
front lines. independent of the Wehrmacht. 11lC} rounded up Jcws. often
with the help of the local population. and summaril) shot them in fields and
forests. Once the Soviet Union was invaded. captured communist Red Arm}'
commissars wcre subjected to the samc kind of ·sp.x:ial treatment' -
Sonderbehandlung. As most members had not \'oIWItarily joined the
Einsatzgruppen, many of them faced inunensc psychological problems.
While the I~msal=gruppen began to enhance then killing methods
wilh the help of vans inlo which carbon~mol\oxidewas released - the first
centre of three such v3ns was organised at Kulmhof - the Wchrmacht did
not remain idle. An exhibition put together b) the Hamburg Institute for
Social Studies in 1997 proved beyond reasonable doubt that especially in
Serbia thc ordinary Gennan armed forces involved themselves in the
murderous activitics of SS-led units.
Parallel to the establisbment of the extcmunatioll camps in Poland
the Jews wcre ghelloised as a precursor 10 "hat was officiall)' labelled 're-
settlement' b)' the German autllorities, Man) Jews in fact believed that they
were headed for a JC\\-;sh statelet in tllC Ukraine. The biggcst ghetto was that
of Warsaw which was eventually. likc all other ghettos in eastern Europe,
forcefully cleared and its inhabitants either shot on the spot or uanspon.ed to
one of the death camps.
Upon lheir arrival at the camps. the Jews \\ere subjected to a
selection process. At Auschwitz, camp doctors. onc of which was the
nolorious Joseph Mengele. decided on whether death \\oold be infiiC1ed at
once or \\hcther the respective Jew could still be utilised as labour. Sooner or
latcr, however. an inmale was taken 10 the so-<:alled 'S\\;mrrting pool' or
'shower room'. Bat/eanslall, at Birkenau, besidc the main Auschwit7. camp.
In the S\\;mming pool or de-lousing WIit they were killed wilh the help of
the industriall}-produced poison gas ·Zyklon-B'. The corpses were cremated
and all personal belongings were collected and. as far as possible. utilised to
fosler the German war effort. When the Red ArnlY liberated Auschwitz in
January 19~5, thc soldiers found over lhrcc-hundred and sh.1y thousand
men's suits in ouJdition to over eight-h~ and twenty-six thousand
women's coats"and dresses. A mere sevcn thousand internees SUlyived the
terrors of AuscllwilL.
All operations at Auschwitz and the othcr cxtennination camps
were imbued with a legitimising sense of ·order'. Officially, then or rape by
,
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prison guards was not allowed. Thc facade of nonnality was maintained,
both for victims and perpctrntors. The laller wcre thus enabled to distance
the~sc:lves el.notionally from the unspeakable acts of crime. They latcr tried
to JUSllfy thclr behaviour by saying that they had merely followed orders.
Vcr)' few guards or administrators harboured any personal vindictiveness
against Jews.
Hannah Arendl coined the tenn 'banality of evil' to describe the
emotional and motivational background of Nazis like Adolf Eichmann.4 Hc
w~s head of the department within the Rcich Main Scc-.lrity Office dealing
WIth the 'final solution'. From his desk he mastenninded the futile attempt
to barter ten thousand Allied lorries in exchange for the lives of one million
Jews in 1944 to obtain desperately needed military hardware for the
Wehnnachl. Personally, he probably never laid hands on a Jew but he
meticulously organised the death of hwulreds of thousands.
Others were physically involved. In 1960, when Eichmann was
ki.dnapped in South America by Israeli agents, Johann Kremer was standing
tnal In Gennany. He had been a medical doctor at Auschwitz and was
familiar with the organisation of the killings. On 2 September 1942 he
recorded !n his diary; 'Present at Sonderaktion (gassing of 918 French J~WS)
for firs(.tlm~ at 3 a.lIl. The D~tean Inferno seems almOSllike a comedy in
companson . The extent of his personal dehumanisation process is made
evident by his diary entry for 11 October 1942; 'Roast hare for lunch _ a
huge leg - with potatoes and cabbage. Present at Sonderaktion during the
night (1600 Jews from Holland).'
Extremely little resistance was put up by the Jews, a fact for which
some have held the Jewish collective psyche responsible. Thcre is no
empirical evidence to sustain this argument but it would explain the fact that
the ghettoised Jewish popu1atjon of eastern Europe rose against their
oppressors in only seventeen instances. The major uprising <x:curred in
Warsaw in early 1943.
There is, in fact, ample evidence for JC'I\ish collaboration with the
Nazis, ranging from membership of the Jewish Police in the urban ghettos to
the attcmpted tracking down of fellow Jews who had gone into hiding.
Haonall Arendt refcrred to this phenomenon as the 'darkest chapter of the
wholc dark story,.5 The passivity of most Jews was partly based on a
4 Hannah Arendt, Eichman" in Jerusalem: a repon On rhe banality ofevil (London
19~). '
}Ibid.
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widespread unawareness of or refusal to belicvc in the extermination camp
activities.
Although many Jews were left in ignorance or the genocid..d
proceedings. the Allies were kepI informed. Escapees from ~e camps as
well as a small number of German diplomats appalled at the actlOns or some
of th~ir fellow counlJ)lnCII supplied London and Washington officials with
first-hand knowledge. Fllrthennore. the pcrsomlel at Bletchley Park
managed to break the German Enigma code in th~ summer .of 1941,
obtaining detailed inlonnation about shootings of Jews III the Ukralllc.. On 8
December 19....2. United States Presidenl Frank-lin D. Roosevelt was gIVen a
twcnl)'-pagc mcmOf'dodum on Nazi perpe~ated ge~ocide by a Je,;ish
delegation 10 the White House. He pronuscd to give the memo ~II
consideration'. The Vatican stated that Ule papacy was unable to publicly
denounce any 'particular atrocitics'. .
Jewish agencies did their utmost 10 convince the Allied leaders that
some action had to be taken to prevent rurther killings. In June 1944 the
case of Auschwitz was highlighted yct again and the Allies were asked to
bomb the gas chambers and railway lines. But no sufficient ~ttempt was
made to thwart the Nazis' projfX:l. The only part of Auschwltz that was
targcted by air raids was Monowitz. also ~nown. as Auschwitz 1I~ ..where
chemical works were situated. The crcmatona, which were clearly VISible on
photographs taken during reconnaissance flights. suf\ived the hostilities and
were levelled by the Gem13ns themselves in the course or the Wehrmacht's
retreat in 1945.
So far no satisfactory explanation has been found to explain the
inactivity and j~differenceexhibited by western leaders. To some extent ~is
was due to the fact that reports about the atrocities stemming from JCWlsh
sources were dismissed as 'customary Jewish exaggeration'. But there is no
doubt a more sinister explanation. British officials would not have been
happy about a large scale exodus of Jews from eastern Europe. bound for
Palestine. Gilbert's attribution of Allied passiveness to a 'lack of
comprehension and imagination' fails to provide a convincing expl~tion.~
Lrish political leaders were not oblivious of what was gomg on In
the death camps, j:ithcr. While the impositiQ,n of censorship prevcnted the
dissemination of knowledge. it has been pro\w by Donal 0 Drisceoil that
Frank Aiken, then Ministcr for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures,
6 Martin Gilbert, Ausdlll'ilZ alld the Allies (New York, 1995).
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knew about the Holocaust. Information about these events, however. did not
pass the Irish censor: ·Buchenwald. BeIsen. Lublin, Dachau. Auschwitz-
Birkenau - nonc could be allowed to distUJ'b the equanimity of the nculral
Irish mind.· ' Dcrmot Kcogh has shown that onJy a handful of Jewish
refugees were reluctanlly allowed into the country - the Irish minister
plenipolc~tiary t~ Genuany, Charles Bewley, in fact malevolcntly dela)'oo
the grantmg of \'Isas. Jews were onl)' welcome if thc)' could pro\ide funds
for themselvcs and. preferably. gainful employment for Irishmen.' On 13
December 1938. Frands Stuart wrote to Ihe edilor of The Irish Times. in
repl)' to a requcst 10 admit JC\\ish refugees into Ireland: 'With slums such as
we havc in our large towns. witb nearly one hundred thousand unemployed
.., such an appcaJ for funds must seem ironical,.9
Though most sUlvhing Jews left Germany after the war. their
numbers havc. however. begun 10 increase there. It is mainJy Russian Jews
w~ ~re co~tributjng to the rebin.h of JC\\ish communitics in Gcnnatl)'.
pnnctpally In Berlin. But relations between Gcnnany and the JC'\\ish
community world-"ide remain strained. proofof which are the recent claims
for compensation by former Jewish forced labourers directed at large
German companies such as Volkswagen or Degussa. Such payments had
been J~ade ~fore by the German government ahbough the rendering of
financtal assistance has not helped to relieve the Gcnnan ps)"CIte.
The sociologist Alexander Mitscberlich referred to the German
'inabilil},to mourn', a post-war phenomenon prevalent until the late 19705.
when ~~ screening of the Amercian lele\ision series Holocaust. focusing on
the ~alt.lous story of a JC\\ish family in Nazi Germany, contributed (0 the
ten:nlllauon of the self-imposed. protective amnesia of thc war generation.
Children thcn began to qocstion lheir parents about what they had done or
known about during the Nazi )"C3rs.
. . Probi.ng .into the past on a private leyel had been preceded by
o~cl.allO\·eSllgatlOns. As early as 1946 lhe main war criminals wcre put on
tnal lO Nuremberg. In later )'eats. some of the more immediate perpclrntors
of the Holocaust. such as extermination camp medical staff. were tried and
sentcnced..At ~ud~\'igsb~rg in south-west Germany a special prosecuting
agency, which IS still actlVc. was set up 10 collecl data to found indiamcnts
7 Dolla[ 6 Drisct:oil, Censorship i1/ Ireland during the Second World War: neutrality
politic., alld .,ociery (Cork, 1996). '
: I.>cnnol Kcogh., Jf!WS in twelltieth-eelltllry Ireland (Cork, 1998).
The Msh Time.,. 13 December 1938.
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of war criminals. Most Gennans. howC\cr. remained personally unaffected
and rejected the notion of ·collecti\c guill'. \\hich was ~incd by the pastor
Martin NiemOller. himself a fonncr concentrnllon camp tnmale.
While the screening of IlolocflU.'i/ caused widespread discomfort on
a sentimental and psychological Ie\·d. an intcllectual response by the
politically and historically il1lCfCStcdpublic was triggcred by the so-called
HiStorikerstreit _ disputc among hlstonans - in 1986. Emsl Nolte. a
respected historian of fascism in Europe. maintalllcd that there was a ca~1
IlcXUS bet"een the e:lOtcnnination of European JC\\S as .::lrehcstrated b} Hitler
and Stalin's terror regime in Russia Nolte based his contTO\<ersial thesis on
a speech made b) HiLlcr to Wehnnacht officers III 19"3. Hitler apparently
warned his subordinates thatthC)', if taken pnsoner b) the Red Anny, would
collapse under a certain tonwe method employed iniuall) b) the BoI~he\iks
during the Russian Ci\il War In thc earl) 19205 and "hich prommently
featured a half-starved rat in a cage. olte construed from Hitler's paranoid
fear of BoIsbe\ism. \\hich he regarded as an csscnball~ Jeuish creation
aiming to undennine Christian ci\ilisation.
TIle BcrLin-based historian went on to intcrpret the Holocaust as a
pre-emptive strike ~ Hitler His thesIS was Hlcifcrously ~fu~ed by
prominent German historians and the disputc permeat~ ~ editonal and
feature pages of all German national ne"spapers and penodicals for several
months. Among his opponents "cre leadmg rcprcscnlaIJVcs of the
functionalists' school such as Hans Monunscn or Mart.m Broszat. "ha
interpret the Holocaust as a process sheltered b) and gradually gaining
momentum under the umbrella of Gennan mihtary dominance over large
parts of Europe. rather than as the result of a givcn plan. Their counterparts.
the intentionalists. among them KJaus Hildcbrand and the late Andreas
Hillgrubcr. tended to be sonJe\\hat milder in thclr crit.ique of Noltc.
The bone of contcntion "as not buried properly and in 1997 the
French historian StCphane Courtois, indirectl) reawakened inlerest in the
subject mallcr b)' likening Communism to Nazism. arguing that summa
summorum Communism was thc greatcr menace. to Ernst Nolle. wbo has
since retired from his chair at the Technical University of Berlin. continues
to write thc ~ional controvcrsial Icttcr,Jo his favourite newspaper, the
. ';
10 SICphallc COurlois (et tll.). Le livre /loir cl" commu/IIsme: crimes, terrcur.
repre.~sioll (Paris, 1997).
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Frankfurter Alfgemeine Zeitung.
While the Historikerstreit did nOI send out major tremors abroad, it
was all tlle more surprising that an eminent Irish journalist presented
himself as a disciplc of Nolle. On 22 February 1997 Kevin Myers wrote in
The Irish Times that 'it is impossible to imagine Nazism without
communism as a template from wltich it was fonned, and against the
contours of which it took shape and method. ,11 The evidence as marshalled
in Ulis article, however. points in a different direction. The Holocaust was a
quantitatively and qUtllitatively unpamlleled and unpTCCe'1ented undertaking.
What explanations may be found for this mass murder, unique in
the history of mankind and unimaginable in its dimensions and excesses?
Why was the Holocaust initiated by Germans, but not by other peoples with
more distinct anti·Semitic uaditions, for cxample the Russians and the
Frcnch? Which motives were pursued by the German perpetrators how did
they justify actions which exceeded all moral and cthical limits? W1tat role
was played by the ordinary Genuan as compared to thaL assumed by those
petpetrat.ors well known to the public? Orders. motivated by a strikingl}'
pathological hatred of the Jews. have historically served as explanation for
the actions of the latter: the culprits were relegated to the categol)' of
fanatical Nazis or SS·henehmen.
In 19% Daniel Goldhagen attcmpted to answer some of these
questions in his book: Hitler's willing executioners: Ordinary Germans and
the Holocaust. According to Goldhagcn, a typically Gennan version of anti.
~mitism, whi~h di5J.>l.aYed an 'eliminatory' feature and thus distinguished
Itself from antl·Semlllsm of other peoples, was responsible for the mass
murder of the Jews. While the aim of anti-Semites in other European
count~es w~ .'social elimination' (the de-cmancipation of the Jews), a form
of 3nll·Semttlsm had established itself in Germany at the end of the
nineteenth century based upon genocidal tendencics. Goldhagcn stated that
the ordinary Genuan accepted his role as executor willingly and
enthusiastically.12
In suppor1 of his tbcory he examines the reserve poUcc battalion
101 from Hamburg, which was involved in tbc mass-execution of Jews and
the subject of a stud}' by Christopher R. Browning.]] The difference betwcen
11 The Jri.vh Times, 22 t"ebruary J997.
12 Daniel lGoldhagen, Hiller's willing execuliQ1Jers. orrlilUlry Germans mu!
the Holocaust (New York, 1996).
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the two studics is made obvious b} the respective titlcs: Browning's ordinary
men arc Goldhagen's ordinal} Gennans. 'Thc most appropriatc. indccd the
only appropriate gencml proper name for the Ge~ans who pe~~tcd the
Holocaust is Gcnnans.' In a speech. precedlOg the battalion s first
exccutionar', action. the commanding officer. Major Wilhclm Trapp. lcft Ihe
issue of p~rticipation up to the policcmen themselves: somc refused to
participatc _ more than tcn but less than twcnt} per cent - but the
overwhelming majority agreed to takc part in the massacfC.
According to Goldhagen. thc explanation is that the .perpetrators.
'ordinal)' Genllans'. were animated by anti·Semitism. by a partlcu.lar t~pe of
anti-Semitism that led them to conclude that the Jc"s ought to die. Sml~ly
put the perpetrators, having consultcd tbeir o\\n conv~ctions.and moraiJty
and having judged the mass annihilation of Jews to be nghl. .di~ not want t~
say no. This behaviour is cxplained by the Ge~man 'c1111u~at~1) ~~u·
Semitism' mentioned above: it possessed a 'potcntJal for gcmJCldc waJtJng
to be activated. ].l
Goldhagen's work aroused immcnse interest. not least because of
his monocausal explanation for a phenomenon that exceeds human
comprehension. Subsequently, he \\as SC\'ercl) c~ticiscd by. numerous
historians on the basis of his methodolog). It was c1auned that his book was
lacking in revclationary content. Furthermore, his work was lambasted for
not being scientific, a criticism based on his selective usage of sources.
Eberhard nickel labelled the book 'simply bad'.
1'\\0 basic arguments contradict Goldhagen's thesis of 'eliminatory
anti-Semitism' as the sole explanation for the Holocaust. Firstly. not all Naz.i
victims were Jews. Thc organised murder of Sinti and Roma gypsy people.
disabled people. and political opponents cannot be explained in temlS of
anti-Semitism. Secondly. the perpetrators were not only Gennans. Up 10
thirty per cent of the camp guards wcre Romanian, Croatian. Ukrainian.
Estonian. Latvian and Lithuanian. Goldhagen' s harsh judgement of the
perpetrators is based upon his belief that their decisions ~vere govcrned by
their own free will: ltis so-called ·hwnan' clement IS challenged by
Browning. who argues for grealer consideration of psycho-social elements.
Hitler's .....illing e,recutioners is exposed as",,"!, moral pamphlet rather than a
",
II Christophcr Bro\\lling, Ordinary men. Reserve Police &IW{jO" /Of and the Fi"al
501ut;0'1 if! Poland (San Francisco, 1993).
14 Daniel lGoldhagr..'Tl, 'A rep~v 10 my crilics..\Io11l'es, causes and alibis' in The New
Republic, 23 October 1996, pp_ 37--45.
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scientific treatise.
In concl~i~n, Browning's call for a rnulti-eausal intcrpretalion
~~s I.no~ convIncmg: he analyses the perpetrators' motivation from an
I eo oglca and cultural as wcJl as from an organisational pcrspect',
General human dispositions such as TV'<' I.\C.
ob . ...~r pressure, confonmty
scqUlQusness and Ihe legitimisation of the events b)' Ibe 'be 'd red . . govenunent must
conSI e . In addlllOll, Browning emphasises the mut I .' r.
of war and racism. ua rem orccment
A comb~tion of situationaJ aSJX.'Cls, an ideological o\'(.>rlapping v.1tich
re~Ultcd ID the Jews lx:ing wrgeted under the auspices of anti-Semitism
;U' d~C ~'llT ~ ~ell as the victims' dehwnanisatioll was sufticicnl to turn
or lllaJ) men mlo pt.."'rpCtrators of genocide. IS
"B 'rowmng, Ordinary men.
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'With burning anguish'
The Vatican, the Jews and the Third Rcich
1933-45
David A. Fleming
From the time of Constantine to that of Napoleon. Roman popes have
influenced Europe.m politics. But as the Catholic Church's predominance
over lemporal affairs declined in the nincteenth century. the pope bec:imc a
less important political figure on the European stage. From 1870 until 1929
Catholic popes had been in setr·imposed cxile within tile walls of Vatican City
in Rome. It was left to the Italian dictator Senilo Mussolini to free the pope
from his bondage in 1929 and to set up the VatiC'dn City State. ruled by him as
its sovereign hcad. For the following two decades the spiritual authority of the
Roman Church was pushed to an extreme which has not been seen since the
Lime of the Reformation. Burning questions about the moral conduct of the
Vatican have been put. as accusatJons of silence. collusion and collaboration
with totalitarian Teb>imes. proliferated. This paper allempts to look at the
Genuan state·s relations with the Vatican as well as the controversy
surrounding thc Catholic Church's attitude to the Jewish question during the
Second World War.
By 1890 the CatllOHc Church had recognised that it could no longer
effectively influence a Europe which had embraced liberal thinking and had
increasingly become anti-clerical. The pope now saw the chief Catholic parties
of Europe as the only means of representing his vie,,,s and offered them the
Church's whole support. They were Action Fran9aise in France. the Popular
Party in Italy and the Centre Party in Germany. This was 10 change. however,
with the arrival of a new pope - Pius Xl (Achillc Ratti) in 1922. He saw a
need to return to 'spiritual values and Christian living· which he believed
could not be delivered by the main Catholic parties. Consequently he
transferred his support from the Catholic parties (0 the newly founded
Catholic Action••an organisation" hich com~rised all of the lay institulions of
the Church. lhat in his view. would be more su1ted to bring back to sociely Ihe
'ChrisLian living' that it had lost. No" that support for the political parties
had been withdrawn. they soon declined as a politiC'd.! force in their own
respectivc states.
Consequently, the Catholic Church lost one of the few means of
protecting its interests politically in Europe. Thus, the policy of making
,
• 3I
Within fh-e da\"s of the conclusion of the concordat the Church was
tcsted .... hen Germanv ~1Cd a sterilisation la\\. in cont:r.l\"CfltlOn to Christian
moral tcaching. Th~ follo\\;ng years saw..~.he gradual elimination of all
churches in Gcnnan~. Religious personnel \\ete arrested. often on charges of
It IS not surpnsing. therefore. that \\ hen approached ~ the Ge~
CO'-cmment to conclude a concordaL the Vatican was more than enlhUSl~c.
After onl) eight days of negotiations between FranL \on Papen rcpr:esenung
German) aod Cardinal Sccrctar) of State P....celh. a concordat \\as ~Igned on
23 Jull 1933. The tenns were astonishingl~ favourable to the Vaucan. The
Chureh was granted the right to nm its own schools \\ hich had been a bone of
contention in Geml.an~ for years. Onc of the most significant tenns .of the
concordm was article 31 which Slated that ·the inhibited freedom of aCIJon for
all Catholic religious. cultural and educational organisations. as~ia~ions ~nd
federations' were to be assured b) the Gennan govenunent. ThiS article
guaranteed the existence of the Catholic Church in t~le Third Rcich. F~r
Genuan}. and more importantl) Hitler. tbe coocordat stJpulated that ~~thoLtc
priests could IlO longer take part in polit~cs. This put ~he final nall In ~
coffin of the Centre P'dIh. \\hich along \\Ith the Cathohc Ba\'anan People s
Part) were the last parti~ to succumb to the na7jfication of the State. ~ith
one stroke of the pen. Hitler's regime gained the prestigious honour of belDg
ra:ogniscd as the legitJmate gO'o·emment of German) by onc of the oldest
institutions in Europe.
Cardinal Pacelli. \\ho was later to become Pope PillS XJI. said
privatcl) to the British representativc at the Vatican that ·the .~nt c~ges
in Gcnnany had madc it essential ... for the Church to regulansc Its relations
juridically with the Reich.·~ This was the strategy behind the signing of such a
treaty with Germany. Henceforth. Gennany was legally ~und 10 saf~guard the
rights of the Catholic Church within its borders. Little did the. Vat.lcan. know
that Hitler and his regime would become notorious for their "Iolallon of
form1l international treaties. A French Jesuit. Y,·cs de la Briere. commented
at the time that 'he (the pope) hoped that in the probable event of an e."treme
conflict between Church and State in GemWl} the legal ,-alue of a coocordat
would givc tile claims and protests of the Church hierarch~ a surer legal
has· ••IS.
formal concordats between the Vatican and panicular states was adopted.
Although concordats between Church and state were made in the pasl. much
more imponance was DOll' gh-en to such agreements. A coocordat can be
defined 'as a formal treaty or agreement entered iDlo by the Holy Sce and
individual States for defining the respective roles of the two parties in fields
where conOict tends to arise.· 1 The Vatican does not negotiate these treaties to
obtain rights necessarily for itsclf but rather for the Catholic eiti7.ens of the
particular stale. During tile reign of Pius Xl from 1922 te 1939. eighteen such
concordats were concluded, a record for any papal reign.
As the Church changed its diplomatic and political slrategy from
1922 onwards, it also recognised the rise of a new political idcolog)' in
Europe. The rise of fascism was feared by the Church as it threatened to
replace religion \\ith its own philosophy of the supremacy of the race. Both
vied for the minds and souls of the individual and demanded undivided loyalty
to the one supreme po\\-er. whether that be God or dictator. H(ffi'C'·cr. PillS Xl
held thc ,iC\\ that 'the Church could obtain greater religious influence in
publie life from a stable go...emmcDl under an energetic. all-powerful ruler
than it could through democratic party JXllitical strife' which of course
reflected the Church's own structure ofauthority.llt is within this context that
the Catholic Church embrnccd Fascist Italy. However, Nazi Gennany was
treated differently.
The Church feared the rise of fascism but worried more about the
growing spread of communism. Consequently it vicwed Nazi Gennany as the
lesser of two evils. The Church recognised in Nazism a force in Europe which
could prevent communism from in"ading Europe. But this policy had to
reflect the Vatican's distrust of national socialism as well as considering the
fate of Gcrman)"s thirty miUion Roman Catholics. The Vatican had cause for
alarm. Article 2~ of the Nazi Party manifesto stated:
The Part)' bases itself on positi\'e Christianity ....itbout binding Itself
dogmaticall) to any singJe coofessioo. We demand the freedom of all
religious beliefs in the state, 90 far as they do not endanger the existence
afthe state and do not otTend the manners and morals of the German race.)
Some top-ranking Nazi leaders advocated the establishment of a German
National Church which would eliminate any outsidc influences in Gcnnany.
This naturally frightened the Vatican.
•
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Ibid., p. 32.
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immomlity or of smuggling foreign currencies. The Catholic presses wcre
closed and Catholic publications were banned. Onc of the more frightening
reports which came to the Vatican concerned education. Thc Church saw
education as its rightful sphere of influence since it was essential for the
propagation of Catholic teaching. Widcspread intimidation was used by Nazi
officials and police to prevent children from attending Catholic schools. This
was in total violation of the concordat which stated that 'the maintenance of
Catholic schools is guaranteed ... Orders and religicus associations are
authorised to found and direct such private schools in accordance wilh the
general laws and conditions fixed by the state. ,7 To counter such intimidation,
thc parcnts of Catholic school children established associations which the
Nazis did cvcl)1hing possible to break up. Things came to a head when Pacclli
sent a formal letter of protest to the Gennan representative 10 the Vatican. von
Bcrgen:
a plannl.-d attack is ill progress against tht: Catholic schools. Party
members go from hou~ to house intimidating part..'TIts into signing in
favour of state schools. Morem'CI, tenchl.'TS who do 1I0t speak openly in
fa\'our of state schools are relieved of their posts.
The letler also recorded at [east one hundred such instances where education
had been attacked in contradiction to the concordat. School attendance figures
suggest thal the intimidation worked. In Munieh in 1935, three per cent of
parents sent their children to Catholic schools in comparison to 1933 when
sixi1y·fivc per cent were doing SO.8
TIIC Nazis also found a way to eliminate the Catholic Youth
organisations. These were forbidden to stage any form of organised sporting
activity. Sport could only be played by members of the Hitler youth. The
Catholic bishops complained fiercely, but to no avail. Another law banned the
wearing of unifonns, the display of insignias. flags and marching. These
mcasurcs eventually killed off tbe Catholic youth organisations. The Vatican
now feared the worst in Genuany. One final attempt at reconciliation camc in
1936 when thc Vatican offcred to support the German efforts in 'defence of
the Church' during the Spanish Civil War, if tlle persecutions in the Third
Reich would stop. This was rejected almost immediately.
By 1936 the Vatican had few options leO. having fonnally protested
through its nunciaturc in Berlin and through von Bergen in Romc, but to no
avail. The Genoan bishops met at Fulda. in Bradenburg. for their annual
conference in 1936 and decided to ask the pope for an encyclical regarding the
7 Ibid., p_ 185.
I Ibid., pp. 186-8.
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state of Catholicism in the Third Reich. In January 1937. the po~ agreed with
the bishops and asked Cardinal P'dcclli to formulatc an :Ilcychcal. It would
surprise the world ....;t1l its content. It became known as onc?f l~~ greatest
condemnations of a national regime ever pronounced by the VaUcaD
'1Ifit Brennender Sorge' - With Burning Anguish - detailed the
many grievances and persecutions of the Church in Germany.
Ours was mled by the loyalty to the tenus of Ihe agrccrn<~~t; hut ... [the
rcadcr] will ha\'e 10 recognise \\ith surprise and d~ ~Isgust th~1 the
UIIwrilten law of the other part)' has been arbitrary rrusillterprc~t10n. of
agreements, evasion of agrcemt..'TIts, alld finally more or less open vlOlatlOtl
"of agrl.'CJllcots. . . .
The subject of education was raised in the next lD~gnant sentence. . ,
the open .....1lf against the confessional schools, which are guanmle\Xl b} the
COIICOrdat, and the nullification of the freedom o.f the .ballot for those
entitled to a Catholic education., show the tragic senoUSllcss of the
situation in a field whieh is of vital interest to the Church and an
oppression of the colISCience of the faithful such as ne\'er before been
witnessed. 1I •
In a clear reference to the intimidation of Catholics, the .cncyclical noled In
our districts ... voices are raised in ever loudcr chorus urgmg mcn to l~~e. the
Church.'12 This was 1he only Vatican document of impo.rtance .th~t cntlclsed
the Nazi regimc and was read from every Roman Catholic pulpIt In Genuany
on Palm Sunday, 21 March 1937. ,
Hitler was outmgcd at what he saw as flagrant and arrogant
opposition to his policies and ordered all copies to be sc::izcd and f~ture
publication banned. The printing presses where ~e eDcycl~cal was pnnted
were destroyed and the printers arrested. An offiCIal compl31~t was.~de ~
von Bcrgen at the Vatican. on ordcrs from the German forelg~ mllllstry ~n
Wilhehnstrassc. From that date the persecution of the Catholic C.h~h. III
Gcnnany intensified. The Nazi government ordered that the 'mora~lty tnals
be stepped up. One such trial in Koblcnz was of two hundred and sixty-seven
Franciscans of whom there were only five hundred in Germany, accused of
, . . ' 13
offcnces against mentally-Ill youngsters ID IhelT care.
~,
9lliid.,p.2M. ~ . ~
\0 Charles E. Dclzell (ed.), The papacy ami totalitanamsm betweell the two wo wars
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11 Ibid., p. 152.
12 Snydcr , IJitler's 71/ird Reich, p. 255. . .
13 Richard GnmbergCI", A sociol hislOlY ofthe TIlird Reich (Mlddk'SCx, 1979), p. 558.
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Instead of stemming the Nazi tyranny toward the Church, Pius Xi's
encyclical augmented it. However Alii Brenneder Sorge was of pronounced
importance, since it set a precedent for subsequent Vatican statements against
injustice and persecution. Even though the encyclical did not name the regime
or its leader. it did spccificall)' address the suppression of the Church and the
doctrines of N37jsm, World opinion was surprised at this pronouncement of
'deep anxiety' and was quick to utilise it for propaganda against Genuany,
WilhelmstIaSSC received many reports on the effecl of the encyclical: Swiss
Catholics expressed their support for the Vatican, Hung2I)' reported that nol
onc single Hungarian paper had sided with Genoany. Chile \\"35 becoming
increasingly unfriendly.u
Under Pius Xl, the Vatican denounced Hitler whenever his regime
threatened the Church. Some commentators have concluded that the pope
adopted sueh a line so as to 'drivc a wedgc' between the continuing closeness
of Mussolini's governmeD1 and Berlin. This relationship was copper·fastened
after the signing of the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936 and Pius XI feared that
Italy would be forced to adopt Nazi policies which would strike at the Church
in Italy itself. Such overtones were recognised by both Britain and France who
encouraged the Vatican in its stance loward Germany. Pius XI died in
February 1939 before, it is said, he could deliver a scathing condemnation of
fascism.
Pacelli was the candidate most likely to succeed Pius Xl. He was seen
by most commentators as the candidate who would continue Vatican policy on
the lines of Pius XI and consequently Britain and France supported his
candidacy while Gennany and Italy opposed iLlS Pacelli was duly elected as
Pope Pius Xl1 in March 1939, Three days after his coronation he called a
conclave of bishops to discuss 'the German question'. He told his cardinals
that he would personally write a 'letter of peace' to Hitler. This letter
immediately Te\'Caled a softer approach and commenced as follows:
To the illustrious Adolf Hitler, Fuhrcr and Chancellor of the <h."TIlUUl.
Reich! Here at the beginning of Our pontificate We wish to assure you that
Wc remain devoted to the spiritual ..velfarc of the German people entrusted
to your leadership ... We recall with gre3t pleasure the many years Wc
spent in Germany as Apostolic Nuncio, when Wc did all in Our power to
establish hannonious relations bet\.-.een ChUTCh and State, Now that Our
14 Rhodes, The Vatican in tile age ofthedictntorJ, p. 206.I' Peter C. Kent, 'A tale of two popes: Pius XI. Pius XII and the Romc-Berlin Axis', in
JOIlnJa} ofCcntemporory HiJtory, 23, 4 (1988), pp. 589~.
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.-nnn~ibilitiesof Our pastoral function ha..·c increased Our oppoltwlitlcs,
o_e_o_ "
how much more ar<k:ntly We pmy to r...'ftch that goal.
It was the first indication that the new pope was read)'. l~ adopt a more
conciliatory attitude to the Genuan slate in order to protcct Its Interests then:,
The Vatican, like the rest of t.hc world. \\"35 convinced that a war \nth
Genuany was coming closer. Vatie:m poli~' under Piu:' XII changed to
facilitate a neutral stance in the coming COnflict 'from whi~h the pope coul.d
act as a mediator to ensure EuroJXan peace.'!' Howcver, It was duc .t~ ~IS
continued neutrality during the war, that Pius Xli has been cntlc.tsed
subsequent!). Allegations of remaining silent .., hite Nazi Gcmlan)' committed
atrocious acts of barbarity were \\;del) made in the post war years..
From the beginning of his pontificate, Pius XII made vahant effo~s
to keep thc peace in Europe. In April 1939 he asked all powers, except .SoVlet
Russia to attend a conference to discuss the problems at hand. ThiS was
rejected b} both sides. Britain feared another 'Munich' ,.. hile Gennany was
confident in her anus. , .
Hitler invaded Poland 00 I September 1939, hnmcdiatel) Bntam and
France asked the pope to condemn tllis act of aggression. The pope. refused.
stating that in accordance with the policy of neu~lity w~eh the Vatlcan had
always taken during wartime, be could not publicly or di~tly comment on
any fonn of international conflict. \~t the pope di~ say aOOu,t .the
commencement of war in Europe was ISSued through his first eRC)chcal
cntitled Summi Pontificatus on 27 October 1939: . '
The blood of countless hWllan bemgs. including man~ civilulJ~s, cn~ ~t
in agony. a race as bclowd by Us as the l'oh~h,.wh~SC stcadtliSt Fa.,th m
the s....rvice of Christian civilisation is wntlc.:n In lIIdlaccahlc Ictt...'fS III the
BooIo: of IlistOl), gh-ing thc.:m the right to imok..: the brothc..~ly ~mpathy of
the entire world,lll
11 did not mention Gennan} by name nor did it condemn the, in...asio~. This
was not 5atisfactoT) 10 Britain and France. Gennan) banned thiS ene)"el~ca1.
The Vatican Radio, ran by the Jesuits, became a YOC1ferous
commentator on Gcnuan aggression. A broadcast dctailing 'the state or terror
and brutalisation' .., hich Poland was suffering was made in JamlaIJ .1940. -:he
Gcnnan representative. \'on Bergen, \\"35 ~trueted to make an munedtate
complaint for this breach of ncutralil}. TIle replJ from the Secretary of State
stated that Vatican Radio ..,as run by the Jesuits and was Dot under the control
l~ Rhodes, 71,e I"aticall ill 11ll! age oftile dictatorJ, p. 228
I' Kent, 'A tate ofh\o popes', p. 603.
!'Rhodes, Th~ I,mcall ,n th~ ag~ ofth~ dictaton. p 237.
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of the secretariat. Although many more lines can be written on the subsequent
Gennan im'asion of European countries and Russia and the pope's stance
regarding those it is clear that the papacy tied itself to a policy of neutrality,
the merits of which can be questioned.
Another aspect of the Vatican's Gennan policy, which evoked
criticism, was in relation to the genocide of the Jews. Reports of lhe
gheltoisation of Europe's Jews began to be communicated to the Vatican by
priests and bishops from 1940 onwards. Rwnours of actual extennination
came during the summer of 1942. The Allied governments. represented by
Myron Talyor, the US representative to the Holy Sec asked the Vatican in
September 1942, as a neutral source, to confirm reports that the Allies had
received aboulthe extennination of the Jews. Moreover. he asked, if 'the Holy
Father have any suggestions as to any practical manner in which the forces of
civilised public opinion could be utilised in order to prevent a continuation of
these barbarities?' The reply came in October 1942 and stated that the Vatican
could neither confinn nor deny such reports and therefore would not
comment.
l9 The Americans infonned the Vatican that their silence \vas
'endangering its mond prestige and its undermining faith both ill the Church
and in the Holy Father himself. ,2(1
The Vatican never once publicly denounced Nazi Germany by name
during the Second World War. What was the reason for this? One view is that
if the pope was to condemn Nazi Gennany he would also have to condemn
Stalinist Russia. Furthermore, if he did condemn the Nazi regime the
persecution would have been intensified, as had happened after MU
Brennender Sorge. It was this argument that the pope constantly used when
defending his refusal to condemn German atrocities. In 1942 the Dutch
bishops issued a pastoral letter condemning the transportation of the Dutch
Jcv.'S to Poland. The Nazi leadership threatened the bishops that if the letter
was widely disseminated all Jcwish converts to Catholicism would be
transported. The .bishops went ahead anyway. Consequently, baptised Jewish
converts were arrested and transported to their death in the 'East'. The pope
noted: ·Ifthe lctter of the Dutch bishops has cost forty thousand lives [ninety-
tv.'o thousand in reality], a protest from me might cost tv.'o-hundred thousand.
I C3IUlot and should not bear this responsibilit),. ·11
19 Ibid., p. 67.
20 Ibid.
21 Jonathan Louis, The pope and the Nazis, docUtn(.'ntary by the British Broadcasting
Corporation (1996).
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A second explanation for I1lc pope's silcnce was that the Vatican had
lost vital credibility at the commencement of the war when it had failed to
maintain peace. For it to regain its posWon as a peace broker. it could ?ot
comment on any particular incidents or alroCities. knowing thal the other Side
would use the words of the pope as propaganda. 11 therefofC had to abide by
strict neutrality. Thus. when the Axis powers asked the pope to declare that
the invasion of Russia was a 'Holy Crusade' against Bolshevism. the pope
refused.
A third justification for a policy of silence relate to the possible
consequences of a papal condemnation. Even if the pope denounced Hitler. as
a murderer of Je"'S. it might have been very difficult for such a condemnatIOn
10 be relayed through occupied Europe. if Pius XlI had excommunicated
Hitler and his henchmen would it have stopped the slaughter? Would Genuan
Catholics have viewed Hitler in a different light?:!
If the Vatican did not publicly condemn the persecution of the Jc",'$,
it did utter condemnations in private messages to heads of Axis states. One
message Lo the Slovak government read:
The Holy See has always entertained the lirm hope that the Slovak
govenunent ........-ould never proceed with the forcible 1\.'1noval of persons
belonging to the Jewish race. It is with great pain iliat the Holy Sec has
learned of the eontinued transfers of such a nature ... The Holy See would
fail in it~ Divine Mandate if it did not deplore these measures?3
A letter of similar content was sent to the Hungarian government. However, it
must be stated that no such letter was sent to Hitler.
By October 19·B, the Germans were in Rome. The question of the
Roman Je\\'S now arose. During one single night the Jews of Rome were
arrested. When ne",'S of this came to the Vatican. the pope ordered the
secretary of state. Cardinal Maglionc. to snmmon the Gennan anlbassador.
Magliooe infonned voo Sergen that 'It pains the Holy Father more than \....ords
can say. that here in Rome right under his very eyes so many people are made
to suffer simply because they are ofa particular racc.' The amb.:"lssador advised
the secretary of state not to jeopardise the Vatican's impartiality by making a
stand now':4 The Church didn't go any fw1her with it. However Pius Xli
ordered all enclosed monasteries in Europe to'\Qpeo their doors to any person
fleeing persecution. Consequently five thousand Roman JC\\'S were saved from
n De17..e1l , The papacy and totalilarianism. pp. %-102.
2J Rhodes, The Vatican in the age oflhedlctators. p. 347.
2~ Louis, The pope and the NaziJ. ~
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certain death. Overall the Roman Catholic Church may have saved the lives of
four hundred thousand JewS.25
Dclzell concludes that the pope was daily preoccupied v.ith the
counte~cting roles of his temporal and spiritual duties. Every Icuer, speech
and actIon of the ~pe ~d to be clearly balanced against its likely results.
Eaeh had to be Wetghed In the impossibility of predicting which action would
best serve the interests of the Church. 26
. . Several questions must remain unanswered. Should the pope, as
spmtual head of the Roman Catholic Church, have denounced and
condemned the Na~ regime for attempting to eradicate the Jewish population
of Europe? Would It have done any good? Would the Catholic Church itself be
eliminated as a result of such a condemnation? Onc would have to contend
that some form of public pronouncement on the plight of the JC\\~ might have
sent a message to the world that Christ's vicar on Earth and his Church had
not forgotten them. This viC\\' however comes with hindsight. On 17 March
1998, the Catholic Church under Pope John Paul II issued a document titled
We :eme,!,ber, a R~jlection on the Shooh. U expressed the grief of the Church
for Its f31lurc~ d~ng that period. It did not however explicitly apologise for
the stance WhICh PlUS XII took, but rather praised him for his diplomacy.
25 Ibid.
26 Delzdl, The papacy and totalitarianism, pp. 95-6.
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Mothers of the Fatherland
Women and National Socialism in Germany
Janet Power
From his earlicst days in politics Adolf Hitler attracted support from German
women. Although relatively few women voted for the National Socialist Party
up to 1930, the deepening economic depression brought more women to Hitler's
sidc. The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of National Socialism on
German women and their involvement in Hitler's movement. Nazi supporters
shared the same mcntality that united them against the hostilc world and the
only security that they felt was a strong sexual identity: men would be men and
women would be feminine.
The vision that Nazi propaganda propagated was that of a strong maD
and a gentle woman co-Qperating under thc stcm guide of an orderly state. But
even the image of an ordcrly state was an illusion. The Na7j party was
decentralised and authoritarian. needing leaders throughout the nation. Local
organisation was one of its main allractions. Followers had plenty of
opportunity to gain power at local level witllOut worrying about interference
from above and women were no exception. It was because of this lack of
interference that womcn were allowed to build their O'tHl ideology and set up
community services for Nazi men and their families. Their presence misled
observers by offsetting the brutal masculine type cxalted by Hitler with that of
powerful manhood and loving womanhood. True women believers could see for
themselves that thcir ideal state could exist in tllC future. But before Hitler dealt
with the future he first had to expel the past and find a replacement for the 'new
woman' of early twentieth century feminism. This he did wilh the creation of
the ncw mother who would put family and country abovc all else and would
become a missionary for Nazi ideals.
From 1890 onwards most German womcn supported the German
Socialist Party (SPD).1 However all tIlC women elected to the national assembly
no matter what party they represented. concentrated on women and family
issues. After the fiirst World War, Gcrman ..women had in fact greater freedom
than in any othcr country because of theri' votc and their academic and
professional skills. The Social Democratic Women's movement began to fade as
lUte Frcvert, Ifomen i" Gerolall hislory: from bOllrgeQi.~emallcipation 10 sexual
lib4Jralism (Oxford, 1989), p. 169.
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an indcpendcm group and concentrated on social work. Frevert noted that it was
women's consen'atism that had won them the vote in the first placc.2 After
1919, women voted in favour of the Centre Party, the German Democratic Pany
and the Gennan Peoples Part)'. In this traditional societ}', women voted for mort
consen'ativc parties than men because the)' were faced with fears 00
experienced. before. The more religious a party, the more women followed it as
many women hoped that the part)' would mould thc community into a model of
a Christian family.
After World War Onc many Gennans were unhappy with the political
system of democmtisation and with the economic hardship of the period.
Women in particular, were afraid of many of the new changes that were
occurring. They wanted emancipation from the cmancipation that they had just
gained. TIle freedom that had delighted some around 1920 had unsettled the
majority of women. Many women argued that access to politics had not given
women any political influence. so the only way to increase that power was to co-
operatc \\ith men and to reap their protection as a reward. 11lcy also realised
that h)'ing to competc with men for political power was pointless but that
compromise "lib them might bring am anlage. Women were wiUing to settle for
fewer rewards and less influence. They crusaded to take women out of political
life and into a more 'natural' sphere of social activity. For the many women
who rejected emancipation, the National Socialist mo\'ement was attractive.
Hitler knew that tlle German people wanted to regain the pride they
had lost with the fall of the Empire in 1918. Not alone that, but the economic
depression of 1929-33 had dampened the nation's idealism. So much discontent
between worker and capitalist, socialist and nationalist and rich and poor
prompted nostalgia for an idealised past. Hitlcr reasoned that the only social
categories providing a sense of security were those of race and gender. Thus the
Ar)'an race and the rightful place of men and women in society had to be
secured. Conscn'atives beHe"ed that the Jew and the 'new woman' were
becoming too powerful and wanted them both out of the Aryan man's world
lbe 'new woman' was scen as an agent of degeneracy and national decline that
'would bring in her wakc the destructive forces of Bolshevism and democracy. l It
was said that Gennan women were being lured into rational thinking by Jews
and Marxists and that those who agreed with female emancipation were trying
to destroy the existcnce of the Christian-Gennanic family Iifc. But even this
1 Ibid., p. 172.
l History Today, 43 (No....embo...--r, 1993), p. 35.
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'DC\\ woman' was more of an image than a TC3lity. It would have been almost
impossible to haye such power in a societ) that regarded women as a~
e\;1. and which did e\'erything in its power to keep women as subservient as
possible.4 The Union of Female Retail and Office Staffstatcd in a report ~t the
lning standards ofalmost half of its members was w~1I belOVo the poverty h~.
S)I\13 Pankhurst wriling in 1936. was I~ no doubt .that f3SCLS.m
represented the use of force in the()[)" but in social pohcy and.d~nnc the ,fasc~
promised to create was 'more masculine men and more fcmlnme women. 11lls
fitted into a racist context that pitted 'Roman' and 'Af)'an' clites against
'inferior' races. S Hitler made his racial and sexual prejudices about mce and
gender the basis OftllC state's social policy and !dCOlo~. ~omen. felt t1~c i~pact
offascism most dircctl) when it touched them III theIr faith.. thcn fanlll} life or
their occupational goals. Fascism invaded each of these areas and touched the
lives of ordil13T\' women and b} doing tlris influenced them in their daily
routines. This is·e.xactI) \\ hat Hitler had intended. By the use of propaganda. be
urged women to be feminine and proud to be so. He had them fccl that they
were a source of power at the roots of famil~ lifc. Hc realised that women ~d
be used to achiC\'C his aims. Although he \\ould never allo\\ them pohucaI
powcr. he supported their efforts and did not inte~ere \\ith. their separate
organisational structures. TIley however wcnt along ",th the \\lshes of a party
that wanted to deprive women of power and political innuence. For them
democracy and choice had resulted in chaos and competition. They wanted to
get away from that world and devote themsclves to family and economic
security. They believed that they had the opportunity to create tl~e. larges~
\\omen's organisation in history \\ith the blessing of the male chaUVinist Nazi
Party and without interference from an~ authorit~. The} \\ere also com;nced.
that they could gain unHmitcd power from \\ithin their own separate sphere -
an entirel} feminine world "here the) "ould imprm'e their 'own space'. In
other words their 'OVo"n Ii\;ng room' But the) would have to use nanel')' and
coyness to ward off suspicion of women's autonomy. 1lleir strength was \\hat
men feared.. but vet. nccdcd most.
This. of course. was nO( \\ hat Hitler had in mind. Hitler's ideal woman
would be of good background. have a large number of children and be loyal to
the state. In fact what he "anted was a dCVO~ follower \\110 would do, say and
4 Frcvl.'11. Women in German l!i.flOry. p. 182.
SR. I3riw.."Olhal (cd.), Becoml"g \,jjible: women III Hllropccm !listory (HostOIl, 1917), p.
500.
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believe whatever the slate wished. The psychological pattern of this type of
woman was:
The yearning for subjcction and self-surrender that lacks neither the features
of pcn;onallUlSelfishncss nor the shrill tones of hysterical faith; the blatant
prejudices and the ability to fit all obviously contradictory facts into her
philosophy ",i.thout any intellectual embarrassment, to canonise stupidities
and to surrender blissfully to the den!4'Sl obscurity.6
So it is not difficult to sec why the Nazi leadership preferred to recruit
passive women who would implement (Xllicies handed down from the male
leadership. Women had very Little control in the Third Rcich, but some like
Gertrod Scboll2-KJink who was appointed leader of the Nazi Women:s League
in 1934, managed to gain subslantial control oyer the women in her charge. Her
main job was to integrate all non-socialist and non~mmunist women's
associations into the Nazi network. While some embraced Na;dsm, some
Catholics and Protcslanls did express reservations for a time. but most
welcomed an authoritarian state in 1933. Most women believed that party and
church goals were the same. 7 Hitler demanded the SOI1 of talal surrender that a
wife should givc to a husband or a priest to his church. TItrough his 'faith',
women discovered a (XllilicaJ religion and pledged loyalty for Iifc. Even the
Nazi symbol, the swastika, embodied two lraditions important to them, the red
cross and the Christian cross.
Christian ideologies were far from Hitler's mind wben he proposed and
implemented his policies for the good of the German race. One needs to keep in
mind that his main aim was to restore the natural order of things, by keeping
men masculine and women feminine aided by a cleansing to purify the Aryan
race of its bad blood. Onc of the strdtegics used by the Na7J party in order to
keep women in thcir tradilional role was the use of propaganda 10 make them
happy and content with their domestic roles as mothers and bousewi\'CS. and
more imponantly, to keep them a\\'3)' from gainful employmenl
Hitler had promised from the beginning of his rule 10 keep womcn out
of public influence. MOlherhood was exalted. Homc economics institutes were
established arol,lItd the country. These institutes were supported by radio
programmes, home classes and popular media reports, all directed at cementing
the role of the modem homemakcr. Degrees and awards were also an incentive
offered to lhe perfect housewife and capablc mother. This had a two-fold effect
6 Joachim C. Fest, 77le face ofthe Third Reich (Hannondsworth, 1983), pA08.
7 Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the fatherland: WQme.ol, the family and Nazi politics
(London, 1987), p. 66.
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on the nation. With \'l'3rtime labour soortages the Na:t.is considc~ reversing
their (Xllicies. SO that women could be available to replace men III thc \\ork
place. There was resistance from women. man). of \\ltom had understood that
their rightful place was in thc home. Instead fOre1gn forced labour was used.
Loan schemes offered \\omen \\ays to sta) ID the home and rmse
childrcn.' A 1933 la\\ for thc ·cncouragcment of marriage' gavc I~ to
couples to maIl) with exemption of repayment for a large number o~ children
with lwenl)-fivc per cent being deducted f~m th~ loan for each c1uld borne.
This was after all the main aim of the fascist regunc: to make sure. that the~e
"35 a population to defend the statc for all lime. But to order to quahf) for thiS
:hc:me \\omen and men had to undergo medical tests to e.nsure each was ,Of
N)lln blood. In other words. racial 3\\arcncss replaced love III mamage. It \\as
im ratjvc that children born to Gcnnan people were perfect. Ar)ans ha~ to be
fr: from hereditary defccts which led to a lucrative .bla~k I~arket III .111:
document industr). The law for the ·Prevention of Hercdilanly SIC~ ,?(f~nng
\\"35 publicly acclaimed as the begJnning of stale measures for the elltnmauon..of
the biologicall) inferior. It forced raciall~ unfit mcn and women. ~on~ "1t.1t
alcoholics, mentally or physicall) handicapped peoplc to be stenllsed. It IS
cstimaled that mer three-hundred and sevent).-five thousand people were
forcibly sterilised and of Ihese five per cent wcre killed.
The establishmenl of the 'Motherhood Cross' was another part of the
incenti,e scheme. This \\as based on the notion thal .
The German mother of man\ children should bold the same place 01 honour
ill the national cornmuntty ~ the fronl-hne soldll..'r, for her nsk of bfe and
hod) for JXX'P1e and J:atherland was the same as that of the from Imc soldier
in the thundL-r of battle 10 .
Aa:ording to HiLler. equal rights for women meant tl13tthC) recetved the~
that they deserved in the sphere that nature had assigned to them. HO~e\·er It
\'1"35 more than that. The Nazi S)stem rested on a female hter:archy as \'lell as a
male cham of command. As in \\llttime. "omen bcliC\·ed theu sacnfices pla)"~
a vital role in a greater cause. mainly by bringing Nazi doctnn~ to ~'\'ety ~amtly
in the Rcich. Whilst Naa men preached race hate and nauonahsm \\oll~en
created a gloss of idealism. This in13ge kepi the morale ofGe~ men high
while lhe) continued the tymnn~ under 8,{!., IllUSIon ~t t~ remamed decen~.
Women in Nazi Gern13ny pul policies 1mo practJce. not alone b) their
• Fest, 71,e face if fhe Thinl !telcll. p 406,
, Bridcnthal, Becoming viSIble. p. 521
10 Fest, The face o/I/le Thinl Reich. p.407.
Fencouragement but also by implementing them themselves. For example. the}"
supported OC\\ Slerilisation policies. they ooycotted Je'\\ish businesses. by the use
of Nazi propaganda the)' converted the uncomrinoed sent their children to the
Hitler Youth to be indoctrinated and closed their doors to those who begged for
merc)'. Woman along with men. delh'ercd up their \rictims.
In return. Hitler purported to honour women as long as they remained
in motherly roles. Even going back to thc fall of imperial Germany in 1918,
families and schools prepared girls for roles as mothers and wivcs. The)' were
discouraged from wearing cosmetics and fashionable dress. as it was considered
'Jewish cosmopofitanism'. Smoking was strictly forbidden for pregmmt women
and physical fitness was encouraged at all times for the gOCKi of the nation.
Apart from their prohibitions. they could benefit in maners of. arguably. more
importance. For example. Guilda Diehl founded her own land mm·ement in
order to bolSler morale at the home-front She also defended women's interests
in separale women's legislation. Her snpporten; wanted more than tinder, kuch~
and kirche and beliC\"ed thal only women could bring health to the nation
through female solidarit), thal would unite Ary·ans of all classes. Although she
opposed a woman's right 10 work outside the home she proposed state subsidies
to allow moLhers with no support to stay at home. In general her main aim was
to work for Nazi "ictory from an independent position.
Gcnrud Scholz-Klink was another woman in the Nazi movement who
liked the feeling of power. As leader of the women's movements she had control
over Lheir actions and thoughts. It was she who indoctrinated a generation of
young women and girls 'to be brave, be Gennan and be pure'. Her women's
division concerned itself with women's responsibilities and fonned almost a
statc within a state. She directed government departments of economics,
education. colonial issues. consumer affairs. health and welfare without any
male inlerfcrence. Just as the Nazi part)' had organised on the peripheT)' of the
Weimar Republic. women's organisations organised on the periphery' of the
Nazi party. And to pro\"C Elias Caneui's view on crowds and power. this crowd
ofwomcn prescr..ed itself in the crowd of men and both kept each other alive in
an almosphere of hate and prejudice. In a recent interview with Claudia Koonz.
Gertrud SchollbK1ink argued Ihat by keeping women from political powcr. they
were saved from doing wrong and e\ril. 11 Howcver. she neglected to mention
that middle class Na/.i wivcs look belongings from Jewish people and thal there
werc women like Gerda BomUUln who told her husband not to rest until cvery
IJ Bridt:nthal, Becommg IIisible. p. 525.
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Jew was eliminaLed. She also closed her eycs to the fact that she heI5(M \lo'3S
prominent at the core of the C\TI that penncated the N37J era. She was
spectacular but ruthless and ruled oyer lhe livcs of thirty million w0n:-en. She
bad the responsibilit) of the bome spirit and told them ha\\" man) children to
tm·c, \\hcn to have them. \\hat to wear, what to cook and how to cook il.
Women in the nineteenth centuI)' wcre supposed lO oc moral crusaders,
bul by contrast the N37J woman forfeited her moral influence because she gave
herself up to the stale and enjoyed the rewards lhat she received. While
endorsing homely domesticated roles, lhey smuggled weapons, served as
couriers past police check-points and marched behind swastikas. In the guise of
heightening women's status, ScholLz and her followers invaded personal choices
DOl alone in childbearing and education. but also in ethical values and social
life. Nw women who once felt an atom of power wi.thin their own space found
to lheir cost that b) the late) 9305 the stale was beginning Lo destroy it. In less
than a decade these legal changes threatened 10 undennine long-standing family
\'3lucs.
The Divorce Refonn Act of 1938. led to an increase in legal
separations and there was a possibility of dissolving a marriage" here women
after five years of marriage had no! given birth. The ubensborn - a statc
rcgiSlered brothel organisation - was set up for the procreation of illegitimate
children and plans were in hand to allow men to marry Lwice for the purpose of
pnx:reation. Even if the family had four children already. the wife was obliged
under the law to allow him to remarry. All these new innovations in a country
thal set traditional Christian family values so high wenlto the opposite extreme
in less than a decade.
By surrendering their political rights in return for honour and prestige
bestowed on them as 'mothers of the faLherland'. Gennan women ultimately
llaIwred an equal role in helping to make the Third Reich possible. They made
Germany a pleasant place in which to live for their communit) but unbearable
and impossible for racially unworthy people. 1besc Nazi women helped make a
murderous state possible. llle)', along \\ith their men. foUowed Hitler from
conviction. opportunism and choice and although they did nOI issue orders. they
did implement them and played a vital role in making dictatorship, war and
genocide possible. By offering material aid. and emotional reassurance to Nazi
men they made fascism effective. \
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Corinthian or Philistine?
A history of modern sport
Jack Anderson
It is ditlicult to think of 11 modem society in which sport, ill its widest
sense, does not occupy an important role and indeed where it has not
taken on the trapping of a major, natiml-\vidc industry.l
]am~ Walvin suggcsts that sport is unquestionably humanity's greatest
~S~II~le. Sport. he contends. reveals everything from national idiosyncrasies to
mdivldual temperament It has developed from an activity rooted in folklore
and tradition to onc based on ntillions of pounds of sponsorship money. It has
spawned. ex~haustive academic study, mosUy 10 place it in its soci"ological
perspectIve.· It has even started wars. 3 Essentially, this paper attempts to place
sport. particularly male sports, in its social and historical context and hopes to
address these related issues.
Firstly, .an ~ttempt will be made to briefly outline the revolutionary
effect that the Vlclonan cullure of respectability and utilitarianism had on the
evolution of modem sport. In short. the Victorians transfonned folk-based.
custom-related. sporadlcally-held and often gratuitously violent events into
codified and 'socially acceptable' pastimes, Secondly, reference will be made
to Ihe manner in which Victorian sport coped with the social and commercial
~eman~s .of ~he twentieth century, particularly in relation to the impact of
llldust~hsatlon00 sport. Due to a myriad of reasons, sport, like many aspects
of SOClety, emerged from the industrial age in a fonn almost unrecognisable
from lh~t of before. Y~t, the impact which industrialisation had, both on sport
and soclcty was not Sllllpl)' structural in nature: the social values and norms
I J. Walvin, nle people's game - A social history ofBn'tish football (London, 1975),
p. I.
2 E. Dwuti,ng, Soccer: the social origins of the sport alld its dl'Velopmem as a
spectacle alld profession (Londoll, 1979), E. Dwming, Barban'alls: gentlemen alld
players: a sociological study ofthe dl'Velopmem ofRugby Football (Oxford, 1979), R.
HOI!, .SfX!r1 and the Bn'tish: a modem history, (Oxford, 1989) and A. Mason,
fsoclatlOflfootball and English sociely, 1863-1915 (Sussex, 1980).
[he .Honduras-El Salvador war of 1969 was inspired by a SOCC....T match the two
COWltries Wl-Te playing for the right to take part in the 1970 World Cup in Mexico see
R. Kapuscinski, 'The Soccer War ': The best ofGrollta reportage (London, 1993). '
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associated with sport were affected also. Finally, this paper will argue that in
many ways sport, as defined by the Victorians, was a victim of its own
success. While the Victorians tamed the wildness of traditional sports, their
popularity inevitably led to commercialisation and professionalisation. To this
end. winning, regardless of the means. became paramount. The epitome of
such pressure on modem athletes is the manncr in which they arc willing to
risk their health and reputation through the abusc of performance enhancing
dmgs, MOfCQvcr, it is suggested that this 'win at all costs' mentality is at the
root of the recent increase in on-field violence. l1lUs, it will be argued that
these contcmporary trends havc led to a corruption of the more honest and
respectful values ofspon and may in the long teon threaten spon's Itislorica.1
role as thc true 'opium of the masses',
Holt in his seminal study on sport and the British argues that
'modcm sport according to receivcd wisdom was invcnted in the mid
Victorian years ~ the 1850s to l880s':
violent, disorderly and disorganised ~'POrts gave way to more carefully
regulated ones adapted to the COllstraints of time and space imposed by
the industrial city, embodying the Victorian spirit of 1iClr-COlltrol and
energetic competition as well as taking advantage of the development or
the ruilways and the mass press.4
A bricf perusal of the history of sport supports this view. This golden age of
sport gavc birth 10 a diverse range of organisations, including the Football
Association (1863), the Rugby Union (\871). the Amateur Athletic
Association (1881) and in a slightly more reactionary manner. thc Gaelic
Athletic Association (1884), Sports like cricket nourished from village greens
to county-based leagues, boxing was regularised through thc Qucensbcrry
rules, Evcn racing, the SQ-<;3Ued 'spon of Kings' became more accessible to
thc Victorian bourgeoise with the inauguration of the Ailltree Grand National
in 1847,
During this period. 'traditional' sports such as cock-fighting, badgcr-
baiting. coursing and the ancient field sports of the landed gentry lost the pre-
eminence which they had fonnerly enjoyed. To the Victorians, the term
'sport' was no longer synonymous with the killing of animals any more than
street games such as football could be d~scribed as 'an ill-defined contest
between indeterminate crowds of youths' onan played riotously, in restricted
4R. Holt, Sport and the Bn'risll, p. 3.
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city streets producing uproar and damage and attracting an}'one wilh an
inclinaLion to violence.s
Quite apart from the social unrest these events cau.scd. the}' were
oOen ,accomparticd by injuries, maimings and even fataliLies, In fact. as
Walv'n notes, except lhal 'personal injury even death characterised early
references to football .,. the games would, and presumabl)' did, go
unrecorded.,6 As early as thc ft.fteenth century, the English monarch}' itself
'was forced to address lhis C\'cr-spiralling social phenomenon. In 1491 Jamcs
JV ordered that ·It is statule and ordained that in na' place of the Realmc there
be used Futeball. Golfe or uther skil unproffitable SJX>rtis' contrary 'to the
co~mo~ good of the Realme and defence thereof.,7 With wars either present
or 'mllllnent, monarchs in the medievaJ and early modern period were anxious
that thc, ~avourcd pastimes of the people were sIt3tegicaUy directed towards
more Imhtary concerns. Archery, jousts and duels wcre to be encouraged and
~ly games, ~cularly SLreet football, were seen as a threat to the very
fab~c and ~unlY of society and were e~..pressly condemned. The history of
pre-lOd~aJ SJX>n might be written in tenns of the attempts to suppress it
firslly. In the name o~ m~tarism and latterly. in the posI-refonnation age. i~
the name of ~bbalanamsm. In the puritan era games held on Sunda}' were
regard~ as .fnvolous and a waste of time, a view underpinned by a scriptural
adm~rutJon In Exodus 20: 8-10, Thus the Lord's Observance Act in the Irish
Parhamcnt of 1695 prohibited 'hurling, commoning [groWlrl hurling) and
football on the Lord's Day with the penalty of twelve pence for each offence.'
Indeed, ~rru:: commentators lr3Ce this religious anLipath)' to spon back 10 the
very begrnmng of Christianity itself. a point well made by Scanlan and
CIC\'eland:
The. <?1Yl,TIpics and the gladiatorial conlests ended al a time when
Ch.n~aruty was establishing itself in Rome. The acceptance of the
rchg~on by the Emperor Constantinc marked its establishment as the
offiCIal state ,religion and fostered its dc\'c1opmenl as the dominant
cul~ force m. the wc,st~ world. It is v.'O!1h noting that the spokesmen
for this cmergmg religion, great fmedievalJ scholars such as Saint
Au&,ustine and Saint Jerome. chose the customary rites at the Coliseum
(which had usually featured unfed lions and 1.IlIlUlned Christians) as
) Walvin. The people's game, p. 12.
~ Jbid., p. 11.
7 Ibid.
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JlO'o'erful S)mbols of pagan decadence and in the process tarred all sports
v.,th the same brush. I
Yet society and its laws were not al,,'3)'s so hostile towards spon.
Many ancient societies. particularly Greece. welcomed the competitiveness.
3lhleticislll and egalitarianism of sport. Sport was seen as promoting a
neCCSSIH)' outlet for the expression of violent and aggressivc tendencies in an
arena that unlikc the battlc-field. was contained, respectful. much less
dangerous and much less wasteful in tenns of life. cost and territof)'.
Consequently. in ancient Greece the law e.xelU»(ed fatal accidents that
occurTed during a sporting C\'cm from a charge of murdcr. on the grounds that
death was regarded as an inC\'itable risk of SJX>rt.9 Boxing and chariot racing
had high fataJity rates. Scanlan and Cleveland explain this legal exemption by
reference 10 the social mores of the spcclators. Blood was what they C'dme for
and blood was what they gOt,IO
It must re admitted that spon did not tra\'el comfonably through the
Middle Ages and beyond. nor did mediC\·aJ socict) particularl}' care about
specific legal prmisions for spon. lndeed. given its religious puritanism and
the fact that medieval society had more on its mind than leisure activity. Ihe
official and legal tolerance of spon can be safely said to have actually
decreased during this period,l1 Medieval Europe spent several centuries in a
stale of almost perpetual war. marked by invasions from the Teutonic north.
SC\'cn centuries of sporadic battles "ith the forces of Islam from the East and a
series of vicious border disputes evolving out of the collapse of the Holy
Roman Empire. lnvariabl}'. economic disruption and depravation
accompanied these wars and the bubonic plague regularly swept across a
weakcned continent. Medieval life was severe. dangerous and brief ....ith an
atmosphcre not conducive to the pastime of SJX>n or indeed any pastime ",itb
the notablc exception of an occasional witch-hunt. While a slight. if
contained. respite did come "ith the Renaissance and the Age of
Enlightenment the contained cultural fC\ival therein was more concerned with
the arts and sciences than any physical activity. Moreover. as the period ofthc
InduSlrial RC\'olution approached in Europe. the pri\ilcged elites withdmv
whatC\'Cr tacit suppon the} had for these aeth;ties in favour of more cultural
"
• Sce J, Scanlan, and G. Cleveland, 'Hie past a~a prelude: the early origins ofmodcm
American sports law'. OMoNatio"al U"ivenity Law Review. (3) pp. 433, 440 (1981).
'Ibid. p.437.
10 Ibid.
11 S. Lee, Aspect.! ofEuropeall J,;JIOT)'. 1494*1789 (London, 1992).
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and profitable pursuits. Arguably, the period 1750·1850 marks the lowest
JXlint almost to c.xtinction. of many sports and leisure activities especially' in
Britain and Ireland. Industrialisation ga\'e rise to a ne\\' monied puritanical,
mentality that initially' "denied the rights of industrial people to any leisure at
all. insisting instead onl)' on their economic utility. ,12
Yet, these puritanical attitudes gradually disappeared and as the first
Industrial Revolution gathered pace in the nineteenth centut)', the utilitarian
vi€:\\]Klint of society changed significantly. 8)' 1850, increased wages. better
working conditions. Improvements in communications and education and the
effects of urbanisation led to a rebirth of sport in its more recognisable modem
fonn. In Britain, the Victorians acknowledged that a suc:cession of
prohibitions would never stop the development of sports among the lower
classes. particularl)' a lower class that had a steady week.ly wage and the
leisure time in which to spend it. If any1hing, the Victorians took a pragmatic
view that thc only way to control these sJXlrts was to attempt to organise and
regulale tllem. The process of 'changing the game'. which admittedly was a
comparalively slow and gradual one. started around 1820 and lasted until !1le
begilUling of the present century.
In Victorian Britain, the JXllice force gradually became more aware of
the need to counter the JXltential for social unrest and the propensity, for harm,
injury and €:\'en fatality inherent in many of these so-<::aIJed 'sporting' events.
Such €:\·ents were seen as merely an e.'(cuse for gratuitous street violcnce and
mayhem, as subject to mob rule. Holt, for example. noted the remarkable rise
in prosecutions for the illegal holding of cockAights in Liverpool during the
18705.13 Moreover. it is around this period that the first prosecution of
spectators for aiding and abetting a bare knuckle prize fight was suc:ccs.sfulIy
mounted. 14As Walvin stated, 'The contrast with pre·industrial leisure \\'as
stark. TIle new forms of leisure were as disciplined, regulated and even as
time-tabled as the industrial society whicb spawned them. ,IS
This was especially true of those areas where there was a high
concentration of large-scale, regulated. factory-bascd manufacturing. For
e.'WIlple, in Lancashire. in north-eastem England, the new rhythms of
working hours brought about major changes in the way in which leisure time
was spent. The passage of the FaClory Act in 1850 and its statutory
11 Walvin, The people's game, pp. 26-7.
IJ Halt, Sport and the British, p. 57.
I~ Coney (1882) 8, QUD, p. 534.
IS Walvin, The people '3 Game, p. 56.
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introduction of 'la semaine anglaise' which in effect ordered the stoppage of
work at 2 p.ffl. on Saturdays produced the conditions which facilitated the
popularity in many urban areas of the 3 p.m. start to football games.
Industrialisation and urbanisation also affected and transformed the
most unlikely of sports evcn those tbought to be exclush·cly rural in nature.
such as greyhound racing. The matching of greyhounds for speed and killing
ability is an ancient sport and appealed as much to industrial workers as it did
to countr" foUI:. 16 With the introduction of circuit racing from the United
States in -the 19205. urban greyhound meetings. offering a cheap. night out
\\ith the opportunity to gamble legally. bccamc hugely popular. As Holt
obscr..cd.. during the period 1925 to 1935 Britain could be said to have truly
"gone to thc dogs' and by 1932 the annual altcndancc at licensed tracks in
London had risen to six-and-a·haIf million.I' This exemplified a trend general
10 lIlany SJXlrts at thc time. namely that sport was changing rapidly from
"open-field participation' to 'enclosed spcctatorism·. For large sections of the
working population in the United Kingdom it soon became the case tll3t their
only active particip;.ltion in SJXlrt was in the fonn of a betting stake in the
weekly football pools or at a track, usually run by a local magnate.
This mid-nineteenth century development llIeant that burgeoning
club learns and the public schools who between tllcm fostered the initial
development of modem SJXlrl did not have 10 confine themselves to local
contests. In effect sport became 'nationalised'. Moreover. it meant that
supporters could also tr3vel cheaply and quickly to places they would
othemise n€:\~r have seen. engendering a sense of camaraderie and
identification with their local team.
With the devcloprncnt of the new national school system in the
United Kingdom during the 18705. literacy rates among the working class
soared. From the 18805, regional OC\\'spapers in particular. helped b)' the
devclopments in communications such as the telegraph. began to give serious
covcrage to sport especially the 'gamble friendly' sports such as racing and
football. Results. fixtures. \~nucs. team-shect.s C\'cn starting prices became
much more accessible. Halt remarks that by the 1880s specialist newspapers
I, 11 still~ and arowKl ten thOlL'Wld s~tors, accompanied by equal aIOOWlts of
pl't>lcsk.--rs, annually attl..'Ild the Waterloo Cu~, coursing's biggest prize, held every
February at Altcar on the outskIns ofLivcrpool.
11 Iloh, Sport alld the British. p. 86. For further reading S'-"e N. Bakl.."I', Going to the
Dogs: hostility to greyhound rocing in Britain: Puritanism, socialism and pragmatism
in JOllnJal olSport HislOlY (2) (Swnmcr 1996), p. 97.
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such as Sportsman, Sporting Life and The Sporting Chronicle wcre each
selling over three-hundred thousand copies a day,18 The resulting publicity for
the sports in question was immense and further enhanced their popular
following and occasions such as the Derby became national events in their
own right. Over a quarter of a million Londoners were being drawn to the
Epsom Downs by lhe turn of the ccntuIy.19 Walvin, concluded:
Modem fOOlball reflected then a deep-rooted social revolution within
industrial society, involving the freeing of the lower strata to enjoy the
[lfSt meagre b..ilefits of a technically advanced and relatively
sophisticated society. Leisure time, more money and the improvements in
education, transport and comnnUlication~ cwnuJati\'ely produced the need,
desire and possibility for leisure and recreation.20
Howcvcr, whilc Walvin refers to football only, his words may apply to all
sports during the utilitarian period. In short, the new industrialised class,
anncd with a utilitarian view of socicty, was responsible for lhe birth of
modcm sport. The newly emcrging middle class mentalities inspired people
across the social spectrum. Public schoolmasters such as Thomas Amold
recognised both the physical and mental benefits of organised sport in their
attcmpts to refoml their unruly and aristocratica1ly arrogant pupils. 21 Trade
Unions and factories were equally taken by this wave of 'embourgoisement'
into organising recreation for their leisure time. In fact many of today's
professional football teams have such hwnble origins. For example, in a
northern suburb of Manchester, workmen of the Lancashire and Yorkshire
Railway Company fonned the Newton Heath team in 1880. In 1902 it took the
name Manchester United. Workmen employed at Singer's cycle factory in
Coventry formed Singers Football Club in 1883 and by 1898, the team had
become Coventry City. In London workers at the munitions factory in
Woolwich began to play football in 1886, as Royal Arsenal Football Club,
then latcr as Woolwich Arsenal. The present name, Arsenal, was adopted in
1914. 22
IS Holt, Sport and the Bn·tish. p. 181.
19 Sec the discussion of the role of the sporting pn.'ss in A. Mason, As.wciation football
and Hnglish society: 1863-1915 (Sussex, 1980), p. 175.
20 Waivin, The people's game. p. 66.
21 It was in the public schools that the rules for many of today's more popular sports
were initially drafted, see E. Dwming, Bamariam. gentlemen ami players where he
outlines the role of sport, especially rugby, in the public schools of the time starting
with the famous 'pick and run' ofWilliam Webb Ellis in Rugby school in 1823.
22Walvin, Thepeople 's game, p. 60.
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Given the above it can be argued that spon, once organised and
codified, becamc not only socially acceptable to the ~ictorians but an integral
part of what it meant to be British. Victorians recognised the ~umcr~us values
that a spons-Ioving nation. or even empire, could hol.d..TW~ ID particular arc
noteworthy. Firstly, it was seen to contribute to a dmllnutlOn of a tcnde~cy
towards social unrest. Taking part in sport mcant that workcrs had less time
for drinking. and sport was even charged with promoting social col~esion by
bringing the classes together both in participation and in spcctalmg. The
monarchy was quick te acknowledge the social lubricant that W"dS sport and as
early as 1914 Gcorge V began thc tradition of royal attendance at the FA Cup
Final. EvidenUy, it was not lost on the British establishment that many of ~he
men and women they would have to rely on in the then inevitablc upcollung
war against Germany would be typically drawn from such crowds. Secondly,
sport was held. not alone to be good for the p~ysique, ~ut it al~ hcl~ ~o
build charactcr, in thc true traditions of the gntty EnglIshman, nnbumg In
him a sense of fair play and honour. Victorian commentators suggcsted tl~at
thcse factors contributed to the social stabilily of Britain during this volal.Jle
fin de sii!C/e period, . .
British lcaders, espedally within publ.ic school oreles. ~lIsed that
books alone could not teach the young such VirtUes as sclf-restnunt honour
and the 'give and take' of life. 23 Lord Wellington was moved 10 rcmark that
the batUe of Waterloo had been won on the playing fields of Eton. Even
chauvinistic Swiss mcn like Baron de Coubertin, founder of the modem
Olympic Games. agreed that the encouragemcnt of p~ysica1 vigO~ ~nd group
co-operation in games had played an important part In the acqUlSltIOll of the
British Empire! 24
EveT)'one from king to pauper was expected to be a 'sport', an
attitudc which some commentators suggest was an important factor in thc
social stability of the United Kingdom as compared to the other great powers
of this period. such as France. Scanlan and Clevc.land a:'ncl~de l~t team
sports played a role in 'debmtalising thc masses. filling thelr leisure tIme and
offering opportunities for distinction with less regard to class (or ra~).tban
might reign otherwise. ,25 British commcnlators such as Mason smularly
remark that 'sport could provide the ce(!lcnt which would fill the dangerous
gaps between classes and wedge them tiglw in a relationship based in part on
23 Halt, Spol1 and the British, p. 93.
2~ Ibid. p. 274.
:rJ J. Scanlan, and G. Cleveland, 'The past lIS a prelude, pp. 433, 441-2, fu48.
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common excitements and shared pleasures. ,26 Indeed, Holl goes as far to point
out that a ner\'Ous King George V anticipating his first Labour gon:rnment
was advised that "the general feeling of the countIy was that, true to British
ideals, the Government, whoever they should be, should have a fair chance. ,21
That is a sporting chance, regardless ofclass or social standing.
In conclusion. this industrial age also gave birth 10 a new monied
'working' class whose "aloes ","'Cre not so Corinthian. As the crowds
expanded. the pcxential and real income from sport and football in particular,
could no longer be ignored, especiaJl)' by the industrial. magnates of northern
England::'l In general elite pla)'Crs in the more popular team sports such as
football and rugby soon recognised and realised for themselves the monetaJy
value of Iheir sporting skills. For many, especially the less privileged in
society, sport became an accessible and potentially rewarding profession as
athleticism, unlike the qualifications needed for the traditional professions,
recognised no social barriers or educational auainment to success.
Nevertheless. it 'was argued binerl)' that professionalism and
professionals would be seen to convert into a job, an activity which should
have been a mere pastime, Sport would become a \\'ay of life rather than an
enjoyable and diversionary part of life. In turn it was felt that this would lead
to an oyer-emphasis on winning at any cost given that the livelihood of the
professional would depend on it. Furthennore, it would destroy amateurism
because no amateur could compete with the best professionals who trained and
practised toge!.her. The emphasis in sport would alter from onc of
participation to one of aggressive 'spectatorism'. feeding the ever vicious
circle of competition and blurring the line between the respect for 'fair play'
and a resort to cynical gamesmanship. To paraphrase the unforgettable
comments of BBC commentator Kenncth Wolstenhohne, ageing Victorian
athletes thought that the professionalism of !.he twentieth century signalled
thal thc golden age of sport was 'all ovcr'.
105 Mason, AssocJOtionfoolball, p. 222,
27 Holt, Sport and the Bn'tish, p. 268.
28 Ibid. p. 222. Sce also Walvin, The people's game, p. 222.
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A troubled relationship
Tbe influence of tbe West in Russian history
William Sexton
This paper will cxamine the thousand·ycar relations~p between Russia an,ct
the West. In order to assess this question. it is pertment 10 define \\hat IS
meant by Russia. Russia comes from the word Rus or pecple. first used b) the
Norsemcn. \\hich ultimately originated from Roslagen. north of Stockholm.
"here Ihe traditional Viking founders of the Russian states originated, This
conncction \\ith Sweden highlights the ambiguity of Russia: inOuenced by the,
Wcst yct always remaining detached from Wcstcm cnlturc.
What is Ihe West? According to some it encompasses Europe and the
Amcricas. thc westem hcmisphere and Europe. non~mmunisa nations. that
15 western Europe and the United States of America. This COnccpl of .West' is
associated with Western Cluistianit)'. the rule of la\\. democratic secular
constitutions and a concept of human rights. in CODtrnsl \\ith twenticth
ccntUJ) Russian or Soviet history. '\\ hose people wcre viewed as a nation ,of
slavcs.· 2 This paper will explore the complex and oftcn controversIal
interaction between Russia. 'whose Western researchers by and large feci only
astonishment and contempt'J and the West in temts of literature. religion.
architecture. gcograph)'. personalities. concepts of laws and constitutions and
abo\·c all history.
In cont.rasl to the relatiyely restricted dimensions of France or
Gcnnall), Russia is characterised b)' a \\ide "ariel)' of environments stretching
from high steppes. thick forests. high mountains and rugged plateaux. TIle
European plain is west of the Urals and includes Russia's industries. richest
soils. and its principal cities. The Urnls separate thc European plain from
Russia's Asiatic Siberia. Its AraI.caspian lowlands arc arid and oftcn include
formcr SO\iel territories such as Kazakhstan and Turkmcnistan. its west
Siberian plain is marshy. rising DO more than one hundred and fifty~
abo\'c sea level while the central Siberian plateau is forested and Arcllc·llke
\
1 1~lOnd Kochan, The making ofmodem RUSSia (l-Iannondsv.orth. 1997), p. s.
1 Edvard RBdzhinskr. Stalin (London, 19%). p. 34.
J Akxander I. SoIJ.henitsyn, nU! morlal danger: how misconceplioll$ aholll Rl/ssia
imperil llle West (New York, 1980), p. 10,
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and rich in mineral resources. Finally Russia's cast Siberian uplands are
dolled with mountains "hich face the Pacific Ocean.
As a nation Russia is a contrast of time-~.oncs. 1t is a vast plain acting
as a natural bridge across Eurasia. Its northerly location, relative isolatjon and
its mountains and deserts have hindered eM)' conlact with Europe and has left
Russians with 'the consciousness of me insecurity of land frontiers.,4 In
contrast to the United States' location on both the Pacific and AlIantic Oceans,
Russia's longest coastline is on the frozen Arctic, while its shon Pacific and
BaItic coastlines are often ice-bound. Russia is in many respects not just a
~lr)r but a .world of its own. Its geography also indicates great diversity of
chmatcs rangmg from Arctic, sub-tropicaL humid, dry-fertile and continental
while its many major rivers such as the Volga., Pechora. Ne\'a and Don are
amongst !he world's major waterways. In both size, stature and mentality
Russia remains inunensc although the boundary changes of 1991-92 have
reduced it SOJ1lC\\hal.
Some would suggest that Russian history was and is a tug of war
betwcen Asian and European forces "ith neither side gaining complete
ffi3StCI)'. As lan Bcckeu has suggested. Russia's world-\':iew has perceived a
constant menace from foreign PJwcrs threatening invasion. s Between 1240
and .1480 Russia came under Mongol ruJc. Up to the eighteenth centlll)'.
Russla fought many wars \\ith Sweden, Poland and Lithuania. In 1812.
NaPJleon's invasion of Russia - the First Great Patriotic War - was repellaL
1854 to 1856 saw the Crimean Wa:r against Britain and France while the
twentieth celllUl)' saw conflicts with both Gennany and Japan. Much of what
relates to Russia is also relevant to both her Belorussian and UkJanian
neighbours who share a common culture and varying histories. They perceive
'the bad old Russia of01d,6 as a myth.
Who resided in Russia and its neighbours? Research indicates thal
~ine.or southern Russia was dominated between lOOOBC to 200AD by
Cnnmenans, Sg'lhians. Sannalians - the lasl two being Iranian. Belween
200 and 370AD Gemmnic Goths from Scandinavia ruled and were followed
in 370 by Mongolian Huns. These too were replaced by Ule A\'iUS and
Khazars who laler converted to Judaism. Much of northern Russia was
: I~l &:ckcn. Commullist military machine (Hong Kong, 1987), p. 187.
Ibld.,p.12.
6 Solzhcnibyn, The mono! danger, p. 16.
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dominated 1))' nomads. while other sparsely populated areas were occupied
mainly by Baits and Finns.'
Between 400 and 800 Sla\s began 10 spread out from their original
habitats in Poland and the Black Sea areas to central and eastern Europe. lhe
Ukraine. Belarus and Russia edging oul Gcnnans and Balts. The}' were active
traders and townspeople. During the ninth ccnlul)'. \\hcther by force or by
consenl, Vikings from S\\eden and German} set up proto-Russian states such
as No\'gorod and KiC\'. Both Slavs and non-Slavs - Khazars and Vikings -
inter-married. The greater dispersion of Slavs throughout Ewop;: and Asia
resulled in the creation of different languages such as Ukranian. Polish and
Russian. Up to the late tenth ccntUl), Russians worshipped nature gods,
Around 988. Kiev's grand prince Vladimlr I adopted Christianity. Although
his mother favoured Roman Catholicism. he accepted Christianity emanating
from the Bp.antine capital of Constantinople. This choice proved 10 be a key
element in shaping the future orientation of Russia and its neighbours since it
brought them inlo the Eastcrn Orthodox world, Unlike Europe, "here nations
like France and Germany became great!) influenced 1))' Romc's heritage and
language. Russia orientated itself towards Greek mfluence and the heritage of
caesaro-papism which had an emperor as head ofbolh church and state.'
KiC\'aD Russia was. after 1050. in decline \\ith ci,;1 wars. famines.
new rivals and fC\'olts 1))- cities like Novgorod. In this vulnerable stalc. it could
not fend off Mongol attacks between 1237 and 1240 which was to culminate
in the tragic conclusion to the KiC\'an period.9 Thc Mongols destroyed Kiev
and other cities. subjugated almOSl all Russia and regularly invaded eastern
Europe. 1bey incorporated Russia wilhin the Golden Horde which was ruled
from Sarai on the Volga. Although Russians sometimes exaggerated Mongol
oppression. it is true to say that the period between 1240 and 1480 was
eharacterised by hC3.'')' taxcs. wholcs.'l1c waste, gcnocide and stultification of
fledgling democratic institutions. Above all, whilc Europe was transformed by
the Renaissance, voyages of diSCO\'cl)' and constitutional ideas. Russia was cut
off under the yoke of Mongol rulc. 10
Kiev was replaced as thc focus of Russian lifc by northern Russia.
Cities like Novgorod. Pskov and Moscow comp;:lcd for Mongol favour. Many
•
7Lco!lUriS, ropaz (New York, 1968), p.lOg,
• Tim Judah, The Serbs: history, myth ami the destruction afYugoslavia (London and
New Ilaven, 1991), p.44.
9 Ores! Subtelny, Ukraine: a hisrory (TooII010, 1988), p. 41.
III Kochan, Modem Ru.uia, p. 16.
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princes like Alexander Nevsky became national heroes by fighting off attacks
from the Teutonic Knights and Sweden. Finally Moscow became the pre-
eminent state. Its princes, such as Yuri and lvan I, were favoured by Mongol
leaders who made them grand dukes and allowed them to collect ta'\cs. Helped
by its location, Moscow soon became increasingly independent and between
1380 and 1480 it eliminated Mongol rule. After the Ottoman capture of
Constantinople in 1453, Moscow's Ivan III married the Byamtine heiress Zoe.
This led to many developments including his self-proclamation as tsar, or
Russian Caesar, which was based on the claim that Moscow was the heir of
the east Roman empire. He encouraged the idea of Moscow as a third Rome
which had succeeded both Rome and Constantinople, where true Christianity
would sUrviVC. ll This myth-making would sunrivc to form part of modem
Russian ideology.
This identification with the cast Roman empire and Orthodoxy
provided a powcrful ideology that in practise saw the tsar as ruling almost by
divinc right, thereby starting 'Russia's long tradition of bureaucratic statc
power ovcr socicty. ,12 During this period Russia expanded to the Caucasus,
Volga and Siberia.
Many features of modem Russia developed during thc sixteenth
century. Tsars increased power by centralisation and weakened the hereditary
nables - boyars - in favour of nables who owed their position to service.
While this reflected many processes in Europe, Russia's past devclopment and
distinctivc culture and geography gave it a more dcspotic twist than clsewhere.
This process was intcnsified in Russia under Tvan IV who ruled from 1547 to
1584.
Ivan IV, 'who was unaffected by the great movcment of the
Renaissance',13 was a tyrant. He fanned a huge secret police force, the
oprichnika, had tcns of thousands murdered, burnt many cities such as
Novgorod, gave land arbitrarily to his servants and even killed his heir. !van's
rewards to his servants helped create a new nobility and spread the idea of
serfdom whereby peasants remained on landed estates and farmed it. While
serfdom was diminishing in Europe due to the cultural revolution, the
expansion of trade, the availability of money and the exploration of the
11 Leon Uris, Annageddon (London, 1964), p. 158.
12 Stephcn F. Cohen, Voices of Glasnost: interviews with GOrVachev's reformers
(London and New York, 1989), p. 32.
Il Peter Calvocoressi, Resilient Europe: 1870-1000 (London and New York, 1991), p.
73.
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Americas_ Russian serfdom became entrenched and economically inefficicnt. 14
Ivan IV pursued wars against the Mongols. Sweden and Poland with varying
degrees of success.
The years 1584 to 1613 became known as the 'Time of Troubl~'
with weak and incompetent tsars like Ivan's son Theodore I and Bons
Gudonov. Between 1605 and 1613 many pretenders, such as the fi.rst and
second Dmitris claimed the Russian throne. Civil war betwcen nobles,
peasants and C~ssacks and the Polish and Swedish invasions of Russia all
scn'cd to weaken the country.15 At one time the boyars ....ffered the throne to
Poland's Prince Wladyslaw. but fcar of Poljsh dominance ended this
possibility. After much fighting things went in favour of the Romanov family
whose scion Miehacl was offered the throne by the special assembly - Zemskii
Sobor. His descendants ruled Russia until 1917. nlC invasions from the west
of the Polcs and Swedes confinned for many Russians their anti-Western
attitudcs. Under the reigns of Michael and his son Alexis between 1613 and
1676 Russia annexed most of the Ukraine and Siberia and increased its power,
at the expense of Poland and Sweden.
Up until the late seventeenth century. Russia remained aloof from the
West and its modernist trends. l6 However from the time of Peter the Great,
who ruled between 1682 and 1725. Russia began to embmce Western ideas. It
is pertinent 10 examine certain aspects of Russian culture and society up to the
scventeenth century. Russian art flowered with the adoption of Christianity
and during UlC late thirteenth century under Mongol rule developed into three
schools, those ofK.ie\'. Novgorod and Pskov. Russian art and architecture took
its inspiration from the Eastern Chureh_ with its anti-sculptural natUIC and its
distinctive onion-d.omcd churches. The period of Mongol dominance saw
cities like Pskov and VIadimir building churches such as SI. Dmitri. As
Moscow came to the fore, brick and stone buildings began to rcplace wood
and many Krem/in churches were designed by Ilalian architects.
The Russian church was noted for its monasticism. Communities
modeUed on that at Greece's Mount Athos were founded. Icons and religious
art spread quickly from the churches to peoplc's homes. I? TIle fall ofKicv as a
14 John M(:rrirr)an, A history of modem EUr8f?e: from the French Revolution to the
present (London, 19%), p.806. \
U Roy Mcdvedev, The October Revolution (London, t979), p. 178.
16 John L.H. Keep, L.ast of Ihe empires: a history of the SOlI;et Union 1945-1991
(Oxford,1996), p. 28.
17 Subtelny, Ukraine, p.50.
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consciousness as 1x:ing fellow Europcans,1l imported French chefs and
GcmUUl bakers. eating onl~ European dishes and speaking only French while
'looking to the West for a model of progress.'=:: Russian art and architecture
was dominated b) imports nith artists. particularly from Italy. creating a
Weslern European Baroque st)le nith palaces such as the Winler Palace
designed by Bartolommeo Rastrelli. This Westernisation took place only
among nobles and intensified divisions between nobles and peasantry.
WCSlem art was incomprehensible 10 many peasants removed from Western
sown concepts and thi:; incomprehension ma)' havc. as !:Ome historians ha\'C
argued. sowed the seeds of m'oh iD Russian minds.
Catherinc the Great is a major sym1xl1 of this division between
peasant and Westernised noblc. A Gennan princess. she usurped her
husband's throne in a coup d'etat in 1762. Being well-educated. she paid
aucntion 10 Western ideas and corresponded with Diderot and Voltairc.
However her record was one of contradictjons. Her profession of
Enlightemncnt principles contrasled sharply with her actions. Dependent on
the nobility, due 10 her dubious legitimacy, she entrenched serfdom, crushed
peasant revolts and cnscrfcd the Ukranian peasantry. While she introduced
many innovations and rcfornlS. particularly in medicine and education. she
started wars of aggression against Poland and Ottoman Turkey. Her cynical
three-fold partition of Poland when thc lattcr was trying to implement new
constitutional ideas mock her pretcnsions to progress. She treated her heir
Paul badly and her Enlightcnment pretensions gavc way to increasing
repression.
After Catherinc's dealh in 1796. Paul ruled until he was assassinated
in ISOl "ith his son's complicity. The patricide succeeded as Alexander I
"ith a reign that reflected that of his grandmother. Young and idealistic. be
talked of fundamental changes including the dra\\ing up of a constitution.
freeing of serfs.. and even the setting up of a republic. HowC\'er like many
before and after him he found that Russia's dC\'clopment and culture rendered
her iII-suited for such fundamental change.=3 Reliant on aristocratic support
and facing the threat of Napoleon. he abandoned any plans for change. Some
historians \'iew him as a sincere reformer whilc othcrs view him as irresolute,
dc\'ious and caught between Weslern .ideas and lite realities of Russian life.
Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812'-.vas repulsed by all Russians led by
centre of power led to religious authorit) shifting 10 Moscow in 1328. At this
time Mosco\\ 's rulers became linked \\ith the Church 'which remained rather
aloof from mundane secular concerns. ,11 The sixtecmh century was marked by
divisions wilhin the Church nith many. like St Nil Sorsky. who believed in
poverty and religious toleration.19 While others like SI. Joseph of Volotsk
supported unit) of chureh and state. ownership of property and religious
confOmllly. The lalter group succeeded in 1589 when Moscow's Metropolitan
Job was made pau'iarch (hereby rendering the Russian church independent
The SC\'cmeenth century saw Western theological ideas ~tcred by Patriarch
p)10r Mogila's sySlem of theological training. But under Patriarch Nikon
during the 1650s. schisms occurred. Hc introduced liturgical refonns that
caused conservativc groups known as 'Old Believcrs' to break away. They
wcre persecuted and fled to Siberia where they still exist and are noted for
their repULation of economic efficienC)'.
Petcr the Great is a controversial figure. To some he is the tsar who
embraced European culture. introduced major refonns to Russia ill
shipbuilding, dress, education, mathematics, tcchnology :md in the army. He
ensured that his nobles would serve in Ule stale apparatus and that they would
be able to compete with the best of Europe. Hc managed to defeat Poland and
Sweden dccisively during the Great Northern War bern'ceD 1700 and 1nl
and brought Russia to t.hc West's attention with 'another round of Russian-
Turkish fighting.':tl Yct he was an eccentric in the mode of an Ivan or a
Stalin. He built his new western city. St Petersburg. on the Baltic Sea over the
bodies of tcns or perhaps hundreds of thousands of people. His refonns and
conquests burdened greatl) the serfs who were increasingly bound to their
landJords. as the latter were bound to Peter. Some Russian authors. such as
Andrei Bel)' in his [)(J\'el Pelershurg. viev. St. Pctcrsburg as a metaphor for
anempted Westernisation of Russia.
After Petcr came thirty SC\'Cn years of tsarina rule. During this period
the Russian noblcs were able to free themselves from obligatory seni.ce. This
period saw intcnsified Westernisation. Italian, French. Swedish and English
words entcred the Russian language. Russian ballet commenced under the
supervision of Freneh teachers such as Jean Baptistc LandeL Imitation of
things European becamc commonplace. Russian nobles. 'who had a
18 Kochan,,\fodenl Russia, p. 7.
19 t\lexand<.:r I. Solzhcnitsyn, From under rhe rubble (London, 1975), p. 40.
:l(l Judah, TheSerb:J, p. 54.
62
11 Uris. Topaz, p. 164.
22 Meniman,Afodem Europe, p. R08.
13 Ibid., p. 608.
,
63
Alexander. In 1814 Russia and her aBies defeated France and enlered Europe
vlC1oriously.24
However. despite Ule viC1ories. there was some uneasiness in the
Russian anny. Many Russian officers who had explored Europe on their
military campaigns came into contact with Western ideas of constitutionalism
and democracy. These 'captivated' the revolutionary movements in the
country.ll They were funhered radicalised by Alexander's increasing
conservatism, leading the officers to view revolution as their only means to
rcfonn. TIle fonnation of secret societies was met with increasing repression.
When Alexander died in 1825 these officers tried to overthrow his anti-liberal
brother Nicholas I in the failed Decembrist Revolt. Nicholas was a suspicious
man. He restricted universities, increased ccnsorship and expanded the secret
police. Yet his repression proved a failure. Known as the 'Policeman of
Europe' he failed to deal with the growing land problems resulting from
population growth and agricultural backwardness. His oppression merely
stimulated Russian literature and led to the radicalisation of new political and
social ideas -towards left·wing ideologies.' :l6
The Crimean war, 1854-6, showed how bankrupt Nicholas's policies
were. The}' proved to be inadequate against British and French forces. The
new tsar, Alexander 11, realised that serfdom would have to end or the regime
would fall. Aided by favourable economic conditions, his 1861 proclamation
freed serfs. He also introduced juries, relaxed army discipline, intrrouced a
S)·stem of local government, although. he never intended to destro)'
aristocratic poljtical power?l However, the partial failure to solve peasant
O\'erpopuiation and the rise of radical anti-tsarist radicals, induced Alexander
to pursue an expansionist and 'Pan-5lavic' foreign policy. This culminated
when Russia went to war with the Turks. In his last years he fCvened to a
refonning policy and at the time of his assassination approved a draft
constitution setting up a parliament, the Duma. His assassination induced his
anti-liberal heir Alexander III to ditch this constitution and to J'C\'erse many of
his reforms.
Alexander In relied largely on censorship, the secret police and
force to maintain order and this policy was continued b)' his successor
14 Nikolai TolsIOY. The minister and t/fe mauacres (London., 1986), P .363.
11 David Thomson, Political ideas (Hannonds....,orth, 1966), p. 14.
2(i Ibid., p. n.
21 Gail Shcehy, Gorbachev: lhe making of/he man who shook the world (London,
1991), p. 294.
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Nicholas 11. who came to the throne in 1894. His minister Stolypin tried to
creatc a base of land-owning peasants in order to maintain th~ monarchy.~. In
spite of their effons Russia was changing greatly. Peasants migrated to ClUCS.
Industry expanded massively after 1870, in new areas ~uch as manufacture.
mining and oil drilling. Its expansion into CenLr.al AS13. the Caucasus and
Siberia continued during this period. Both tsars Implemented a pro~m of
'Russi£ication' _thal is. the pressurising of non-Russians to learn RUSSian ~nd
to become Orthodox... It can be argued that the mpid changes in Russian
society helped seal the C\'enlual doom of the Romanovs as ~ old .au~ocr:acr
'was iJJ<quipped to deal "ith the new conditions of increased ~dust.nal~Uon.
Gail Shcedy noted that ·thc Russian people had no cxpencncc of I1beml
.. ,29
monarchy or economic compeuuon.
Interaction \ViUI Europe took place on the intellectual level as well as
the political and military'. Russian IiterJture wellt through a rcnais:sancc or
'golden age' between 1815 and 1910. This era produced many wnteTS and
intellectuals such as Alexander Pushkin_ Nikolai Gogol. Ivan Turgencv.
Fyodor DostofC\'sky. Leo Tolstoy. Alexander Ostro"sl~y, Anion Cbe~,
Ma.'(im Gorky and Andrci Bely. Thcy were noted for thelT treatment o~ ~al
issues and Russian identity. A major question among intellectuals at thIS tnne
focused on which direction Russia should go. Was it to become a part of the
West or remain separate? Ivan Turgenev spoke for the former, those 'willl a
passionate love for Europ::an oonstitutionalism'JO while Fyodor ~oyevsky
spoke for the later, the SlavophiJes.. who it seemed to many 'did ~ot want
Russia to go forward. ,)1 While some Sla\"ophiles supponed ehange thIS debate
dominated Russian intellectual life. Other cultural pleasures. such as ballet
and art flourished. Ballet prrouccd people like Lev h'anov. Michel Fokioc.
Olga Prcobrajenska. Aona Pavlova. Tamara Karsavina. Scrgei Dia~lcv ~d
Vaslav Nijinsky. Art produced ligures like Thomas de Thomo.n: hya Repm,
Andrci Voronikhin. Vasili Stasov. Ale.xander IV3nov. VaSlil Perov and
Mikhail Vrubel.
TIle tensions wjthin Russian society exploded in the 1905 RC\'olution
"hich was touched off b)' humiliating defeats at the hands of the Japanese.
"The J'C\'olution ended in the granting of a Duma and a constitution known as
the 'October Manifesto' Although the!c. concessions were restricted.. Russia
. ,
;>I Ibid., p. 294.
:Ill Ibid., p. 295.
JO Rad7.hinsky. Stalin, p. ix.
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seemed to be heading along the road to a constitutional monarchy or cvcn a
republic. However. the weakness of Nicbolas 1I in both foreign and domestic
policy, oombincd with the disaster of the First World War destroyed Romanov
autocracy, Thc road seemed set for the destruction of the proto-democratic
institutions b)' Ihe Bolshcvik coup d'elat. wilh some historians stating it as 'a
naked scizure ofpower,32 and a 'quickly spawned .. , militaristic, nationalistic
despotism.•))
The course of Russian history and society from 1917 to 1991,
provides an arena for great oont.rovef'S)'. SeeD at firsl, by some, as a road
towards a 'workers paradisc', it became evident that this was a substitution of
onc tyranny for another, a tyranny that was far more oppressive than that of
the tsars. The BolshC\iks under Vladimir Lenin, deposed a democratic
provisional govcrnment in October 1917, Icft thc First World War at the treaty
of Brcst·Li-..otsk in 1918. fought a civil war with their opponents from 1918 to
1921 and then set in motion the 'Sovietisation' of Russian life. This included
the persecution of the Orthodox Church. the adoption of onc-pan)' rule and
mass repression. AJler Lenin's death in 1924 he was succ:ecdcd by Joscph
Stalin. who is estimated to han: killed bctween thiny and fifty milJion
Russians and non·Russians between 1924 and 1953.~
During his dictatorship, Russia and its dependent territories, which
became known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), were
traumatised by forced collectivisation into state·run farms. industrialisation,
the 'Great Terror' or purges, mass deponations and famines. 3$ In August. 1939
Stalin signed a non·aggression pact with German)' which partitioned eastern
Europe into Nazi and Soviet spheres of influence. Poland 'was once again to
oomc under Russian occupation. This pact \\"35 tenni.nated by Hitler's attack
on the USSR on 22 June 1941 which began the 'Great Patriotic War' and
broughl the USSR into the Allied camp. Whcn Germany was finally defeated
in May 1945, Soviet Russia seemed to M\'e nOl only proven itself as a major
JXlwcr but as a new superpower on the world stage. Howevcr, thc initial
~lIusion with the West in the Allied camp dissolved into conflict culminating
In the Cold War t.hat lasted until 1991 which pitted the US·led western bloc
against the Sovict·lcd eastern bloc. The focus of Soviet policy during this
32 Ulis, Armageddon, p. 159.
3lThomson, Ideas, p. 152.
l( Sol".lu:nitsyn, Rubble, p. vii.
l5 Ulis, Topaz, p. 106,
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period was the creation of a communist world.)6 Stalin was succeeded in 1953
by Nikita Khrushchcv who rela.xed Stalin's iron grip on Russia but was
himself forced out of office in 1964.
Khrushchcv's removal was t.he signal for a partial re·Stalinisation of
SO\1ct life under Leonid Bre7.hnev. Although relations between the United
States and the USSR improved duling the 19705 with the Strategic Anns
Limitation Talks (Salt) leading to a reduction in nuclear weapons. relations
\\ocscned in t.he 19805.)7 Meanwhilc, the rc-imposition of stricter social
oonttols brought the Soviet government into conlliet with its subjects in the
western parts of the USSR and with dissidents such as Andrei SakhatO\' and
Ale..xandcr Solzbenitsyn whose books oondemned the Stalinist past.
On the foreign front the USA was angered by what it saw as SO\1e1
interference in Latin America and Africa. In lhe mid-1980s il became clear to
many communists that the USSR \\"35 in need of radical change. FolJ~win~
Brezhncv's death in 1982 and the rule of some short-lived succ:essors, Mikhail
GOIbacbcv gained power in 1985. He commenced JXllicies of g/asnost and
pereslroika which advanced both external and int.ernal liberalisation. He
allowed eastern Europe to break away from SO\1cl domination between 1989
and 1991 and he ended lhe Cold War. However. his policies released tensions
\\hich ripped at the core of t.he SO\'iet system and following an attempted coup
in August 1991 he lost power to his rival Soris Yeltsin who accepted the
USSR's break·up and became president ofa rump Russian state.
Despile the turmoil of the twentieth century, Russia still produced
many great figures in its cultural life. Many inteUectuals proved to be fierce
critics of communist oppression. Russian architecture. although stifled by
oonununists, produced some innovations such as the 'wedding cake'. Musical
geniuses such as Dmitri Shoslakovich. Aram Khachaturian and Sergei
ProkofiC'" made vital contributions 10 music while the Bolshoi ballet produced
gcniuses such as Rudolf NUnI)'cv. HowC\'er. in general. communist rulc stifled
the cultural expressions of Russians and len an oppressive legacy than
continues to suppress Russian culture.
On the C"'e of the twenly first century, how might the future of Russia
be conceptualised? There is no doubt thal Russia will continuc to go through
many prol;llems' as it adjusts to We!lcrn thinking and a rapidly changing
econontic and social statc. As many Ruslians arc disapJXlinted with the failure
36 To!stoy, Minister, p. 385.
]7 Thomson, Ideas, p. 196.
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of their fledgling democracy to bring them cccnomic benefits, the danger of a
communist and ultra-nationalist resurgcnce is acute. However, in many
respects Russia proved over the past thousand years to have a remarkable
abilil)' to recover from adversil)'. Having to deal with their communist and
tsarist past will prove difficult for many Russians. 1be likelihood of Russia
managing to overcome its demons is strong and it is possible that in time it
will deal with its past and become aligned with the West. The future stiLI
remains uncertain and whether Russia and the West can establish satisfactory
relations remains to be seen. Though Russia is deeply conscious of its
European heritage and has striven to be regarded as an inventive nation,]I
there is much difference between the two, lOat heritage of difference still
remains a guU to be bridged.
)lI Bcckcu, Military machine, p. 77.
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Who fears to speak?
Cbanging patterns of remembering 1798
Maura Cronin
Who fears to speak of: ninety-eight.
Who blushes at the name... ?
These lines by John Kells lngram have become almost as familiar among the
hisloricalty conscious in the bi-o::ntenaJ)' year of 1998 as they were in the
centenary )'ear of 1898 and, with their focus on commemoration the)' serve as a
useful foundation upon which to build an analysis of poetic and liteTar)'
expressions of popular memories and pseudo-memorie:s of the rebellion.
In what w3)'S did these memories cvolve over the~ of the
nineteenth century? An cxamination of nationalist poetry, song and newspaper
articles suggests that as popular litcT3C) spread. as the Irish language declined
and as the chronological distance between the C\'ent and the commemoration
grew, that a process of romanticisation and sanitisation occurred in the way the
rebellion was' remembered'. The main sources used in this anal)'sis are popular
street ballads, songs in the Irish language. songs and poems penned by
enthusiastic nationalists from Young Ireland to the republican clement of the
1890s.. and ncwspaper articles and illustrations appearing in both separatist and
mildly nationalist newspapers from the 1840s onwards.
Songs dating from the 17905 are of two types. each reflecting the
political atmosphere of the 17905 in a different way. The first type consists of
those poems and songs composed for propaganda purposes by the United
Irishmen and their supporters. particularly in the earlicr 17905, The writers of
these compositions were \'CI)' conscious of events in France and looked forward
to a direct replay of those C\'ents in the Irish context. hence their preference for
anti-monarchical and egalitarian sentiments and their use of revolutionary
imagery like the tree of liberly:
Plant, plant the Troe, lair Freedom's Tree,
'Midst dangers, WOWlds and slaughter,
Erin's green fields its soil shall be...
Her tyrant's blood its water.! \
These were the oplimislic works which saw the chance of revolulion a
la Jranrraise as a real possibility. Such optimism did not long survive the
I G. D. ZinuOt,'TII'Iaml, Song$ ofIrish rebellion (Dublin, 1967), pp. 127-29.
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rebellion itself. It is true that the songs continued to be reproduced for some
years between the covers of Paddy's Resource, and were reported to the
authorities as being sung in public houses where the disaffected continued to
gather. They seem to have been largely supplanted by songs of defeat and
J'C\'cnge like 'Father Morphy of County Wexford' and 'The Croppy Boy'.}
'Fr. Morphy of County Wexford' is worth quoting at some Icngth as
typical of these post-rebellion songs:
Come all you \l..arriors and R:nO'Wned nobles
And listen to my warlike theme.
And 1 will tell you how Father Mwphy
Has lately roused from a sleepy dream.
For Julius Caesar nor Alexander
Nor bra\'e King Brian e'er equalled him,
For annies formidable be did conquer
Though \\ith two pikemen he did begin
o had the Frenchmen they reinforced us
And landed transport at Baginbun,
Then Father Murphy would be OOT leader
And fifty thousand with him would come.
Success attend you brnve Coonty Wexford
Who look o(fyour yoke and to bettle did nul.
Let them not think we gave up our anns
For every man has a pike and gWl.
Decidedly localiSl in its focus, it raises the rebel leader to the $larns of almost
~perhuman hero, stresses the courage of the rebel bands against
IDsumtountable odds, laments the inevitable defeat which comes from lack of
foreign aid, and expresses a heartfelt wish for future re'\'Cnge on the enemy. It
probabl}' dates from the Rebellion itself or from soon afterwards, giving as it
does, through snapshot-type accounts of incidents, the impression of having
2 Paddy'J' re.JOlu'Ce: being a .fe/ect collection %n'ginoI and modem patriotic .f01lg.t,
complied/or the IMe o/the people 0/frelQlId"lIS first published in Belfast in 1795 and
wenl into a numlx.'f of editions OVtt the following two decades. A song from Paddy 'J'
re.fOUf'C(! was reported as being sWIg in a tavcm in Newry in 1804. Tom Dwme,
'Popular ballads, revolutiolUlty rhetoric and politicisation' in lIugh Oough and David
Dickson (eds.), freta/Id QI/d the French Revolution (Dublin, 1990), pp. 139.155; State
of the Country Papers, National Archives, Dublin (cited hereafter as SOC) ISM
102sn. ' ,
J Zimmermann, SOIlg.t ofIrish rebelliOIl.
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been written by a first-hand observer or by someonc placed at one 01' two
removes from the actual events narraled:
When Enni5corthy was subjected to him
It \\115 on to Gorey he man;hed his mo;,.'U,
On the Three-Rock MOW1win we took our quarters,
Waiting for daylight the to\\l1 to Win , ..
0.-. from 'The Croppy Boy':
It was to the guard-house I then was led,
And in his parlour I .....as tried,
My sentence passed and my courage low,
To New Gcne\'llI WIlS forced LO go.
A number of songs in the Irish language give the same impression of
closeness to events. Chief among these arc the poems by Mice3.1 6g 6 LongAin
who, working and living in the immediate hintcrland of Cork city_ combined the
!ie\'CraI roles of farm labourer, teacher, Gaelic scribe and poeL and organiser for
the United Irishmen. 6 LongAin's works reiteratc some oflbc themes in 'Father
Murpby of Count)' Wexford'. They lament bittcr!}' the fact that the province of
Munster failed to participate in the n::belJion:
... nuair d 'adhnmhar an gfeo
Le scata greafna greannmhar bhi fadhartha go leor ... ~
and at the same time look forward to the day to come when French aid ",ill be
fortbcoming and - a vital motif for the future - when traitors who expedited the
failure of the rebellion will be dealt with in an appropriate fashion:
... go mbeadh duthaigh Defseach is far/har Eireann
Ag teacht le chti/e on dtir anens.
Go mbeadh or gcampai deanta le flrsai treana,
Bheadh ciJnamh De linn is an saol ar fad.
Is ni dhiolJadh meirleach darbh ainm NeW sin
Is bhuafai an reim /inn ar Shliabh no mBan. j
r have decided to treal these immediate JX)St-rcbcllion soogs. both lrish and
English. as a genre distinct from the second type of song, the broadside ballad.
~ 'MDidin LUDin·CinciJe· (Whit Monday morning).
"Sliabh Ha mBan' (Slie\'enamon):
That the De.ise country (Waterlord) and thi!'"WCSI of Ireland
Would come together, '
That our camps would be manned with strong fC>t'Ces,
And God's help given to us,
And no traitor called Neill would sell us,
And .....e would be victorious on Slievcnamon.
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This latter type became a major channel of popular politicisation in the two
decades immediately preceding the famine. The division is, as wc will sec,
somewhat artificial. since a number of the themes of the two genres overlap.
However, because the broadside ballads appear to have been more widely sung
or, at 1eas1_ were considered thus by the authorities, their capacity both to
illustrate memories and pseudo-memories of 'ninety-eight and to foment
popular excitement seems particularly significant. As the Sovereign of Kinsale
complained to Dublin Castle in 1833, ballad singer and listening crowd could
unite in defiance of the lawfully constituted authorities:
(One singerJ told me in the street., surrounded as be \\1lS by vast. numbers of
to\\llspeople and comJ.trymen, that I would not dare to interfere with him; to
which decl8nltioo the mob g3'-e wtequi,'ocaI S}mptomS of assent and
approbation.6
What were the broadsides? Described by a contemporary as 'thousands
of )'<u'ds of nonsense daubed on tea.paper',1 they were usually anonymous
compositions. mostly (though not always) in the Englisb language, sung and
sold on 5treeH:omers and around fairs and markets to a very receptiYe audience,
and ser.ing as both a pre·famine equivalent of 'Top of the Pops' and bush
lelegrapb, Since many ballad singers were highly mobiJe - covering as much as
a four hundred mile circuil oyer a year and a half, their audience was both
nwnerous and represenlatiye of popular political feeling - something whicb is
highly significant when we realise that although songs of place, comic SOngs
and love songs fonned the greater part of the average ballad singer's repertoire,
the most popular numbers by the immediate pro-famine years were the seditious
ones. some ofwhicb referred lO 'ninetJ-eight.'
Interestingly enough, most of the broadside ballad references to 1798
are q~i,te oblique - just a word or a phrase rather than any long description. In
a seditiOUS ballad called 'The Young Soldier Boy' sung in Listowel in 1848 a
brief exhortation to 'prepare your Croppy pikes' was sufficient to whip up
considerable excitement. Similarly, the Bandon ballad singer who gave a
rendition of 'Erin the Green' in 1843 had only to declare: 'Dear Christians,
6 Chicf SecreI8l)"S Otlice Registered Papers, OutrllBe Reports, National Archives
(cited hereafter as CSORP.OR) 1833, Ill.
; Charles ?avan Du~,Fou~years ofIrish history (London, 1885), p. 66,
F~r. dcl1uls of thc Itmcranes of ballad singers and the preft:rcnce of the public for
sechtlous songs, sce Maura Murphy, 'The Ballad Singer and the rol~ of the seditious
ballad in nincteenth century Ireland: Dublin Castle's view' in Vis/er Folklife 25
1979, pp. 79·102. ' ,
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remember the year 'mnety-cighl' to get the crowd going. Versions of this
ballad, sung throughout Munster in 1843, frequently omitted the date - 'Dear
Christians, remember the )'ear' since everyone throughout the political spectrum
knew exactly how significant the date was, In other words. there was no need
for detail since all knew the e~ive nature of al1)' recall of the year of
rebellion.!J
What all street ballads of the 18305 and IS-Ws shared in relation to
their treatment of 1798 was an imense sccwian bitterness. There was no doubt
that both composers and audience saw the rebellion as a war between Catholics
and 'heretics' - another link in a chain of persecution stretching from Luther to
Henry vm to Cromwell and on to the 'tithe-eaters' of the Established Cburch
in the immediate pre·famine period. 1lle role of the ballad was to 'remember'
(or create memories) and in remembering to look forward to revenge. This link
bet",,-een diSlant past, the more recent co.'enlS of 1798, and the sectarian tensions
of the present came across very clearly in the pm'iously mentioned 'Erin the
Green':
Since Luther lit the candle, wc','c suffered penury,
Bm DOW it is extinguished ID spite ofhcresy.
We'll ha,'e an Irish parliamenl, fresh laws we'll dictate,
Or we'll ha"e satisf9CtiOll fer the year of 'Ninct)-EigbtIO
This "as not - any more than were: the Irish poems of Mieeat 6g 6 Longain - a
lament invol\·ing a helpless wringing of hands in recalling an irretriel'able and
tragic past. This was a gleeful savouring of what could be done in (he near
future to wreak a horrible m-enge on whose who, in the words of one ballad.
'took great delight in hanging us in (he year of 'ninety-eighf ,11
Were the vengeful bards of the broadside tmdition reflecting current
memories of Cl'enlS whicb were, after all, less than a half-century in the past?
This seems highly likely since the a'enlS of the rebellion and ilS aftennath had
burned themselves so deeply imo popular memory that as late as the 1930s
collectors for the Irisb Folklore Commission were given graphic accounlS in
Wicklow of 'Hempenstall, the walking gallows'. But it is also likely that the
sectarian bitterness of the pre-famine broadsides bad as much to do with current
inter-denominational tensions as with any retrospective judgements on the year
of rebellion, After all, the 1830s had ~n replete with denolninationally-related
controverstes concerning the lithe system. the revival of the Orange Order in the
9 CSORP.OR 1848, 121316; 1843,6114675.
10 CSORP,OR 1843,6114675.
Jl CSORP.OR 1843,27/11344.
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face of government repression, the Protestant evangelicalism of the 'new
refomtation' and the Pastorini 'prophecies' promise of the downfall of
Protestantism, Thus, \\'hen ballad singers referred either directly or obliquely to
1798. thcy did so in the context of other and more immediate grie\'aDCeS and
hatreds. When, for instance. '1bc Downfall of Tithes' was SWlg throughout
Munster and bc}'ond in 1832, this wcaving of 'memor) , of 1798 was closely
linked with current popular e.xultation over the gruesome killing of a tithe
collector and police at Carrickshock near Knocktopher in County Kilkenny.
This is a particularly interesting ballad since it uses the motif of Slie\'enamon -
the same background against \\hicb MieeaJ. 6g 6 LongAin wrote his lament for
the failure of the rebellion - to forecast not only the 'downfall oftithcs' but also
a more ominous warning of the overturning of existing authority structures
'wben all our woes are tenninated' and CathoHcs come into their own again:
The wisp is kindloo lhroughoot this injured nation,
Recall your hl.'fQCS who from home arc gone,
As thl.")' pay no more unjust taxation,
Tythes are abolished on Slie\'cnamon
Wc heard the text of the divine sages,
That when the date of the year is gone,
lbat onc true Catholic without a ....~pon
Would banish legions from Slievenamon.11
The hcy-da}' of the mosl soctarian of the I798-related ballads had passed by the
early 1850s. largely because the most sectarian elements in Irish society - those
at the bottom of the social heap - had been more or less effectively removed by
the famine of the previous half-decade. The sectarian element did DOl of course,
disappear. The revival of sectarian tensions \\;th the Ecclesiastical Titles BiD
controvers:y of 1851-2 brought ilS own brief rash of anti-Protestanl ballads
which clearly 53\\ a line of continuity between the 'persecution' of 1798 and the
spate of 'no-.p<>pcr)' \\hich exploded in British cities as a reaction to the new
legislation. BUI anolher element had inlcrvened 10 replace the essentially
sectarian approach of the broadsides with something more acceptable 10
exponcnts of the emergcnl romantic nationalism of the period. This new
clement was the Young Ireland movcmcnt. with ilS leading light. Thomas
Davis. and its enthusiastically propagandist ncwspaper, the Nation.
Young Ireland's 'remembering' of 1798 demonstrated contradictory
elements. At onc Icvel. mOSI of those subscribing to the movement's non-
I1CSORP.OR 1832,l/l572,NI581.
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denominational romantic nationalism were horrified by the sanguinary and
sectarian aspects of the )'car of rebellion. At another IE:\-'el. Davis and Young
Ireland \\ere impressed b) the secular nationalism of the United ~h leaders.
and particularl)' by Tone's objective (which the) interpreted to a less
oomplicated manner than its original author) to 'substitule the ,common. name ~f
Irishmen in place of the denominations of Protestant. Calholic and D~nter .
MOTeO\'er. since the essential ethos of Young Ireland was the adulauon of
individual valour and tdealism in lhe face of insunnounlable odds, the men and
women of 1798 provided the ideal heroic figures who could be emulated by
current and future generations. This dithering between condemnation of the
1798 rebels' violcnce on the one hand and praise of tlleir courage on the other
comes across particularly clearly in Davis' essay on 'Memorials of Wexford':
[WexfordJ rose in '98 ....ith httle organisation against intolerable wrong; and
though it was finally beaten by superior forces, it taught its aristoemey and
the government alcs.~ not easily forgiven, to be sure, but far harder to.be
forgotten - a lesson that popular anger could strike hard as well as SIgh
deeply; and that it was better to conciliate than provoke thO!lC who even for
an hour had felt their strcngth. The red rain made Wexford's harvest grow.
Theirs ....'8S no treacherous assassination - thcirs no stupid riot - theirs no
pale muting They rose in mass and s"'epl. the coW\lIy by sheer force. Nor in
their sinking fortWlCS IS there anything to blush for. Scullabogue was not
burned by the fighting men. 13
No such equivocation \\as E:\-i.dent in John Kells Ingram's immortal
poem. 'The Memory of the Dead'. principally because he totally ~gnored the less
savoury E:\-'ents of the )'ear of rebellion and concentrated Instead on the
inspiration to be gained by the apprentice nationalists of the mid-l840s from the
heroic example of what were now seen as their natural political parents of half-
a-centuIy pmi.ously:
lbe)' rose ID dark and evil da)'s
To right their natlve land,
AId kindled here a Iinog bl87..e
That nothing can .....lthstand.
Alas, that might should mnquish nghl,
They fell and passed aW8),
But true men, like you, men,
Are p&enty bere today. "". .
This, quite obviously, was far lofticr stuff than that bawled around the stroclS In
the broadside ballads or sung \\i.tl1 more e10quencc in the Irish songs. This was
13 Arthur Griffith (00.), Thoma3 Dovi3: the thinker OfUJ teacher (Dublin, 1916), p. 116.
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'ninety-eight without the blood and. importantly, without the e.'q>licitly sectarian
calls for m'enge. But frightened observers, whether in parliament or among the
loyalist population at local 1e\'eL did noc really see aD)' difference between the
broadsides and what a modem historian has descnDed as the 'genteel warblings'
of Young Ireland. Both genres were ultimately provocative: both urged either
emulation of. or revenge for, the e\'ents of 1798: both appear to have reached a
\\ide audience - either sold for a penny as the broadsides ",~re or, in the case of
Young Ireland's poems, available tllrough the pages oflhc Nation. U
For Young Ireland, of course, 1798 was only onc among a whole series
of pasts which were held up 10 lhe public as both landmarks and guiding lights
in the dcvelopment of a national consciousness. Davis himself had a poem for
almost every prominent event in Irish history or, at least in the nationalist view
ofwt historr 'The Gcraldines', 'Lament on the death of Eoghan Roe O'Neill',
'The Penal D3)'S', 'Song for the Volunteers', What Davis omitted, others of the
Young Ireland school filled in - John O'Hagan's 'The Union', J. D. Frazer's
'Gathering of the Nation IMI' and Bartholmew Dowliog's 'Battle Eve of the
Brigade',1S But as the more militant spirits io Young Ireland became
disillusioned by the terrible disaster of the potato famine and excited b}' tbe
apparent success of the 'bloodless' French revolution of February 1848. the
'gentccl warblings' were now paralleled by a more directly militant genre of
verse which appeared in John Mitchel's Untied Ire/and and Joseph BreRnan's
Irish Felon. Here the etllOS was best sununed up by the poem which closed with
thc line - 'A pike! a pike! a pike!'. The close connection between the motif of
lhe pike and the 1798 rebellion was lost on no-onc, and wbat became very clear
was that the militants bad selected one past upon which to base their ideals, and
had jettisoned the rest. The}' still, of oourse, saw the past and present as
inextricably linked. just as the broadsides. the Irish songs and the poetry of
Young Ireland had done. But they also closely integrated their Irish past and
present ""ith current e\'ents on the continent and particularly io France. In other
words. inspiration for the Mitcbellite nationalists was based as much on
contemporary continental politics as on the emulation and avenging of an Irish
past. This is certainl) the message wruch came across in the aptly titled poem.
'Past and Present' \\ruch appeared in the Irish Felon in early July 1848:
E"ery tune hath fitting action -
Thought and meaning of its 0\\11:
14 It does seem that some of the YOWlg Ireland IXx,'I.IIS - wedded to appropriate airs-
may have also reached thc public by being intf."gl'tltcd into the broadside literature,
lj 1. F. O'Sullivan, The YOIlll8 lrelanders (Tralcc, 1944), pp. 541, 583, 595.
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Not to IlllSC a native faction-
Not to prop a foreign throne-
Not for onmge, green, or blue, Men -
Ha"e we come to gnps with Fate:
Prate no more of Eigbt-Two, Men-
Think - oh think of Forty-EighUl6
TIlere was no mention of 'ninet)-<:ight here. certainly. but a very clear rejection
of the constitutional past epitomised by Grattan's Parliament and a hankering
for the militancy of Mitchel:
Then resoh'c to do or die, Men-
(h114YJro is thc word of Fate -
Prate no more of Eighty-Two, Mf.'I1 -
Do or die in i'"ort)'-Eight!
How effectivel)' were these ideas on 'Ninety-Eight and ntiHtant nationalism
spread? We do not really knO\\. While the broadside ballad long survived the
disaslrous famine of the late 1840s, the audieoce which had turned seditious
nwnbcrs into mollC}-spinners for wandering minstrels had been effectively
cleaned up b)' the catastropbe. This meant that although the broadside continued
into the 1880s to cause considerable worry to the authorities by its capacit} to
disseminate seditious ideas, it would never again ha,'c the capacity to rouse a
crowd to violence as it had in tlle pre-famine decades. But in its place came a
new transmission mode - the cheap songbook. The most influential was "ithout
doubt tbe Spirit of/he Nation, reprinted at least twice every decade from 1843
onwardsl1 . Others which hit the market from thc 1860s were The Wearing of
the Green Songhook. Shanlus 0 'Brien Songbook, and - mosl significantly
named - The Spirit of 'Ninery-Eighl Songbook. In these modestly priced
songbooks (costing between one penny and sixpence). the spirit of commercial
enterprise wcnt band in hand with emergent ntilitant nationalism. Some were
published in Dublin. others came from the presses of lhe Glasgow printing
house of Cameron and Ferguson. With a glorious lack of political partisanship,
this firm tapped the growing current of popular British nationalism, Irish
militant republicanism and Orange consciousness. turning out a wbole series of
songbooks from The O'Donnell Abu Songbook at onc extreme (0 <>.range
songsters at the other. 11
.,
ID Irish Felo". 1 July 1848.
11 O'Sullivan, the Young Irelmulers, p. 58
I1 f"~ian Pap(:rs, Nation.al Archi\·cs, uno, 6791 R.
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ID the Irish nationalist SODgbooks the repertoire ranged from apolitical
'come-aIl-yes'. through some of the compositions of Young lre1and. to Fcnian
songs like John Kccgan Ca5C)"s 'Rising of !.he MOOD' and the poign3nt 'Felons
ofOur Land'. These laller songs. and others like them, returned to 1798 both as
~ ~g~ to be lamented and as the fountain-head of Irish nationalist
msplratlon:
Oh, what glorious pridc and sorrow fills thc lIame of 'Nincty-Eight',
('The Rising of the Moon')
Fill up once more, we'll drink a toast
Tocomradcs far away,
No nation on the eanh can boast
Ofbra\'er hearts than they.
Although they sleep in dungeons deep
And l1ee outlawed and banned,
We love them yet, we'll ne'er fOlEt.'t
The felons of our land
, T~s" like the Young Ireland model, was a vcI)' different type of
fCm.embenng to that expressed in the broadside ballads of two decades
prcvlOusly. 11 was t]lC reverend recall of thc 'martyr'. And martyrs, while they
may be emulated by brave spirits, can be revered even by the more timid
~ugh a vcneration of relics associated with their lives and works. Such a
rehc~ntred cult of 'nincl}'-eight emerged in the mid-l860s wben I.rish
~Jjcans in .~rica sought .to raise money for the cause through the Chicago
F3J~. An examlnatJOD of the objCCIS donated 10 the fair shows just how 1798 and
all It~ retrospectively stood for had become tinged with an almost religious
venerallon:
We want re/iques of Ireland:s past history, oottle flags,. weapons, unifonns,
~s, book,S, k.1tt..-rs, s.ouvt..'runl from the gmves of dead patriots, autographs,
PiCtures, nuncml specuncns, bog-oak ornamcnts, turf, broom, tabinet, lace,
gloves, needle-work, embroidery",
[We have rccein~d]."A Pike, of the Irish War of Independcnce of 1798
found~ the old bridge of Wexford in 1863, with John Nuge:nl's respeetfui
compliments ...
Mc John Hickey, Kingsto",n, - Pistol used in 1798 ...
A ~wder horn, used by Murtagh 8)rne, oflmaa1, Wicklow, in '98
A pIece of stone from Vinegar I[ill ...
From Michael Lee:son, a musket taken by his WlCle, Comclius Leeson, from
the Yeomen at Vinegar Hill ... 19
19 Irish People, 20 February 1864.
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What was also emerging was the cult of the patriot gravc. Davis had.. of course.
already established this in the early ISWs with his poem on 'Tone's Grave'
while the Unired Irishman had roused the ghosts of 1798 in similar fashion:
lbese "'t:re our predccl.'SSOfS. Before foreign rule had fmally clenched its
grip upon the land, they stood up to die and died. And IIOW half a century is
dead and gone and from their Holy Graves we take their principles again.20
From the early 1870s onwards. tlle increasing frequency of Fenian
funemls nurtured the growing conviction tMI the best p;ltriot was a dead onc.
By the time the centenary of 1798 had come around the grave cull had become
an essential feature of popular nationalism. The militant republican Shan I'an
I'uchr produced in Belfast b)' Alicc Milligan and other republicans. harnessed
popular support for the centenary not only by publishing articles and poems on
the rebellion but also by exhoning its readcrship to participate in 'Dc:cora1jon
Day' whcn gra\'es of the patriot dead would be visited and dccorntcd.2\ The
request fell on receptive ears for in a large nWllber of areas the patriot grave
becamc the focus for the ccntcnal)' celebrations, particularly in those areas
which could not boast a battlc site or the birth or death-place of a patriot. Nor
was it essential that the grave be onc ofa 1798 hero or heroine. The burial place
ofany patriot from the militant tradition could provide the focus. In KilmaJlock.
County Limerick. for instance. the 'nincty-cight centenary was marked by the
raising of a green nag O\'er the gT3\'e of an unknown Fenian. something which
upset one loyal lady to such an cxtent that she cut down the flag and found
herself in coon on a charge ofdefacing a public monument. OtllCT loca110yaliSlS
were perplexed as to how an 1867 gra\'e could provide the site for celebrations
of 1798 - which only goes to show how faulty was thcir understanding of the
processes working towards the weaving of a seamless gannent of Irish history.22
For nationalists, of course. there was no such puzzlemcnt. The
centenary allowed Olem to telescope time and to establisb a direct Iinc of
continuity between the cvcnts of 1798 and Ole political dcvelopmen1s of their
own day. A contemporary print entitled 'The llJustrlous Sons of Ireland' was
the visual manifestation of this trend. Portraying a whole range of patriotic
figures from Sarsfield to Tone to Emmet to O'Connell and on to PamelL
grouped togcther \\ith scant respect for either chronology or political
diffcrentiation. this print wove past with present to prove lhat all Irish history
moved inexornbly towards 'frccdom"\an Irish nationalist version of the Whig
:zo Ulliled Irishman, 26 February \848.
21 SIIO/l Van I '/lcht, 21 ,October 1896.
:z:l Cork Examiner. 4 June 1898
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interpretation of history, half a century before the phrase had been coined.
Booksellcrs with an eye on the market presented the samc 'seamless' version of
Irish history in advertisement form, publicising their stock of 'rooks on Ireland'
in a way which covered the entire gamut from constitutionalism to militanCy to
cultural revival to devotional Catholicism:
lrim Sot'8 Book. Patriot Parliament of1689, New Spirit of the Nation, Bog
ofStan, ... Early Gaelic Literotvre. Life of Sanfield. Owen Roe 0 'Neifl,
Mwphy's Crcwmt'e// in Ireland, Prendergast's Crom_l/ian &nlement,
O'Hanloo's Livu of the Irish Sainl$ ... O'Reilly's lri.Jh-Englim Dictionary,
Sa/tair no Rmm, Cath Finntrogha, Smith's Memoin of '98, Fitzpe.trick's
Sham SqIIi'-S and Informen of '98.2J
Since the broadsides of the pre-famine period had lauded the super-
human leader like Father Murphy and the pike-loting rebel anxious for blood,
the type of hero being celebrated had. of course. changed out of all recognition.
Young Ireland. as a1n:ady discussed, bad aIn:ady begun litis trend, but the
process \\'35 completed b}' two related developments of the centenary period _
the re-writing of songs on 1798 and the erection of 'nincty-eight monuments,
The re-writing of poems and songs was an anempt to purge the original
versions ofsectarianism and to inject into tbem a lofty national spirit which had
not appeared in tbe originals. Eithne Ca1bery of the Shan Van VlIcht 'was one
of the re-drafters, producing a new (and now standard) version of the northern
song. Rody McCorley. P. J. McCall was an equally assiduous re-draftcr. He
took, for instance, an old song called <The Belfast MOWlWnS' and rtwrole it
under the same title as a lament for Henry Joy McCrackcn, closing it
appropriately with the lines:
Here solemn WBVes beneath us chant requiems for the dead,
While rebel winds shriek "Freedom" for living hearts o'erhead.z-
More significant was his redrafting of 'Fr Murphy of County Wexford' which
has already been mentioned in this paper. Whereas the original version was
obliquely sectarian and decidedly local in emphasis, McCaU's version, retitled
'Boola\,ogue', exuded high-minded nationalism:
Ann, ann!' he cried, 'For I'vc come 10 lead you,
For Ireland's freedom we'll fight or die!'
'The cause that called you will call tomorrow
In another fight for the green again.'
13 Slum Vall Vuchr, 5 June 1896.
2~ Slum Vall Vuchr, 3 July 1896.
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Now, as had been progressivcly the case from Young Ireland onwards, thc
idcntity of 'the foc' was clear. It was England. TIlis was not. of course. new.
Tone had already in the 1790s described that country as 'the ncvcr-failing
source of all our political evils'. What had changed in the intcrvcning century
was the popular view. Up to tbc mid-I840s those who had cxacted bloody
vcngeance on the rebels wcre seen - particularly in thc broadside ballad
tradition - as the Protestants. Now. following the trend set by Young Ireland.
thc sectarian dimension had been purged and the blamc laid squarely on thc
'foreign enemy'. This vcrsion of events was fostered by nationalist historians
like RC\'. P. F. Ka,'anagh whose version of the 1798 rebellion was presented
thus in a centcI\3I)' lecture at Cork:
Just one hundred years ago England .....as meditating 8 great crime, which, as
usually happens, necessiwlcd many other aimes. This crime was to deprive
Ireland of her nati\'e Parliament ... (The English Ministers) were aWBre of
the efforts made by the chiefs of the United Irishmen to shake off the yoke of
England, and to assert their rights by force of arms. [lbeyJ resoh'ed to
fruslrnte the aims of these patriots by driving the people into premature
insurrection.~
1be monuments erected in towns all oyer the country - particularly
outside nonh-east Ulster wmclt. ironically. had been the heartland of the United
lrishmen - confirmed the squeaky·clean non-sectarian version of 1798. many
speakers stressing. as at Ncwry. that 1798 was not a war between papists and
protestants. However. elsewhere the eross-dcnominational aspects of the
rebellion were givcn less prominence and events were presented not just as a
celebration ofmalt}TS.. bul of Catholic martyrs. At Gore)'. 'faith and fatherland'
were the themes stressed in speeches. while at Harristown near Monasterevan
the commemoration centred. as the ncwspaper heading put it. on 'the memory
of a mart)'I"Cd priest'. 26 The design of thc monuments was equally equivocal.
Celtic crosses. Maids of EriD. and stalwart. straight-backed pikemen
predominated - and sometimes a combination of all three. TIle National
Monument in Cork. whose foundation stone was laid in 1898 and completed
over half a decade later. presented such a combination. It depicted a pensive
Maid of Erin leaning on the broken remains of a Celtic cross, surrounded by
four male heroes of the republican tradition. with the names of many more on
panels around the base. Blithely iguOl;ing the internecine quarrels dividing the
monume~t commiHee - an aspect of miny similar committees at the time - the
2.l Cork Examiner, 30 May 1898.
211 Freeman 'J Journal, 8 August 1898.
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Any attempt to pull together in a few thousand words all that is the mire of
Yugoslavian history must necessarily be selective. A largc tome would be more
appropriate of a two Ihousand-ycar-old history. As the Slavophile writcr Fred
Singleton commcnted in thc preface to his A short history of the Yugo:,'lav
peoples:
Any author \vho is either bold enough or foolhardy enough to attempt to write
a short history oCYugoslavia must be aware from the outset that he or she is
laking on an almost impossible task.]
What perplexed many commentators during the war that ravaged
Yugosla,'ia between 199 Land 1995 was the diversity of cullures in the fonner
federal republic. When Rebecca West travelled through the small port town of
Susak in the northern Adriatic in 1937, shc was struck by how vociferous
seemed the young mcn of the local population. West attempted a justification for
the decibel·shattering exuberance of onc particular Yugoslavian youth that she
encountered:
He was simply the product of Dalmatian history: the conquest of myna by
Rome. of Rome by the barbarians; th(:n three hundred years of conflict
betwt...~'I\ HWlgar)' and Venice; then lour hundred years of oppression by
Venice. with the wur against Turkey running concurrently for most of that
timc; a few years of hope wtd(.,. France. frustrated by the decay under
Napoleon; a hundred years of muddling misgovenunent by Austria. In such
shambles, 8 man had to shout and rage to survive. 2
A few years after West the Nobcl laureate, Ivo Andrie. captured more
succinctly a taste of the eclectic make·up of his homeland in his seminal work A
f,etrer from /920. Andric was describing a city in Bosnia·Herzegovina that had
unjustifiably become notorious as the place where the First World War 'started'.
In the early 1990s its name would resonate again all around the globe:
Whoever lies awake ill Sarajevo hears the voices of the Sarnjcvo night. The
clock on the Catholic cathedral strikes the hour \\'ith weighty confidence: 2
am.-M'"ore than a minute passes - sc~ty five seconds to be exact - and only
then does the Orthodox church chime Its own lam. A moment later the tower
] Fred Singleton, A short hislOry ofthe Yugoslav peoples (Cmnbridgc. 1985). p. 74.
1 Barhara West, Black lamb and grey falcon: a journey lhrough Yugoslavia (London,
1995).
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dedication on the monumenl.; closing with an appropriate quotation from
Thomas Davis, reiterated the perceived stream of continuity and lofty
mindedness ofmililant nationalism:
Erected
through the efforts
of the
CORK YOUNG rn.ELAND SOCIETY
to perpetuate the memory of
the gallant men of
1798. 1803.48 and 67
\\'ho tought and died
IN ll-IE WARS OF IRELAND
to recover her
SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE
and to inspire the youth of
our OOWltry to follow in their
patriotic footsk'PS and
imitate their heroic example.
And righteous men will make our land
A NAnON ONCE AGAIN.
doe\. on the ~'s mo&:ILJe stnkes the hour In 8 boorse, fnw8y VOIce; and It
sui.les 11, the gbosUy Twtish hour. The k.\'S ha\'e 00 dock., so God knows
what time It IS for them. Thus division keeps vigil, and scpllI"IItes these
sleepmg people, who \\ake, reJolcc and mourn. feast and fast by four
different calendars.J
In SO portraying Ihe religious differences, Andric illustrated also much
ofthc cultural complexity ",,'ithin the Yugoslav state of which Bosnia was one of
six federal republics. The city of which he wrote so presciently. SarajC'\'o, had
become synonymous by the middle of the 19905 with an internecine confiict
whose propagation of genocide elicited connotations of another, ostensibly more
sinister age. When war did manifest itself, commentators sought (often
erroneously) to label it as 'a settling of old scores' or else as 'historically
inevitable', conveniently ignoring the rolc played by some politicians in
fomenting anned conflict. indeed. conveniently ignoring history itself.
Any portrayal of Yugoslavia cannot but be sensitive to the panoply of
cultures. dialects. languages. religtons. ethnic groupings, calendars and C\'en
alphabets ""hich pervaded its landscape before and after its declaration of
independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. The notion of
creating a Yugoslavian S(ate (Yugoslavia means 'land of the South Slavs') was
firsl mooted in the early nineteenth century. The fact that such a nation had no
historical or cultural basis did not hinder its most fervent prop:ments. One of
these. Ljudcvit Gaj, a young student of law from zagreb decided on the name
l//yrian for the movement that would press for an independent southern Slavic
state. Croat writers had earlier used this appellation as had the ill-fated
Napoleonic regime of the southern Slav populated Habsbutg provinces. Oaj's
gospel was disseminated b)' a small circle of intellectuals encouraged by the
examples of their contemporaries around the continent who had seen the cause
of nationalism boosted by the French Revolution. For political unity to be
atlainable a linguistic and cultural monolith giving the impression of a common
Slavic heritage also had to be invented. To this end the Stokavski dialect 'used
by the great writers of Dubrovnik'~ 'was chosen as the '[)Jyrian language' to
stand beside Polish, Russian and Czech as a vemacu1ar of the Slavic people.
The intention was to create the myth of a common south Slavic race with a
distinct history and language. In Vienna in 1850 an agreement among soutbem
Slav intellectuals established the Stokavian ljekavian dialect as the literary
standard for Croats and Serns alike. In 1866 a Roman Catholic bishop, Josip
Strossmayer. founded tllC Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences in zagreb to
J lvo Andric, A lener from 1910
~ Singleton, Short hi.Jtory.
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engender the appc:ranc:e of cultural unity. In an ironic twiSl .one hU~ ~
twent)' years later. the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences ISSUed .lts
infamous Memorandum in the daily lecernje NovOJ;ti. the contenlS of w~ch
served as a catalyst in the disintegration of the Yugoslav state that th,c 1I~}'na~
Movemcnt had so cherished. The "lI1yriaDs' were only onc of many naUonal
groups in the nineteenth century who created a fl1)1h of national ullit~ i~ order
to achieve some fonn of autonomy. To engender an ideal of a monohthlc state
meant ignoring or inventing e\'Cnts from Slavic histoT)'. . ' .. .
The Slavs. a people with no apparent connection to aOClent cn'lhsalJon.
first appeared in the Balkans (Balkan in Turkish means 'mountainous') late in
the fourth century after Chrisl raiding Romanised settlements south of the
Danube from their temporary resting place in what now constitutes part of the
stale of Hungary.~ Though only onc tribe among many that embarked on
attacking the Roman world, the Slav is onc of ~le v~ry f~ whose ~ltura1
identity did nol become subsumed into the populaoons It dommated. While the
Goths. AVID'S. HUllS. Franks and Lombards graduaU)' saw their separate cultures
dissipate. the Sla\'S were resilient in maintaining a separate idcntity.6 G~uall).
the Slavs moved in to colonise their fonner rcsting·places. 11ley settled In what
arc now the present-day territories of Serbia, Bosnia-Hen:.egO\;~ and
Montenegro with representative groups in Macedonia and.DalmalJa. which now
fonns part of the Croatian coastline. By the end of the eighth century .most of
the arca of what constituted Yugoslavia south of the Sava-Danube hne was
colonised by Slav tribes, whose influence also extended into. ~bania and central
G~. B~7.3IItine writers refer to this area as ·Sclavoma. the land of the
Slays. . . 'caJ
The republic" hich was created in 1991 as Croatia has Its hlsto.n .
antecedents in the medieval kingdom of two monarchs. Tomislav and Kreslmlr.
It trawuatically relinquished its autonomy in 1097 after defeat by tlle Hungarian
king at the Batllc of GV07..d. Five years later the Croatian crown became a
Hungarian patrimony. a standing it retained until the sixteenth century when
the Austrian Habsburgs took control of Magyar territory.' Croatia was nOl to
regain any semblance of sovereignty until 194 L a status due primarily to the
-.
s Nonnan l)avis, Europe 0 histmy (Oxford, 1996).
6 Stepht.'ll Clissold (ed.), A history of Yugoslavia from early lime.! 10 1966
(Cambridge, I966).
7 Singlelon, Short hi.Jtory, p. 15.
t Alcksandt:r Pa\'kovic. 71lefrogmenlotiotl ojYJlgwlavia (London, 1997) p. 7.
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Na,d inyasion in April that year. Fifty years later. under substantial German
duress. the European CommulUty recognised Croatian independence.
The first SerbIan state was centred in southern Serbia and the
mountainous terrain of Montencgro. A Serbian dynasty was established during
the reign of Ste\7U1 emanJ3 ID the twelfth century. At the beginning of the
thirteenth ccntul). Stc\'an assumed tbe title of king. Moreover, conveniently,
his brother Saya became head of an independent Serbian Onbodox Church.
Perhaps the most revered of rulers in Serbian histol'}·. StC\'3n Dusan (1331-55)
brought his kingdom 10 the pinnacle of its J)(mers. After conquering the
Bulgarians. he was able to havc himself crowned Emperor of the Serbs and
Romans (Byzantium) in 1346. He died while launching a campaign against
Constantinople. the a1l3ming of which remained the foremost ambition of both
the Serbian and the Bulgarian monarchs. After his death the Serbian Empire
disintegrnted.9
The singular event which more than six hundred years later is regarded
by Scrbs as the most blessed in their long history took place in Kosovo Polje
(Thc Field of Blackbirds) on 28 June 1389. Here the Scrbs undcr Prince Lazar
Hrcbljanovic were defeated by the Ottoman Turks and tllUS ceded their
autonomy: it would remain thus for more than four hundred years. Prince Lazar
was canonised a saint by the Orthodox Church and the day itself became known
thereafter as St.Vitius' Day, the feast day of the 'Kosovo Martyrs'. It may seem
peculiar to celebrate a shattering defeat as the greatest day in a nation's history
but the spectre of Kosovo was invoked continoously throughout the nineteenth
cenrury as 'an exhortation to fight for the liberation of the Serbs from foreign
rule' .10 KOSO\'o, as Misha Glenn}' argues. is 'onc of the great Serbian myths,
regarded by Serbs as the cradle of their civilisation,.H Today the population of
Koso...o is approximately ninety per cent Albanian, a fact that rankles with
Serbians. Conveniently obliterated from Serbian history is the fact that Serbs
and Albanians fought together at KOSO\"O Polje, as they did again when Austrian
armies in...aded in 16CXl and 1737. Koso\'o was to be annexed by Serbia and
Montenegro in 1912 ""hen Albania proclaimed independence, provoking
'unprecedented 1C\'CIs of national eupboria,l2 in Serbia. After 1945 Kosovo
became an autonomous province within Serbia. It has become a cliche to state
, Ilugh Poulton, Who are the Afacf!t/oniam? (London, 1995).
10 Pavkovic, Fragme"tatioo, p. 9.
:~ Mis~ Glcnny. The/all a/Yugoslavia: the Third Bal1aJn War (London, 1992), p. IS.
Christopber Bcnnelt, YugOJlavia's bloody collapse, causes, course and
C'tJnSequences (London. 1995), p. 24
that the Yugoslav conflicl began in and will end in Kosovo. However. a lattcr·
day Serbian leader used the grievances of his fellow nationals to pumre his 0\\1\
agenda. In April 1987 thc local. predominantJ}' ethnic Albanian police used
batons and truncheons to quell the manifest discontcnt of Scrbs in Kosovo. n.e
SeTbian leader in Belgrade. Stambolic. asked a relati\'ely unknown party cadre
to visit KOSO\'o and cairn the local minority populace. Once thcre. Slobodan
Milose\'ic told the \'3Sl crowd that the local police should tx: resisted. 'No one
should dare beat you'. he declared to a tumultuous throng, 'This sentence',
according to Kosovo Serb leader. Miroslav Soljevic, 'enthroned him a Tsar'.1l
Within less than two }ears.. the PfO\;OCC was stripped of its autonomous status
and despite armed resistance, subsumed into an enlarged Serbia. Milosevic was
by now a Serbian icon. a status he cemented for himself on the six hundredth
anniversafJ' of Prince Lazar's defeat at Kosovo Polje. In a chillingly prophetic
address before an adoring audicnce of fellow Serbs on 28 Junc 1989. Milosc\'ic
asserted that ',",,'C are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles though
such things should not be excluded yet' .14
Serbia was under Onoman rule for more than four hundred years. It
became a bastion of Christian Orthodoxy in 1054. breaking with the Roman
Christianity that maintained its grip in Croatia and Slovcnia. Turkish
domination induced conservatism through anti-Western sentiments and
Orthodoxy itself. Anti-occidental attitudes in the Ottoman world had been
pl"C\wenl from the Crusades onwards. All the great movements that
reverberated around the Western world - the Renaissance, Reformation. the
Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment Romanticism, the French Revolution
- did not penneale into the collective Balkan consciousness. The possible
e.xception may have been Serbia. Perhaps inspired by cvents in Paris, the Serbs
attempted an ilJ·fated revolt in 1804 under the leadership of George Petro\ric.
t'e\'ered in Serbian lore as Karadjordje. lnitiall)' concerned with railing against
corrupt local authorities.. the fC\'olution turned into a l1lO\'emcnt for national
independence. IS A second uprising in 1815 led by Miles Obrcnovic helped the
Serbs gain concessions from the Turks. More importantly, it gave greater
impetus to the quest for independence, a measure of which Serbia attained in
1829 when it was granted autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire.16 The
I) Tiro Judah, T-h;Serbs his/ory. my/h a'''' the dh,trucrioo 0/YuglJ.Jlavja (London,
1997),p.162.
I~ Ibid., p. 164.
u Barbara Jelavich, History 0/ /he 8allums in the twentieth century (New York, 1983).
16 George W. Hoffmllll and ,,'red Warner Neal, YuglJ.Jlavja and the nnt' communism
(New York, 1962).
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'Bulgarian atrocitics' of 1875. in which Ottoman and Muslim ruthlessly
suppressed a Cbristian uprising. led to the Gladstone government i.n Britain
abandoning its backing of Turkish policy in the Balkans. After Russia had
defeated the Ottomans in the Crimea in 1877 a rc-drawing of the Balkan
political landscape was inevitable. A year later. at the Congress of Berlin.
Serbia along with Romania and Montenegro was acx::orded its long-awaited
independence. The Balkan states. granted independence were impoverished
from the beginning, a situation e:<acerbated by the channelling of revenue uuo
armaments in order to defend their territory rather than into economie
de\'Clopmenl. P
Serbian independence howC\"CT, precipitated a fC\'CrsaI for Yugoslav
narodno jedinslVO (national unity) as the Austro-Hungarian Empire began its
occupation of Bosnia-Hcrzcgovina. Thirty years later, Austria provoked a
continent-wide crisis by actually annexing the province. Serbia had hoped 10
incorporate Bosnia into a Greater Serbia once the Ottoman Empire collapsed.
Austria's actions now appeared to have retarded that possibility. Not only was
the annexation a calamity for the prospects of South Slav unity, it also deprived
Serbia of access to the Adriatic Sea through Bosnia.1 8 Although Serbia
mobilised and threatened war, Russia refused to provide military assistarice and
conflict ",-as averted.
War did come to the Balkans in 1912 however when the Balkan
League. consisting of Montenegro. Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece attacked Turkey
on the pretext of me Ialter's ill treatment of Albanian and Macedonian rebels.
The Turkish anny was soon in retreat and Serbian forces reached the Adriatic,
thereby attaining access to the sea. However, Austria again proved to be
Serbia's bite noir by mobilising its troops in Bosoia and threatening war on
Serbia if it did 001 abandon its outlet to the sea. A clirnb-down ensued and a
treaty signed in London in May 1913 merely aggriC\'ed Bulgaria, which then
attacked Serbia and Greece, thereby igniting the SO<:a1led Balkan War of
Partition. llI The defeated Bulgarians were forced to accepc. the Treaty of
Bocharest whereby it bad to renounce aU claims it bad to Macedonia which was
also CO\·eted by both of the victors. The report of the lnternational Commission
set up to investigate the conf]jet contained descriptions of the war that were to
be replicated almost eighty )'ears later:
17 Jclavich, BalkDf/.f history.
I1 Sin8leton, Yugoslav peoples.
19 Davies, Europe.
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Houses and whol.: villages reduc.=d to ashes. unanned and innocent
populations massacred en nlaSSC. incredible BelS of barbanty, pillage and
\iolence of I:\"CI) kind - such .",.ece the means ~h were l,.mployoo by the
Scrbo-Mootenegrin soldiCf), y,ith a viC\\ to the complete cthruc
lranslOnnatJOII of these regions. ::0
Sending the An:hduke Ferdinand and his "ife to Sarajc\"o on SL Vitius'
Day, 28 June 191 ..t has been compared by some commentators as dispatching
tbe Brillsh to)'aI famil} to Dublin on SI. Patrick.'s 03) in the aftermath of an
event like Bloody Sunda) It is 001 inconceiyable that the ill-fated couple were
dispatched b) the Austrian High Command in the hope that they would meet an
wlt..lmely end. Malcom suspects. 'With overwhelming stupidity his visit to
Saraje\'o was fixed for 28 June. the amU,'ersat)' of the Battle of Koso'l'o and
therefore the most sacred day in the mystical calendar of Serb nationalism.• :1
This would then provide Austria with an excuse lO declare war on Serbia. it had
long sought, especially since 1908. History records that a nineteen year old
consumptive student of the Black Hand movement, Gavrilo Princip, fired the
fatal shot lhat "rang out around tIle world'. TIle Black Hand was wary of the
moderate proposals to rectify the problems of minorities within the empire.
Under Archduke Ferdinand's so-called TriaIist solUlion. an independent
southern Slav state would become an even more forlorn dream.
The war wrought devastation on Serbia. Its railway S)'stem. industry
and Ih'estock were praClically obliterated.. to Croatia and Slovenia indUSlrial
output actually e>.-pandcd during the war. Out of Serbia's population of four-
and-a-half million people. t"ent)'~igbt per cent died in the war. "hich included
the staggering figure of siXl)'-rno per cent of its male population. aged fifteen to
fifty-five. In proportionate tcnns Serbian losses were three times greater than
Britaio's and two-and-a-half times lhosc of France.:::! In contrast, former
AustIo-Hungarian partS of the empire 10Sl less than ten per cent of their
rcspcctive popuIalions.2J Serbia emerged from the war a broken nation C\'er
more detennined to be the fulcrum of a new South Slav state. Its wish was
granted twenty da)'s after the Armistice was declared. Negotiations had taken
place on the island of Corfu from where a declaration was issued. It stated that
the future kingdom of Serbs, Croats and. Slovenes would be a constitutional,
. "
10 From Reporr"ofthe International Commbsion Jp inquire into the caUJeJ and conduct
iffhe Balkan Wan (Camegie Endowo:u."llt For International Peace. 1914).
1 Noel Malcolrn, Bosnia: a short history, (Cambridge. 1996).
n R.J. Crampton, EaJtem Europe in the twentieth century and after (London, 1994), p.
131
:l3 Pavkovic, Fragmentation.
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democralic. parliamentaI) monarch)' headed by !he Serbian Karadordevic
dynaSl) in wltich IwO alphabels (Cyrillic and Latin), three names (Serb, Croat
and Slo...ene) and three major religions (Roman Catholicism, Easlern Orthodoxy
and Muslim) would be equal. On I December 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs.
CroalS and S)(weoes, under lhe regenl Prince AJeksander, look its place among
!he states of the world.
1be flew counlJ) \\as basically a bastion of Serbian interests with
Croalia and Slo...erua playing subservient roles in the state. An attempt was
made to impose a parliamentaI)' democracy of the type that gained popularity in
nineteenth century Europe. Such laudable aims were thwaned when the leader
of the Croat Peasant Party, the charismatic Stjepan Radic was shot by a
Momenegrin radical on 20 June 1928. Seven weeks later Ramc died and with
that the hope of a fcdeml Slate, respectful of the righlS of all its nationalities,
also evaporated. It gave Prince Aleksander the excuse he needed to enact a coup
d'elal which he did on the Orthodo,'{ Christmas Day, 6 January 1929. He
suspended the constitution and granted himself control of all political and
legislative functions within tbe state,
His kingdom was now re-named Yugoslavia (the land of South Slavs),
Alck:sander's inglorious reign was cut short by a Macedonian assassin, possibly
aided by Hungary and Italy, on 9 October 1934 while he was on a state visit to
France. His heir, Peter, was loo young to succeed to the throne so his cousin
Paul was erowned king on condition that Peter would succeed him when he
came of age in 1941. However, by that year Paul's pro-German stance
precipitated a m·olt against his rule, the result of whieh saw Peter installed as
sovereign on 27 March. The new government signed a friendship treat)' with the
So\'iet Union on 6 April and in doing so pl"O\'oked the ire of Nazi Germany,
which. on the very same day invaded Yugoslavia 11le invasion was met with
Slem resistance in both Serbia and Slovenia Croatians. hov.'CVeI", were not on
the whole displeased to collaborate with the Nazis. Marching on Zagreb, instead
of fighting fiercely to take the Croatian capital. the Germans were able to take
fLfteen thousand prisoners, including twenty-two generals?· In all, 0\'Cf three
hundred thousand officers and men of the Yugoslav army capitulated and
surrendered to the Germans in April 1941. Since 1918 Croatia, had resented
what many perceived as the casting off of Hungary as a masler only to replace it
with Serbia.25
:z.4 Crampton, Hasten! Euro~, p. 143.
:l' Clissold. Early times.
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Hitler was delennined to destroy Yugosla,ia and 10 share c·:t Its
fragmented pans "ith his collaborators. An independent stale of Croatia
(tI'e:m'isna Drzava Htvatska. or NDH) was to be created, Initially, an Italian
protectorate. the NDH was in reality run as a German ficfdom. Ha\'ing been
granled asylum in Mussolini's flail", the leader of Croatia's notorious L"slase,
Ante P<nelic, entered Zagrcb on 15 April 1941. Onc of Pavclic's objecti"cs \\'""35
to 'purify' Croatia of 'alien elemenlS'. particularly Scrbs.:6 Wh) Pavelic is not
as m:i1cd as his fasciSl contemporaries in other states is an historical anomal}'.
(,'stase myth maintained that CroalS were by origin Goths and therefore
genetically superior to the Sla,ic Scrns who were derogatorily classified as
'Orientals' who should be destroyed. or the Sctbs they said that 'onc third
would be converted to Roman Catholieism. one third ~lIed and onc third
extenninaled', The Ustase were almost as good as thcir word. The most
notorious of tlleir many concentration camps was at Jascnovac, the 'Serbian
Auschwitz: which operated from 1942-45. Some estimates put the final death
1011 at seven hundred thousand though such estimates arc now impossible to
verify. Not as technologically advanced as Nazi Gentlany. Croatian Uslase
eschewed "Lvklon-B and scaled ehambers in favour of clubbing to death the
inmates. boiling them in cauldrons and sawing off Lhcir heads.27
NOI all Yugoslavians were as collaborativc as Pavelic. however.
ResiSlance to the Nazis came from the Serbian Colonel Mihailovic. Refusing to
surrender to the Germans, MihailO\'ic led an armed uprising in May 1941
against the occupying Nazis. Mihailovic's troopS were called Chetniks and
considered themselves as the representatives of the exiled 8O"emment that
based itself in London. [n June 1941 following the Gcnnan invasion of the
Soviet Union Yugoslavia's Communist Party issued a call for an uprising
against the occupiers. The CommuniSl forces called 'Partisans' were led by
Josip Broz Tito. a man whose name became synonymous initially "ith a policy
of non-alignment during the Cold War and later with keeping the Yugoslav
federation intact. Tito and Mihailovie met in Septcmber 1941 but could not
concur on their strategic aims. By late NO\"embcr, the Chetniks had given up
resistance to Nazi rule. The Chctniks and Partisans \\"ere soon embroiled in a
fratricidal civil war. The Partisans wished to create a new Yugoslav federation
after the war: the Chelniks, the vast ma~ty of whom were Serbs. hoped to
maintain the nionarchy under Prince Peter; After the war the Chetniks were
massaered en masse by partisans, Mihailovie \\'as tried and executed. 1be
~ Singleton, Yugoslav ~oples,
77 Davies, Europe, p. 707
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Chetniks had themselves carried oul acts of depravity against Muslims during
the war. Archbishop Slepinac who had welcomed the creation of the NDH was
tried and sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment for collaooration with the
Ustase. The Vatican excommunicated all those connected in any way 'with the
trial. At least Iwo hundred clergy were killed for suspected leniency towards
Pavelic's regime.:lII In all, Yugoslavia lost a staggering twenty-two per cent of
its pre-war population - over one-and-a-half million pcople.29
Thc 1946 constitution was based on the 1936 constilution in Stalin's
Soviel Union. It guaranteed equality for all before the law. Significantly. Tito,
half Croal half Slovenc. became head of slate after elections in November 1945.
A federation of six 'equal republics' - Serbia.. Croatia Bosnia-HerzegO\ina.
Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro "ith an autonomous province Vojvodina
and an autonomous region. Kosovo-Metohija was established. Kosovo had
become part of Alabania in 1941 afier the German invasion, However, to the
disappoinunent of the ethnic Albanian majority. it reverted 10 Yugoslav rule
after an agreement between Tito and the Albanian leader Hoxha. The new
federalion was soon in dispute with Moscow for what the latter regarded. as
'idcological deviation' and 'sliding back into capitalism,.30 The splil between
the two communist Slales came on 28 June 1948 when Yugoslavia was expelled
from the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) which was an
international association of communist parties. The Yugoslav secret police,
02..\-£4, founded by Aleksander Rankovic in 1943 and based.. like the
oonstitution, on its Soviet counterpan. rounded up hundreds of thousands of
suspected pro-Stalinists and dispatched them for 're~ucation' to various
labour camps. Expulsion from the Cominform meanl that thc Yugoslav
economy suffered a haemorrhage of lost Soviet credit. technical expertise and a
lucrative export market in the USSR.
Tito's government embarked on a policy of long~verdue land refonn,
a collectivisation drive, rapid urbanisation and a series of ambitious five year
plans, which soughl to replicate the success (if not the methods) of Stalin's
schemes in the USSR After some initial success. the economic blockade
imposed by the Soviet Union and its allies destroyed the best intentions of the
first five )'ear plan. A second attempt at long-tenn economic planning begun in
1957 met with much greater success attaining its targets within a four-year
Z3 Holfman and Neal, New Communi.fm. p. 95.
19 Denis Rusinow, The Yugoslav experiment, J948-74 (London, 1977), p. 18.
JO Pavkovic, FrogmentatiOtl, p. 53.
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period.31 Yugosla\;a could not have suf\iyed ~;~t. Western, ~)'
American. aid. An initial grant from the Truman admirustrauon of $20 milhon
was tile precursor to vast loans and grants that by 1960 had total,led over $2
billion.3~ A policy of non·alignment in foreign affairs was p~ued \~gorously by
the regime and earned it much credibility abroad. RelalJons \\'1th .Moscow
improved once Khruschev asswned leadership of the Soviet Commun.lst Party
aOer the death of Stalin in 1953. The 1958 Yugoslav Commurust Party
Congress adopted thc policy ofJugoslol'enstvo, tile concept ~fa singl~ Yugoslav
nation. This alienated in particular the republic of Sloverua tbat hJ~eno had
been one of the more vociferous supponers of a federated YugoslaVIan state.
JiJgoslovenst\!o envisaged the merging of all the different cultures within the
federation into a singular homogenous Yugoslavian culture.
Jligoslo\'f!nsrvo was abandoned by the mid-l960s in favour of.a more
realistic approach to the federation's ethnic diversily. In some~~mcularly
lhat of Macedonia. a new republic was fonned even though It had httle or no
historical foundation. In Ihe latter case a Harvard SlavicisL Horace Landt w~
drafted in 10 create a grammar for tllC Macedonian language!33 It was Bosm<l
howevcr that created thc greatest headache for the Yugoslav state. Tito h~d
promised before the war's end thal the feder:ated republi~ of Bosnia-
Herzegovina would be "neither Serbian nor Croauan nor Mushm but rather
Serbian and Croatian and Muslim', In 1964 Tito created another 'nation' - t.he
Bosnian Muslims. Within little lnore than quarter of a century Bosnia-
HerLCgO\ina would become an independent state during a war in which a
person's cultural provenance often dctenni~ his or her fate. .
The new constitution of Yugosla\'la promulgated 10 1974 was an
attempt 10 decentralise power within the state in an imaginative step ~o maintain
the federation. By tile lime of Tito's death in May 1980, however. It was de.ar
that there existed no unifying presence within Yugoslavia to help secure Its
future as a sovereign gco-political entity. In the 1974 constitution Tito had made
provision for the notion of a ·oollcct.ive' or 'rotating' presidcncy,. whereby a
member from each of the si.x republics and two autonomous provmccs would
hold the state's highest office for a year at a time. By the mid-1980s. ho\\'C\'er,
the Yugosla\' gO\ocrnment was dominated b)' Serbs. In 1987 the death kneU of
the federated stale was sounded when the ,Belgrade governmenl launched a
brutal crackdo;'O 011 ethnic Albanians in KOM)\,o. Two years later Koso\'o was
31 Singleton, Yugoslav !Mop/e.t, pp. 216-35.
)2 Chrislopher Cvile, Remaking the &Ikatu (London, 1991), p. 56.
JJ Dusko Doder. in Foreign Policy 91, p. 11.
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stripped of its 'autonomous' status and by the time Slobodan MiJosevic gave his
fateful speech at the Field of Blackbirds on the feast day of the Kosovo martyrs,
28 JWlC 1989, the delusion of 'Yugoslav unity' had evaporated. Slovenia, which
had begun the push for independence in January 1990, ceded from the
federation in May 1991. When Croatia followed in June 1991 the Serbian
response plunged the Balkans once more into the abyss.
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The road to Kosovo
The Balkan wars 1991-8
Edward Horgan
Nothing is simple in lhc: Balbns. History pervades everything and the
complexities confound el-en the most careful study.I
Any undcT5tanding of the CUlTCnl events in the Balkan region must lake into
consideration the complex matrix of circumstances that influenced these
a'Cnts. This matrix must include history, m}thology, religion, the balance of
power. colonialism, ethnographic migrations. culture, ethnicity and race. A
good understanding of the geography of the region is also essential, especially
its location at one of the migralOry cross roads of the world. combined ",ith
the geographic relief of the Balkans itsel( This paper ",ill deal \\ith the period
from April 1991 10 December 1998. In this short period five separate but
interconnected wars have been waged. These included wars of independence
waged between Slm"cnia and Yugoslavia. Croatia and Yugoslavia and the
Krajina Serbs and Croatia.
The Bosnian war almost defies oonnal description. It includes
anempted genocide against the Muslim oommunity, three way civil war with
Scrbs. emus and Muslims fighting each other in Central Bosnia. Muslims
against Muslims in Bihac. the war of secession by Serbs and Croals from
Bosnia. the war of secession by Muslims from Yugoslavia and the war of
'aggression'. 'conquest' or 'liberation' by Serbia. In Kosovo. the ongoing
crisis could be described as a War of Independence or merely a war to attain
just representation by the Albanians within Kosovo. Serbia would view the
conniet as a countcr terrorist war by the internationally recognised
governmcnt oflhc Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The vaJidity of what one calls these wars depends on one's national
or intcrnational vicwpoint and this fact in itself cmphasises the complexity of
the situations that have devcloped and the difficulty in achicving resolutions.
Even the name Kosovo is no longer agreed. The Serbs refer to it as Kosovo-
Metohija while the Albanians eaU it Kosova.
A knowledge of the demography offonner Yugoslavia is essential in
any study of the region's recent wats. The population blend of former
I Dovid OW("'JJ., Balkan odyssey (London, 1995), p. I.
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Yugoslavia is like a smaller reflection of the eastern European ethnic mix.
Russia. Poland. Ukraine. Bcllarus. Czech Rcpublie. Slovakia. Bulgaria and
ex·Yugoslavia are predominantly of Slav origin wiLh a mix of other minorities
whilc the Baltic States. Hungary. Romania and Albania have non Slav
majorities. Likewise, fonner Yugoslavia. Slovenia. Croatia. Serbia. 805nia.
Montcncgro and Macedonia. havc populalions of which the majority are of
Slav origin with a mix of other minorities. The exceptions are Kosovo with its
large Albanian majority and Yojvodina which has a largc Hungarian ethnic
minority. With the exception of Slovcnia and Kosovo. most of the inhabitants
of fonner Yugoslavia speak vcry similar vcrsions of the Serbo-Croat language.
ReLigion is onc of thc major differentiating factors though not ncccssariI)' the
TOOl. cause of its wars.
Croatia in 1991 had almost fivc million people. the majority of whom
were Croat Roman Catholic. bul it had a large Serb Orthodox minority of over
six-hundred thousand and other significant minorities including Muslims and
Hungarian Roman Catholics. The majority of these Scrbs have since been
expelled into Serbia or to the Serb controlled areas of 8o5nia and attemptS
have been made to resettle up to thiny thousand of them in Kosovo.
Serbia had O\'cr fOM) per cent of the total population of fonner
Yugosla\'ia with ten million people. In the autonomous province of Vojvodina
\\;th ils a large Hungarian minority. Serbs are less than filly per cent of the
population. Kosovo is made up of ninety per cent Albanian and eight per cent
Serb with 'others' making up two per cent. Serbia as a wbole has significant
other minorities including Croats and Muslims. The Sanzak province in
Serbia. located bet\\een Kosovo. Montencgro and 805nia has a large Muslim
population. One of the reasons for the fierce fighting which occurred in thc
Muslim 'safc areas' of Srebrenica. Zepa and Gorazda in east Bosnia was to
prevent the emergence of a crescent of Muslim held territory. This, in theory.
could link Bosnia through the Sanzak and Kosovo to Albania, thcreby
encircling Montenegro and cutting off Serbia completely from the Adriatic
Se<l. This is also a factor in the mutual intcrdependcnce between Montenegro
and Serbia. The MonLcncgrins hold the high ground between Serbia and the
sea with Serbia acting as the guar,.mtor for the Orthodox Montenegrins who
fear bei,!~solated and being surround~ by Muslims. While it is unlikely that
the Muslims in any of tllCse areas have had recent ambitions of this nature, a
study of the geography and dcmography in tllC regions reveals how the fears of
the Scrbs could be raised concerning fulure developments.
The main strategic oonct.'1ll associated with the wars in fonncr Yugoslavia
is the fuse line which nms from &irajcvo, to the Sanzak Muslims to the
,
97
Albanians in Kosovo (both ",ithm Serbia) to the Alb8nians in Macedonia,
to Albania itself, and lhen to Greece and Turkey.2
Howe\tt the possibility of Greece and Turkey becoming involved in a Balkans
clash. in addition to their e:iliting Cyprus and Aegean Sea islands' conflicts,
has been a complicating factor in the European Union (Ell) and the North
Athlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) lm'olvement in mediating the Balkan
crisis.
Montenegro, "hich has now combined with Serbia to form the
Federation of Yugoslavia, has a population of six-hundred thousand people,
mainly Serb Orthodox but with minorities of Slav and Albanian Muslim.s,
Croats and others. Macedonia has a population of over two million people,
mainly Orthodox, but with two-hundred and fifty thousand Albanian Muslims
and at least twelve other calegories including Serbs, Greeks and Turks. Due to
Greek objections voiced at EU and UN levels Macedonia is now officially
called 'The Former YugosJav Republic of Macedonia'. Albania itself cannot
be excluded from the 'Yugoslavia' matrix, because of its tics with Kosovo. It
has a population of almost lhrce-and-a-haIf million people who are mainly
Muslim but with a signifiC.1Dt Albanian Catholic minority, especially in the
north of the country and a Greek minority of over ftfty thousand in the south.)
The fall of communism aU over eastern Europe in 1989. cast the
sparks of conflict onto this namable ethnic mixture, The blaze which resulted
could have been extinguished in Lhc earl) stages of conflagration by judicious
but courageous fire fighting. Events came to a head when in May 1991
Slobodan Milosevic refused to aa:epl the Cro.lt, Stipe Mesic, as an automatic
rot.ating president of Yugoslavia. This was the spark that forced the hands of
Croatia and SIO\''Cnia and on 25 June 1991 the Croatian and Slovenian
parliaments simultaneously declared independence.
The Slovenian War of Independence lasted less than two weeks.
Slo\'cnian customs officials look control of the international border crossing
POlOts backed up by SIO\-enian resen--e forces. Slobodan Milosevic seDt in the
mainly SeJbian Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) 10 regain control of
Yugosla\'ia's international borders. 'The old communist Yugosla\' defence
system helped the brcak.~up of the Federation. Two military sLntctures existed..
the Serb dominated JNA at federal level and at local level the Tcrritorial
Defence Forces (fO), This system helped to reduce the risk of Soviet military
1 Ibid., p. 11.
J Population fIgures tm..:n rrom various sourccs including, Philip '$ ot10$ of the world
(London, 1997) and Noel Maloolm, KO.fovo: 0 short hiJtory (London, 1998).
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interference as had happened in Hungmy and Czechoslovakia. In 1991 in
Slovenia. Croatia. and Bosnia. the TO splil into its own ethnic or national
groups and provided the basis for the armies of the new independent republics.
JNA moved troops and tanks into Slm'enia and attempted to
m:erthrow the gm'emmcnL The plan was 10 retake the border posts from the
TO and secure the seaports and Ljubjana airport.. Slovenian reservisls
blockaded JNA garrisons and forced the withdrawal of the JNA after onl)" ten
days. 'Slovenia mounled a \\ell·planned~. and ~'as soon ~ppcd
from Milosevic's and the anny's Slrategic plans', A war m Slovema could
have bogged do\\n the JNA in a war of attrition that would be difficult to
support logistica1l)' through a hostile Croatia, Slovenia also had cas)' access to
supplies of arms and other essentials from countries, including Austria and
Gcnnany. The prime minister of Slovenia. Milan Kucan. one of the most
successful politicians and leaders from fonner Yugoslavia. manipulated his
much more powerful ncighbours. Croatia and Serbia. playing onc off against
the other. He read thc political and militaI), situations accurately and took
decisive action at thc righl Limes. The Croatian leader. Franjo Tudjman was
much less decisive, cspecially in thc first )"ear of the wars. but hc soon learned
and later led Croatia as the major winner in thc whole series of wars.
Milosevic was. on the onc hand. a cunning and scheming operator but at other
times he displ3)'ed incompetcnce and poor leadership. Hc was drivcn by
sectional Serb intcrests or by self-interest and had little faith in the concept of
a 'Greater Yugoslavia'.
European Union diplomacy and conflicting \'ested intcrests among
EU states such as Britain. France. GenD3Il)' and Greece played an essential
rolc in the failure to prevent or stop the wars. Hans Kung. the German
theologian. highlights the role of unethical Balkan leaders and European
Union leaders in the rapid move from potential crisis to disastrous inter-ethnic
warfare:
Lt is scandalous that Croatia, openly protected abo"e all by German
diplomacy, was ac:cepted into the CounciJ of Europe in 1995 al~
President Tudjrnan, rejected by the majority of his people ... did DOl
either co-open1te in the arrest of war criminals or allow the elected
opposition leader to take up his post .~ the mayor of Zagreb: or ~
Serbian retil:gees to rctunl. And it is equally scandalous that MlloscVlC,
the war criminal and chief author of the\ Yugoslavian war, discreetly
• Maloolm, Bomia.
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protecled by English and French diplomacy, could have bcld on to J'01N'7
for so long.'
Croatian journalist. Vesna Knczevic, writing in The Irish Times. described
Tudjrnan and MiI<>Se\ic as the two remaining European dictators. 'The
Tudjrnans now have estates all over the countzy, along with trade companies,
banks, and sports and leisure complexes' and of Milosevic. 'If his opponents
wer:e e\'~r tempted to finish him olf. he could always play, as he often did, the
nattonahst Kosovo trump card. Too often the Serbs took the bait.·6
The success of Slovenia led to an inevitable chain reaction in the
disintegrati~nprocess. There was no leader in Yugoslavia capable of lcading
the FedcralJOn. partly because of the self-interest and corruption that had
C~~risedmU~h of Tito's latcr period in power. After the loss of Slovenia,
Mil~c and !Us supporters in Serbia slopped pretending to represent a
gen":lDC federalist Yugoslavia and began to more openly espouse a Greater
Serbia. It was all the more surprising then that the Western European powers,
under the convenient CO"t'er of the EU. continued for several years to insist on
a rcsoluti?n that avoi~ a break-up of Yugoslavia Why did the European
powers fail to act? Da\'1d Owen's explanation sounds hollow:
Could NATO have stopped lhe Serb.Croat war when il broke out in 1991?
The 8IlS\\cr must be yes, but al a risk of miliwy lives that no democratic
leaders were p"..pared to ask of their people.-
Yet.they werep~ to risk and lose soldier's lives in the hopeless United
NattoRS PrOlcctJon Force (UNPROFOR) mission between 1992 and 1995.
Over one hundred and fifty United Nations' personell were lost in Bosnia and
Croatia during lhis period.
Hans Kung asserted: 'A timely and well-amsidered threat of
~nomic sanctions and military force (no ground troops but massive NATO
air attacks), could have S(opped the aggression at that time 119911'.' The
NATO air attacks of 1995 that eventually stopped the war were neither
massive nor prolonged..
The military situation at the beginning ofthc wars in 1991 was that
the massive JNA was already in place in garrisons in all the republics. but
each republic also bad anncd, mostly loyal, militias. This mh: almost
guaranteed civil war unless very quick and strong pre-emptive military action
: flan
Th
S Kung, A global ethicfor global politic.J and ec01lomic.J (Munich, 1997), p. 124.
e Irish Time.J, 23 November 1998, .
Owen, Balkan ody.uev.. .
Kung,A global ethiC, p. 122.
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could be taken by Yugoslavia 10 enforce the Federation. Such decisive action
failed to materialise. Milosevic dithered and Yugoslavia died when Slovenia
successfully seceded in July 1991. The altcrnative was for the UN, or NATO
acting on its behalf, to deploy a strong 'peace enforcing' force to facilitate a
relatively peaceful series of separations of the republics from Federal
Yugoslavia. This option also failed 10 materialise. EU leaders and diplomats
argued strongly against military interyention by NATO at this point In
betwcen these options was an abyss of chaos, into which Bosnia and
Hcn-..cgovina almost inevitably feU.
In Croatia, since the middle of 1990, Sel'b extremist militias had been
actively provoking clashcs in the Krajina area of Croatia, and then calling on
the lNA to impose 'peace'. Their leaders included Zelijko Raznjatovic, known
as Arkan, who set up the Arkan Tigers, Vojislav SeseIj and his Cetnic Army,
and lNA army commander Colonel Ratko Mladic, later to become notorious
in Bosnia where he emerged as a general and is now an indicted war criminal.
Croal nationalists also stoked resentment among Serbs by large-scale
discrimination in employment and other areas.
The self-proc1aimed ''Serbian Au1lmOmOUS Region of Krajina" held its
o~n serood referendum on May 12: ninety-nine per cent of the
perticipants \'Oled to leave Croatia and join Serbia. One week later,
ninety-four per cent of the \'Oters in Croalia opted for independence', mosI
Scrbs boycotted the Croalian vote.9
These incompatible decisions led to all out war in Croatia between the Croats
and Croatian Serbs who were supported by Serbia. The Serb dominated JNA,
using its massive predominance in tanks and artillery, quickly annexed almost
thirty per cent of Croatia including all the Krajina and most of east and wcst
Slavonia and laid sicge 10 the key strategic towns of Dubrovnik OD the
Adriatic and Vukovar on the Danube. They needed the area around Dubrovnik
to expand Serb accc:ss 10 the Adriatic and to help make a Serb canton in
Hel7-CSO\'ioa viable. Inlernationally this proved a major mistake. because the
world media and especially that of central Europe focused on the destruction
of the historic and popular holiday centre of DubI"O\'llik and C'\'cntually forced
the Scrbs to halt their attacks on it. 1be contrast, between the Western
treatmcnt of Dubrovnik and Vukovar. highlights both the power of the media
in drawing international attention to an iSSUf and its detremental effect.
9 Robcrt J. Doma and John V.A. Fine, Bo.snia and Herzegovina: A tradition betrayed
(London, 1994).
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The international outcr) over Dubrovnik was justified because of the
loss of life and because of it historical significance but the reality is that the
physical damage to Dubrovnik was., on a Yugoslavian scale of destruction,
relatively small. The tit) has been vel)' sua:essfully restored since. Vukovar,
by conuast. was relatIvely unknown and of significance only to the Serbs and
Croats woo had pmiouslyli"ed in this town in peace and hannony. Vukovar
received relative~ little attentIOn from the world media while it and its
citizens were clestro}ed.
When the JNA retreated from Slovenia it concentrated its efforts on
Croatia and. combined "'lIh the Serb Militias. it engaged in full-scale war
attacking to\\ns in Slavonia On 19 August 1991. the JNA laid siege to
Vukovar and aUacked DubrO\l1ik in September of that year. VukO\'aI was
cvcntualJy captured on J7 Novcmber 1991 with heavy casualties. The
surrender was followed by the killing of unanned prisoners and civilians
including hospital patients by Serbian troops and irregulars. Manin BelL the
BBC coresponrlcnl, highlighted thc plight of Vukovar:
E\'en to this day there IS no destruction more oornpletc than that which the
Serbs visited on the Crootian town of Vukovar, which th,,'Y turned into a
Stalingrad on the Danube. A Serbian ColOlleltold me at the time, not just
as a matter of record but of pride, that they hit it with two million
shells. IO
At this stage almost onc third of Croatia was under Serb control. Croatia had
iRltially avoided anrung liS militias in order not to provoke Serbia and as a
result had to rely on hghtl} -aoned Croatian police units as its first line of
defence. Bosnia was later to repeat this same mistake. This lack of
preparedness forced Croalia to concede territol) and to agtee to an
unfavourable cease-fire on 2 Janual) 1992.
The UN. the EU and the USA took no deCl.si...e action until the
fighting had effectivcl}' fimshed.. Thcy deployed UNPROFOR in Croatia on 13
March 1992. Four separate protected areas called United Nations Protected
Areas (UNPAs). were Cl'C3ted in east Slavonia (Vukovar). west Slavonia
(Pakrac), north Kraji.na (Glina) and south Krajina (Kmn). Large parts of these
areas. especially in south Krajina and east Slavonia. were now ethnically
cleansed of Croots. so the UN demilitarised ,wnes were protecting thc Scrbs
within Croatia. This freed up large numbers of JNA troops and equipmcnt,
who crossed into Bosnia with UN approval and assistance, thereby reinfoocing
the Bosnian Serbs with large quantities of heavy weapons and manpower. The
10 Colonel Mark Cooke, Promije oil/ope (London, 1994), p. xi.
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Serb militias in the UNPAs of Croatia continued to remain in Croatia in
breach of the UN agreement 11 was a UN logic that "''as taken to an even more
unjust and iUagical stage when.. on the basis of the Serb reinforcement ~f the
Bosnian Serbs., the UN imposed an arms embargo on all combatants m the
region. Since the Serbs ~ere already O\'er-anned and the Croats got adequate
supplies from Europe, the unprotected Bosnian Muslims were penalised by the
arms embargo. Croatia benefited from an uneasy peace for three years from
1992 to 1995 and used this period to rearm its forces with considerable foreign
assistance. in spite of the UN embargo.
The EU recognised the independence of Slovenia and Croatia iD
December 1991 after Gennany forced the issue by announcing that it was
about to do so unilaterally. This hasty recognition was to have devastating
consequences for Bosnia as it further polarised its three main communities.
Hans Kung argues that 'the second fatal mistake was, conversely, iJl the face
of massive Serbian aggression immediately to give diplomatic recognition to
Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states.'1l He blames the Vatican authorities
and Germany for this move and goes on to accuse Britain and France of equal,
unot more serious duplicity,
10 order to restore the blI1ance of po....'e:T in the Balkans in the face of the
unfortwlate massive German and Vatican support for Croatia and
Slovenia, England and France ... played the card of therr ally since
Bismarck's time, Serbia. Officially 'neutral', they sent UN troops as
'observers' to Bosnia and precLSely in so doing constantly prevented any
... .-....:__ . 12
serious military mten'efltion agamsl..-x::J u..... aggressIOn.
March 1992 saw the negotiated and peaceful withdrawal of the JNA
from Macedonia. Mjlosevjc was again cutting his losses and creating a buffer
zone to avoid the complications of Greek and Bulgarian interests in
Macedonia. This 'was important also because Greece and Bulgaria wcre
essential sources of suppli.es to the beleaguered Serbia. A separate UN peace-
keeping force, which included US troops, was deployed in Macedonia in 1993
as a tri~wire force in case of Serb attempts to prevent independence for
Macedonia.
The EU recognition of Croatia and Slovenia now forced a reluctant
and totally unprepared Bosnia to also move towards independence. 11le results
of the Bosnian'"referendum were announceQ on 2 March 1992 and showed
overwhelming support for an independcnt multi-elhnic Bosnia·Herzcgovina.
11 Ibid., p. 122.
11 Kwtg,A global ethic, p. 123.
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Despite a Serb boycott of the referendum many Serbs had voted in favour.
Bosnia was recognised as an independent state by the Ell on 6 April 1992.
Violence was already widespread in Bosnia in the months leading up to
recognition. HO\\1:\'er, the war started in earnest with the arrival of Arkan's
Serb paramilitaJ)' group in the town of Bijeljina, in north-eastem Bosni.a.
Ethnic cleansing, as recently practised in Vukovar, had arrived in Bosnia. Up
to one hundred Muslims were killed with the deliberate intention of
tcnorising the region and forcing Muslims to evacuatc this strategically
important corridor joining the IwO main Bosnian Serb areas and providing
access to Serbia. On 16 May the UN decided DOl to send a peace-keeping force
to Bosnia and withdrew most of the UN force already in Saraje\ro.13
Bosman govcrnment forces wcre hopelessly ouulUmbcred. There
were almost onc-hundred thousand Serbian regular JNA soldiers serving in
Bosnia by March 1992. This was in addition to the Bosnian Sem irregular or
reserve soldiers and the special paramilitary groups from Serbia provided by
Arkan and Sesclj. TIle Bosnian government had as few as four thousand
aoned troops at this time. From a military point of view, Bosnia and
HcrL.Cgovina, were irresponsibly unprepared for a war which had been
inevitable for over a year. Without the help of tllC Bosnian Croats and the
Croatian government each of which provided about flfieen thousand fighting
troops and the tanks and artillery provided by the Croatian army. Bosnia and
Herzegovina would have been completcly overrun in a few weeks. 8)' the
middle of the Summer in 1992. over two thirds of Bosnia and Herzegovia was
under Serb controL UNPROFOR was e\'Cotually re-deployed back into Bosnia
and by the end of 1992 there were eight thousand UNPROFOR troops in
Bosnia. However. their nussion was limited 10 facilitating humanitarian aid.
and t\'en this they failed to do effectively. By August 1992, journalists were
reporting the existence of prison camps and severe maltreatment of prisoners
in Serb controlled areas of Bosnia. In June the Bosnian authorities cited a list
of ninet)'-four known Serb concentration camps, They estimated thal over nine
thousand bad died within them. \.. Air strikes were threatened by the Western
powers but ne\,'er malerialised. Many of these camps. where men. women and
children were tortured. raped and mnrdered. continued in existcnce until
1995. Comparisons with thc Holocaust are justified.. t\'en if the scale of the
atrocities \\'35 considerably less.
J] Ibid., p. 242.
I. Maleolm, Bosnia. p. 245.
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The Siege of Saraje\'o began in April 1992 and continued until
Scpc.ember 1995. It demonstrated. on the one hand.. the lack of resolve of the
much stronger Serb forces aDd, on the other. the resilicnce and detennination
of the people of Saraje\'o. UN monitors were allowed 'monitor' the gun
positions during firing but ~'Cre not allowed take any action to pm'ent them
doing so.
In July 1992 NATO and the Western European Union (WEU)
imposed a nawl embargo in the Adriatic. This was effectivc only against the
encircled Muslim community of Bosnia who bad no significant allies at this
point. Croatia had already established its supply routes from central Europe,
while Serbia bad enough military supplies to last for decades and \\'35
supponed by Russia and Greece, both of whom were breaking the economic
embargoos. Despite the presence of EU officials and EU military monitors
(ECMM) the EU could find no evidence of Greece breaking tile EU and UN
embargos,
In October 1992, the Muslim situation worsened with thc 80snian
Croat take-over ofMostar. The new Croalleader. Boban, began establishing a
separate state of Hcrccg Bosna, in the western parts of HerL.Cgovina and in
central and western 805ma. The Bosnian govcrnment forces were now
fighting against the Croats and Serbs simultaneously, Though on a smaller
scale atrocities committed in central 805nia by the Croats were comparable to
those commined by the Scrt>s.
to January 1993. William Jefferson Clinton took over from George
Bush as US president. In spite of election promises there was no real shift in
US policy on Bosnia for O\'Cr two yeani. Douglas Hurd. a fonner British
foreign secretary, claims that 'the UN intervention in Bosnia saved hundreds
of Iives.'H It can be argued that the opposite is true. that the UN inleriention
in Bosnia cost thousands of lives and that the three )'ear delay in obtaining
effcetj,..e NATO intervention COSI tens of tbousands of lives.
Atrocities continued 10 be inflicted on the Bosnian population.
mainly, but not exclusively. b) Serb forces. On 5 February 1994, a mortar
attack on Sarajevo killed sixty-four civilians. NATO at last took some action
and declared an exclusion zone for heavy weapons around Sarajevo which the
$ert)s partiallr..oomplied with, Around this ti,me in spite ofthcir overwhelming
strength in manpower and annaments the \\~r began to go against the Sems.
The first hopeful sign for the Bosnian government was the suspension of the
15 Douglas Hum, The .,eorcll for peace (London. 1997), p. 135
,
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Croat-Muslim war in central 8osnia. This led to increasing co-opcrdtion
between the Muslim and Croat forces in Bosnia. Meanwhile thc Scrbs
continued to pursuc their military objectives by attacking the S(H;3lled UN
safe areas including Gorazda, Zepa and Bihac, in spite of non-cnforccd threats
of NATO air strikes. Combined Croat and Bosnian government forces scored
somc success in central Bosnia with the capture of Kupres on 4 NO\'cmbcr
1994. In April 1995. Bosnian forces made gains by capturing Tra\'llik and
Mount V1asic.
On 1 May 1995. after a three year pause. the war in Croatia resumed.
During ~t pause. the Croatian army had been substantially improved with
new cqwpment and training. The Croatian army attacked the UN protected
area of western Slavonia and captured it within six days. Most of the Serb
population living there fled into the Serb areas of northern Bosnia. Serbia and
the JNA failed to inten'ene. leaving the Croatian Serbs to their own devices.
On 2~ May 1995, following further shelling of Sarap'o, NATO was
authonsed to carry out air strikes against the Serbs. Serb ammunition dwnps
were destroyed. The Serbs retaliated b)' killing SC\'Cnty-one civilians in the
centre o~Tuzlawith a rocket and b)' taking more than three-hundred and sixty
UN soldiers hostage. This action succeeded in the shon tenn and NATO air
strikes were halted. All UN hostages were released by early June. The Serbs
now DlO\'Cd and quickly captured the UN safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepe
and attacked Gorazda and Bibac.
The fall of Srcbrenica on 11 July 1995 was the blackest moment in
the histol)' of~ UN's involvement in Bosnia, if not in the complete history
of the UN. Aenal photographs later released by the United States indicated
that mass graves bad been dug near Srebrenica and possibly contained as
many as four thousand people. 16
In late July, the tide turned against the Serbs. A combined Croat and
Bosnian assault captured Livno and moved toward Bihac cutling ofT Serb
fo~ in the Krajina Knin area of Croatia. The Croatian anny attacked the
KraJla~ a,rea on 4 August 1995. The town of KIDn was captured on 5 August
and WIthin scventy~two hours the Croatian forces were in almost complete
control o~ the en~~ territory.17 Croatia subsequently negotiated the peaceful
return of Its remaining territory from Serb control, finally gaining possession
of east Slavonia and Vukovar in December 1997. From an almost disastrous
16 Maloolm, /lost/ia, p. 264.
11 Ibid., p. 265.
beginning in 1991, Croatia bad emerged as the major winner of the war. Not
only had it regained all its territory but it had suc:cccdcd in expelling most of
its Serbian minority,
Following a further Serb monar attack on Sarajcvo on 28 August
which killed thirty-seven people, NATO commenced two weeks of intensive
bombing of Serb positions. In the meantime, the Croat and Bosnian
gO\'cmment forces in central Bosnia were making substantial gains and
capturod Donji Vakuf and Jajce. lntensive negotiations which led to Cease-
fires and the Da}10n Peace agreement followed. The agreement stabilised the
Bosnian situation, at least on a temporary basis. However, it contained many
WlSlable factors. It ostensibly attempted to unite Bosnia but in reality it
enforced the division of Bosnia into two small and unsustainable statelets. The
Bosnian Serbs. the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims all considered
themselves the losers in these wars. 'By persisting in their misunderstanding
ofBosnia's past, the western statesmen. both European and American. were
helping to ensure that Bosnia would have a much more troubled and uncertain
future. ,18
In the meantime KOSO\'o bad again become the focus of attention.
Milosevic, having lost Slm'enia and Macedonia, having failed miserably in his
bid to annex one third of Croatia, having, at best. been held to a draw in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, now played the Kosovo card, for the second time.
However, be .seemed to have failed to comprehend the broader strategic
factors.. His short-tenn tactics have often succeeded while his long-term
strategy, if he has such, has failed so far. The Kosovo war situation is still
more in the realm of current affairs than history. 1 will therefore avoid
e.x:unining this equally complc.x struggle and leave it for future historians to
consider. Likewise it is much too soon to attempt a comprehensive summing
up of the Yugoslav wars.
I' Ibid., p. 271.
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